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| multilateral trade negotiations 
(Doha Round). 
I The partnership has always focused 
on development assistance which 
'\ targets the twin objectives of 
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development. 
Giving voice to men and women 
from ninety-three EU and ACP 
countries across the globe facing 
the future in a spirit of partnership: 
that is our mission. 
_52 Botswana „Country report 
54 
56 
58 
61 
62 
64 
66 
69 
Africa's best kept secret: Botswana as "a shining liberal 
democracy" 
Interview with President Festus Mogae "We may be a middle-
income country, but we are still a small country, with major 
disadvantages" 
Striving for sustained economic diversification: manufacturing 
or financial services? 
Opening the telecommunications sector to competition and 
new technologies 
The tourism industry: from high value/low volume 
to ecotourism 
An opposition point of view: a somewhat different 
development strategy 
Participatory development: the context of democratic 
governance in Botswana 
EU-Botswana cooperation: "Don't leave us in the middle 
of the river" 
72 Profile 
73 Maps 
Notice to readers 
Many of you have taken the time and trouble to reply to the questionnaire 
published in issue n° 196. We appreciate this effort, and this feedback is invaluable. 
You can still send us your completed questionnaires or reply online at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/publications_courier 
en.cfm Editoria 
On the road to Cancún 
Is the Doha spirit still there? This question, which is currently on the lips of many observers, 
will likely find its answer at the World Trade Organisation's (WTO) fifth Ministerial 
Conference which will be held from 10 to 14 September 2003 in Cancún, Mexico. 
The Doha Development Round, launched in November 2001 and due for completion by 
1 January 2005, seems to be marking time. After almost two years of negotiations, trade 
ministers of WTO member countries will examine a wide range of sectoral issues, which are 
an integral part of the Round's built-in agenda, whilst paying particular attention to the 
development dimension. 
As globalisation accelerates, the links between trade and development are manifest. 
Although trade cannot on its own assure long-term development, it is nevertheless a 
powerful lever for stimulating and consolidating growth in developing countries and for 
combating poverty. Viewed in this context, the commitments subscribed to in Doha are 
fundamental, and it is now a question of taking measures to translate them into concrete 
steps. 
As things stand at the moment, many developing countries feel that there has been little 
progress on several subjects of importance to them (special and differential treatment, 
pharmaceuticals, market access, regional agreements, flexible rules, etc.). Cancún will be 
an opportunity for them to bring the focus of debate back to development. The 
uncertainties weighing on the world economy, together with the tensions left behind after 
September 11, have pushed multilateral cooperation - now more vital than ever - into 
second place. According to the WTO Director-General, "the Doha Development Agenda is 
one key element of multilateral cooperation that will stimulate economic growth, bring 
greater stability into international economic relations and help developing countries grow 
their way out of poverty". An encouraging factor was the call by the G8 at their Evian 
summit in June for a successful outcome to the negotiations taking place in the context of 
the Doha Development Agenda. 
The European Union and the ACP countries have been partners over many years, and they 
are uniting their efforts to ensure that development issues are not jettisoned. To do that, 
they will have to harmonise their positions and strengthen this solidarity that has already 
given results. All the more so, since multilateral issues are likely to have a major influence 
on the setting up of the economic partnership agreements now being negotiated. 
Launching the Doha Round was a necessity: concluding it in a satisfactory manner, that is 
to say, in a way that responds to the challenges of development, is now indispensable. All parties need to remember 
that one of the principal 
objectives of the Agreement 
on Agriculture is to establish a 
fair and market-oriented 
trading system that corrects 
and prevents restrictions and 
distortions in world 
agricultural markets. 
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Meeting point 
Agricultural trade negotiations and 
the developing world: 
an interview with Franz Fischler, European Commissioner 
for Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries 
During the current World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations a number of 
differences between its members have become apparent on the sensitive issue of 
agriculture. These negotiations, in the "Doha Round", give the countries of the 
South a unique opportunity to defend their interests in a crucial sector for their 
economies. In this interview Franz Fischler argues that the EU, which is making 
difficult and radical reforms to its common agricultural policy (the CAP), has 
made proposals to meet the concerns of the developing countries. He outlines 
his thoughts on the problems of a trade regime for agricultural products. 
Kenneth Karl 
Members of the WTO were not able to meet the 
31 March deadline for agreeing on how agricultural 
negotiations should proceed. Is this a worrying sign 
in the run-up to the Fifth Ministerial Conference in 
Cancun (Mexico) in September? 
We all know that there are still many outstanding issues to be 
dealt with. Let's be realistic. The 31 March deadline was missed. 
We regret this. The EU had been working hard to avoid it. The 
Union has put forward a comprehensive plan to further reform 
world trade in agriculture and fully incorporate developing 
countries into the world trading system. We have cited hard fig-
ures and concrete goals that are not unrealistic, but perfectly 
attainable. 
They show a great deal of flexibility and willingness to com-
promise on our part, given that we are prepared to: 
• cut our import tariffs by 36 per cent on average, to improve 
market access for agricultural products coming from third 
countries; 
• cur our export subsidies by 45 per cent on average, and for 
certain products abolish them altogether, provided others 
accept equivalent disciplines for their forms of export support; 
• cut our trade-distorting support by 55 per cent; 
• take account of non-trade concerns; and 
• give developing countries a better deal by creating better 
opportunities for market access — recognising the impor-
tance of food security and allowing a preferential imple-
mentation period for any new commitments. 
But these are not things that we are prepared, or indeed 
can afford, to do on our own. If we are to make these sub-
stantial reductions to our tariffs and trade-distorting support, 
we need and want our partners to go down this same road. It 
is not only our export subsidies that can viewed as trade-
distorting after all: what about bogus food aid, export credits 
and the pricing practices of certain state trading enterprises? 
All parties need to remember that one of the principal objec-
tives of the Agreement on Agriculture is to establish a fair and 
market-oriented trading system that corrects and prevents 
restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets. 
The negotiations must pursue the same objective. 
Now, we need to keep a cool head. More important than the 
precise deadline is to inject a new dynamism into the negotiations, 
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to keep on working constructively to narrow existing differences 
in negotiating positions. We should not forget that in fact there 
are many other deadlines in the Doha declaration that have not 
yet been met. Take the agreement on access to medicines for 
poor countries for example. This deadline came and went in 
December 2002. What is far more important now is that we 
keep the process moving and focus our attention on making real 
progress in these negotiations in order to ensure that the next 
ministerial meeting in Cancun will be a success. 
How will it be possible to manage the demands of 
the different categories of developing country, made 
during the agricultural negotiations, especially those 
relating to special and differentiated treatment and 
to special safeguarding mechanisms? 
There cannot be - there will not be - a Doha deal unless 
developing countries are able to conclude that they have been 
treated fairly. But on market access most of the proposals risk 
undermining developing countries, and especially the more 
vulnerable developing countries, which rely on their prefer-
ential access to European markets in particular. Further mar-
ket access must not become a blunt instrument for already 
powerful agricultural exporters against the developing world. 
Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that 74 WTO 
members, counting the EU as one, have signed up to a dif-
ferent approach - an approach that worked well in terms of 
moving reform forward in the Uruguay Round. Proposals 
that would favour strong exporting nations and would leave 
the weaker ones out in the cold have been rightly rejected 
by many developing countries. 
Commercial competition in agriculture between the 
North and the South is one of the most unfair areas 
of trade, because some players are doped with 
subsidies, as the new American Farm Bill shows. 
Is it realistic to hope for fairer rules at a multilateral 
level? Do you think that decoupling aid from 
production, advocated in the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) reform, can solve the basic problem for 
the countries of the South, that do not have a way 
to protect and support their agriculture against 
market distortions and dumping. 
Giving developing countries a better deal is one of the main 
objectives of the Doha Development Agenda. And the EU is 
ready to deliver. But listening to some WTO members, one 
could easily get the impression that all farm spending is evil 
and should be abolished. We do not agree with this. The cor-
rect common objective in the WTO is to reduce farm subsi-
dies (including those of the EU) that distort international 
trade and harm the interests of developing countries. 
But all parties have not moved in the same direction, and — 
worse - all parties are not even being pushed in the same 
direction. In recent years the EU has taken important reform 
steps to make our farm support much less trade distorting; 
others, such as the US, have done the opposite. This fact has 
to be recognised in the WTO negotiations, and thus far such 
recognition has been signally lacking. 
One can argue that trade-distorting subsidies may be con-
trary to the trade interests of developing countries, and that 
this is in conflict with the objective of fostering these interests. 
But this does not lead to the conclusion that the elimination 
of all subsidisation, including that which does not distort 
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trade, would be coherent with our overall policy objective, nor 
that it would even necessarily be in the interests of the devel-
oping countries, or most of them. 
Would eliminating EU income support, and eliminating all 
tariff barriers for agricultural products (a policy espoused by 
the most radical NGOs), benefit the developing countries? 
This is highly questionable: in fact, eliminating our income 
support would not benefit developing countries, while it 
would be highly detrimental to the sustainable development 
of EU farming; and eliminating all trade barriers could bene-
fit the most competitive developed and developing countries, 
such as Brazil, which produce many temperate products in 
competition with ours; but this would be at the cost of many 
weaker and more vulnerable developing countries. 
This is because a large number of developing countries benefit 
from preferences on the EU market, through the Cotonou 
Agreement, other agreements such as those with the 
Mediterranean partners or South Africa, the Everything but Arms 
Initiative (EBA) or the Genetal System of Preferences (GSP). 
Much of the criticism levelled against the CAP is simply out-
dated. I hear the same refrain again and again: allegations that 
the EU dumps its agricultural products on world markets. How 
can such a claim be substantiated when the actual export share 
of EU agricultural products has decreased in almost every prod-
uct grouping, as evidenced by the recent WTO report on agri-
cultural trade? In fact, if one looks at the net export record of 
the EU, the EU market share has decreased in every product 
grouping receiving public support over the last ten years. This is 
no accident but a trend driven by CAP reform. Unfortunately 
these developments do not make headlines; others do. 
Finally, on market access there is much that developing 
countries can do collectively to help themselves, by opening 
their markets towards each other. According to some estimates 
this would give them two thirds of the overall benefit resulting 
from worldwide trade liberalisation. They do after all pay 
more than 70 per cent of all their customs tariffs (€80 billion) 
on trade with each other. 
The question of access to the market for the 
agricultural products of developing countries 
(and not just the Least Developed Countries) is a 
crucial one for them. To what extent do the Ell's 
proposals for reform of the CAP, and at a multilateral 
level, constitute a real step forward? 
The EU recognises the need to ensure that developing 
countries fully benefit from the expansion of world trade. 
Farming is also about concern for the environment, for 
food safety, for safeguarding the supply of foeLand for 
proteetHb.rural employment and ISHiÉÜ^Hfclife. There cannot be - there will 
not be - a Doha deal unless 
developing countries are able 
to conclude that they have 
been treated fairly. But on 
market access most of the 
proposals risk undermining 
developing countries, and 
especially the more vulnerable 
developing countries, which 
rely on their preferential 
access to European markets 
in particular 
The key is to create oppor-
tunities for increased mar-
ket access for developing 
countries, while recognis-
ing the importance of food 
security and accepting the 
need for the most fragile 
developing countries to 
IP 
maintain protection in 
order to have adequate 
time to adapt. 
To this end, the EU pro-
poses the following: 
• a "food security box". In order to facilitate the implementa-
tion of further tariff reductions and to meet the developing 
countries' concerns on sensitive agricultural crops, a Special 
Safeguard instrument should be extended to developing 
countries in order to ensure food security. Substantially lower 
commitments should be agreed if this is necessary for devel-
oping countries to attain their legitimate objectives regarding 
food security and other multifunctional concerns; 
• not less than 50 per cent of developed countries' farm 
imports from developing countries at zero duty; 
• duty-free and quota-free access for all imports from Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) into developed and 
advanced developing countries; 
• a significant reduction in tariff escalation on products of 
particular interest to developing countries by reducing the 
level of tariff protection (both ad valorem and specific); 
• the possibility of supporting their agricultural sector for 
developmental reasons. This would imply that such sup-
port would not count as trade distorting; 
• lower reduction rates and a longer implementation period. 
The EU proposes that the new commitments be imple-
mented over six years for developed countries and ten years 
for developing countries beginning in 2006. 
How do we strike a balance between the increasing 
demand in Europe for health safety standards, and 
opening markets to an extent that is acceptable to 
developing countries, while preventing new 
environmental requirements becoming, in effect, 
a form of protectionism? 
Our consumers want to eat safe food, regardless of its ori-
gin. This is a legitimate concern and has nothing to do with 
protectionism. Moreover it is absolutely against the interests 
of the developing countries to suggest they cannot meet these 
standards. They can and in many cases they do; and when 
they do not, there is a valid case for technical assistance. 
Oxfam's "Double Standards Index", which measures 
the divergence between free trade principles and 
protectionist practices against poor countries, 
unfortunately puts the EU in first place among the 
"Quad" (the EU, the USA, Canada and Japan). What 
do you think about that? 
The EU welcomes the Oxfam campaign, Make Trade Fair, 
as a useful contribution to the global debate on how best to 
combat poverty. The Commission shares Oxfam's view that 
trade does not automatically yield benefits, and that develop-
ing countries need stability, sound domestic policies and good 
governance to allow growth to flourish. It shares Oxfam's con-
_meeting point 
cern about the marginalisation of Africa. It supports the need 
to make sure in advance that trade policies are framed in ways 
that really do help rather than harm developing countries. 
And it welcomes Oxfam's view that foreign direct investment 
in developing countries can bring many benefits. 
But we take issue with Oxfam's finding that the EU is the 
most protectionist of the Quad group. The calculations 
behind the ranking are quite simply wrong, and don't match 
evidence on the EU's openness to trade with developing coun-
tries in serious studies such as the latest International Trade 
Centre's (ITC) findings on market access and, separately, on 
environmental trade barriers. 
As to agriculture, the EU is not a fortress. We import more 
agricultural products from the developing countries (€36 bil-
lion) than the US, Canada, Australia and Japan combined. We 
are the foremost importer from every developing region with 
a peak of two thirds of all African exports worldwide. These 
data do not yet include the results of the EU's Everything but 
Arms Initiative (EBA) to grant free access to all exports from 
the 49 poorest countries, on which the EU took the lead -
with little response by other industrialised countries. 
Europe defends the notion of "multifunctionality", 
which puts non-commercial factors to the fore in 
agriculture, so justifying support measures. 
Does it accept this equally for developing 
countries, especially as regards rural development, 
food security or employment? And how does it 
plan to help them safeguard these key functions? 
Yes, we absolutely support the notion that "agriculture as 
more than just food production" is by no means an under-
standing confined to Europe. For societies from Mauritius to 
Malta, from Bangladesh to Sri Lanka, from South Korea to 
Sweden, farming is also about concern for the environment, 
for food safety, for safeguarding the supply of food and for 
protecting rural employment and the rural way of life. But 
many strong exporting countries flatly refuse to accept these 
concerns, conveniently ignoring that the Doha Declaration 
clearly states that they have to be addressed in the negotia-
tions. Our proposal moreover reflects our support for policies 
that address these non-trade concerns in developing countries. 
Ten new countries will join the EU in 2004. Is this in 
your view an opportunity for Europe in agriculture, 
despite all the problems it poses, and what could the 
consequences be for the ACP countries? 
It is clear, and always has been clear to us, that the benefits 
of enlargement outweigh the disadvantages for both the cur-
rent Member States and the candidate countries. Trade will 
increase for all Member States, although those that have estab-
lished links with the candidate countries will reap the most 
benefits. They will also reap the benefits of their location, 
being in a better situation to take a greater advantage of the 
services on offer across the border. The potential for ACP 
exports will also improve, as the privileged access they current 
enjoy to the EU-15 market will be extended to a market of 
25 countries and 475 million consumers. 
Enlargement is a project of paramount importance. But this 
does not mean that other projects will suffer. We will vigor-
ously pursue our objective to further strengthen our ties with 
the ACP countries through trade and aid in order to help 
them develop and to alleviate poverty. ■ 
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Development finds its feet 
in the new Council configuration 
Alexandroupolis: enlargement and development 
The General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), which met in 
Brussels on 19-20 May, was the second meeting under the new configuration 
of Council meetings - the first was in November 2002 - whereby development 
is discussed in the context of external relations. Two weeks after the GAERC 
meeting, development ministers from the EU and the 10 accession countries 
met again to discuss the future of the EU's post-enlargement development 
policy. 
Dorothy Morrissey 
The abolishment of a separate Development Council 
had worried some observers, who feared that development 
issues could take second place to exernal relations prorities. 
But, in the May GAERC meeting, discussion on develop-
ment issues was well-planned, thorough and fruitful. This 
was the first GAERC in which the 10 EU accession coun-
tries participated, as active observers, following the signa-
ture of the Accession Treaty on 16 April. 
During the meeting, the key issues on the agenda were 
the follow-up to the Monterrey Conference on Financing 
for Development, untying of aid, and implementation of 
the EC's development policy. 
Follow up to Monterrey: 
Monitoring the Barcelona commitments 
In the run up to the UN Conference on Financing foi-
Development (ICFD), held in Monterrey in March 2002, 
the EU pledged to increase its Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), in view of reaching the UN-endorsed 
target of 0.7 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) ded-
icated to aid. The EU pledge included two commitments; 
one collective, as the EU Member States would reach an 
average of 0.39 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI) 
by 2006 (up from 0.33 per cent in 2001); and the other 
individual - each Member State would reach 0.33 per cent 
of their GNI by 2006. These form part of the Barcelona 
commitments, which were made at the Barcelona European 
Summit in March 2002, in view of the Monterrey 
Conference. 
The Commission was given a mandate by the Council to 
monitor progress on the Barcelona commitments. Thus, for 
the first time, the Commission was allowed to check the 
actions of Member States, and discuss collectively how obli-
gations are being upheld. The Commission's report 
"Monitoring the Barcelona Commitments" was welcomed 
by the Council. Ministers also welcomed the good progress 
towards meeting the EU's commitments. The Council invit-
ed the Commission to continue monitoring on a regular 
basis, and to report annually. 
"We are revitalising ODA," said Commissioner Poul 
Nielson, "and this is being duly noted by others. We are 
well on course. Achieving the objective of reaching 0.7 is an 
ambitious goal, and such regular reporting helps to keep up 
the momentum". 
Untying of aid 
The Council debated untying of aid - with the aim of 
breaking the link between the granting of aid and the pur-
chase of goods and services from the donor country. 
Untying of aid is proving to be a tough nut to crack. On 
the multilateral level, the only agreement is the DAC 
"Recommendation on Untying ODA to least developed 
countries", adopted in 2001 after long and difficult negoti-
ations. The Commission regards this Recommendation as 
"a good political signal, a first, but insufficient step in the 
right direction". At the Barcelona European Summit, EU 
Member States made a commitment to "continue discus-
sions with a view to further untying bilateral aid". The EU 
pledged at the ICFD to build on and enhance initiatives for 
greater effectiveness of aid. The Commission's communica-
tion on "Untying: enhancing the effectiveness of aid" - pre-
sented at the November 2002 GAERC — was welcomed by 
the Council, which said, in its conclusions, that it shares 
the aim of further untying Community aid. It invited the 
Commission to present proposals, including a timetable on 
implementation, to amend all regulations covering finan-
cial instruments relating to Community assistance under 
the Community budget by way of a horizontal Regulation, 
and to amend the relevant rules of the EDF. 
Implementing EU development policy 
The Council discussed the Commission's development 
policy programme of action for 2003 and progress on 
reforming aid management. The Council welcomed the 
programme of action as a planning tool, and encouraged 
the Commission to continue its reform efforts. It recog-
nised that progress had been made in reducing delays in 
decision-making and implementation, but called for fur-
ther reductions in the level of outstanding unpaid commit-
ments. Commissioner Nielson pointed out that the 
Commission was often dealing with conflict and post-
conflict situations, where progress can be slow. The Council 
recognised that, in its development policy, the Commission 
is still guided by its November 2000 document, 
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Development ministers and officials from the 25 countries in Alexandroupolis (Greece). 
The European Community Development Policy, despite 
the addition of new objectives and priorities that have aris-
en since then out of international conferences. 
Other issues 
The Council agreed conclusions on the Commission's 
proposal for an EU Water Fund, as part of the implementa-
tion of the EU's pledges at the World Summit for 
Sustainable Development. It invited the Commission to 
propose specific measures for further discussion by the 
Council and the ACP-EC Council of Ministers. The EU 
Water Fund is intended to increase resources for the water 
sector in the ACP countries. 
Two regulations; on aid for policies and actions on repro-
ductive and sexual health rights, and on aid to combat 
poverty diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis) in 
developing countries were agreed. They aim to follow up 
on the Millennium Development Goal of reducing infant 
mortality by three-quarters by 2005. 
"Organised solidarity" 
Following the GAERC meeting, an informal gathering 
of development ministers and officials from the 25 coun-
tries that will make up the EU in 2004 was held in 
Alexandroupolis, Greece, on 1-2 June, organised by the 
Greek presidency of the EU. This enabled development 
ministers to continue discussions, particularly focusing on 
enlargement and its consequences for the EU's develop-
ment policy, and the treatment of development in 
the draft constitution drawn up by the European 
Convention. 
"The European Union of 25 will be asked to meet con-
stantly increasing and changing demands from the devel-
oping world, demands that will focus on trade, economy 
and society", said Andreas Loverdos, Greek deputy Foreign 
Minister, who chaired the meeting. He added that 4.68 per 
cent of the 10 accession states' contributions to the EU 
budget would be allocated to development. 
Two main issues were on the agenda: 
• The consequences of enlargement on development policy 
• Development cooperation issues in the draft constitution 
drawn up by the European Convention. 
Participants discussed the difficulties the accession coun-
tries face in undertaking the "acquis" of EU development 
policy. This includes fulfilling the commitments taken at 
the Barcelona European Council and the ICFD. While 
the accession countries expressed their commitment to 
the ICFD goals, they had not taken part in those nego-
tiations and are now expected to "deliver on commit-
ments made by the 15", as one participant put it. There 
was a clear understanding that it would be impossible for 
them to reach the EU target according to the set 
timetable. But the message was equally clear that 0.7 is 
part of the EU "acquis". Furthermore, most of the acces-
sion states have no recent tradition of commitment to 
development, and have been major recipients of aid in 
recent years. Moving from being aid recipients to being 
members of the donor community would take time, and 
they would need to convince their public. They tend to 
focus their assistance on neighbouring regions, while the 
overarching aim of EU development is poverty reduc-
tion, which entails a focus on Africa and Asia. Another 
difficulty relates to untying of aid. The Commission has 
clarified rhar development assistance is subject to the 
rules of the internal market, and thus, must be untied. 
But the development sector is undeveloped in many of 
the accession countries, making it difficult to compete 
on an international level. 
Nevertheless, according to one accession country partici-
pant, the fact that 4.68 per cent of their contribution to the 
EU budget will be allocated to development is a psycho-
logical step in this direction. In addition, because of the 
transition they have gone through, they have practical expe-
rience of building democracy, which they could bring to 
the EU's development policy. Their experience as aid recip-
ients could also be useful in improving the effectiveness of 
EU aid. 
Future EU constitution? 
The Convention on the Future of Europe was tasked 
with drawing up a draft constitutional treaty for the EU. 
Discussion turned on how development issues are 
addressed in the draft, if it reflects accurately the objectives 
and principles of EC development cooperation, and 
whether it provides a solid legal basis. Development policy 
is still identified as a "shared competence"; ie, carried out 
both by the Commission and the Member States. The over-
arching objective of EU development policy — to reduce 
and ultimately eradicate poverty — should be reflected in 
the new constitution. ■ 
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ACP Council of Ministers President, 
Serge Vohor, on current issues 
facing the ACP-EC partnership 
May was a busy month, with a series of ACP meetings taking place in Brussels 
(Heads of ACP regional integration organisations, ACP National and Regional 
Authorising Officers, 77th session of the ACP Council of Ministers, 13 to 15 May, 
followed by a Joint ACP-EC Council of Ministers meeting). 
Serge Vohor, President the ACP Council of Ministers and Deputy Prime Minister of 
Vanuatu, spoke to the Courier about some of the issues on the table. 
Kenneth Karl 
The ACP Group is profoundly disappointed that several key 
development issues and other areas of interest to the ACP Group 
and other developing countries have yet to be effectively tackled 
in the Doha negotiations. In particular there have been slippages 
in various deadlines set by our ministers at Doha. These include 
deadlines on special and differential treatment, implementation 
issues, agriculture, TRIPs and public health. It is important to 
make a great effort to resolve as many issues as possible in 
Geneva, in order to avoid overloading the agenda for Cancún. 
In addition, the ACP Group attaches considerable impor-
tance to implementation issues and we urge all members to 
work seriously towards a satisfactory resolution of these issues 
and, thus, contribute to a redressing of the imbalances in the 
multilateral trading system. The ACP Group maintains that all 
the implementation issues and concerns should be adequately 
and satisfactorily addressed and resolved, preferably before 
Cancún. With respect to trade in services, it is critical for ACP 
countries to have the necessary flexibility in the development 
policy options in this sector by, inter alia, preserving the ele-
ments and principles of special and differential treatment con-
tained in the GATS structure, including its Article IV. 
On special and differential treatment (S&D) it is of the 
utmost importance that the difficulties now faced in the S&D 
negotiations be resolved in order to maintain the integrity and 
credibility of the multilateral trading system. 
Another area concerns the need for transparency and inclu-
siveness and the need to promote an overall balance in the nego-
tiations as we move forward to the Cancún Ministerial 
Conference. This is absolutely essential if Cancún is to be a suc-
cess. In terms of the technical assistance and capacity building 
needed to facilitate the negotiations, it is important that assis-
tance continue to be made available in all areas, to enable the 
ACP and other developing countries to adequately handle the 
negotiations. 
Finally it is of critical importance to ACP countries that 
development flexibilities available in the WTO, such as the 
Enabling Clause, be retained, to allow developing countries the 
necessary development flexibility in policy options. 
At their recent meeting in Brussels, the ACP National 
and Regional Authorising Officers were critical of the 
slow rate of disbursement of European Development 
Fund (EDF) resources. 
One of the main issues discussed by the ACP Council 
of Ministers was the state of progress of the 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations. 
Differences persist between the ACP States and the 
EU concerning the first negotiation phase. If, 
between now and September 2003, agreement is 
not reached on this point, will certain regions start 
negotiations nevertheless with the EU? 
The ACP Council of Ministers was made aware of the need 
to ensure that sufficient groundwork is done before the start of 
the second phase of the negotiations. There is therefore a need 
to take stock of the level of preparedness of the ACP countries 
and regions to begin the Phase 11 (regional) negotiations. 
While at least one regional grouping within the ACP Group has 
signaled its predisposition to begin negotiations in September 
2003, it should be borne in mind that Article 37.5 of the 
Cotonou Agreement provides for negotiations on the EPAs to be 
undertaken with ACP countries which consider themselves in a 
position to do so, at the level they consider appropriate and in 
accordance with procedures agreed by the ACP Group, taking 
into account the regional integration process within the ACP. 
From the point of view of the Cancún ministerial 
conference, what will the ACP States' plan of action 
be to promote the development aspects in the 
framework of the Doha development agenda? 
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What concrete measures should be put in place to 
arrive at a resolution of this recurring problem, now 
that the Cotonou Agreement has entered into force? 
The slow rate of disbursement of EDF resources has been a 
great concern and preoccupation for the ACP Group. As you 
are aware, the slow disbursement rate was one of the key areas 
of focus of the 7th meeting of ACP National and Regional 
Authorising Officers (NAOs & RAOs), which took place in 
Brussels during the period 10-12 May 2003. Mindful of our 
own responsibilities in relation to the ACP-EU Partnership, the 
ACP NAOs/RAOs comprehensively examined this issue and 
made specific recommendations to ensure the speedy disburse-
ment of EDF resources in future. Furthermore, the 7th meet-
ing of ACP NAOs/RAOs concluded its activities by adopting 
the "Brussels Declaration on the timely and effective imple-
mentation of the European Development Fund/European 
Programme for Reconstruction and Development", which was 
fully endorsed by the ACP Council of Ministers. The Brussels 
Declaration is an extremely important document, since it is the 
first time that the ACP NAOs/RAOs adopted a Declaration, 
which clearly demonstrates our commitment and resolve 
towards the speedy disbursement of EDF/EPRD resources for 
the benefit of ACP communities. A basis for the effective dis-
bursement of EDF/EPRD resources exists, and it is now the 
collective task of the ACP Group and the EU to ensure its 
fullest implementation and application. 
Do you think that the conception of political 
dialogue between the ACP States and the EU, even 
going beyond the guidelines proposed in Cotonou, 
will in future be an effective way of dealing with 
certain situations? 
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement substantially 
strengthens the notion of political dialogue between the sig-
natory parties, and in particular dialogue on development 
policy and specific political issues. Having institutionalised 
political dialogue between the ACP Group and the EU, the 
adoption at the 28th Session of the ACP-EC Council of 
Ministers of a joint paper on "Guidelines for ACP-EC politi-
cal dialogue within the context of Article 8 of the Cotonou 
Agreement", is an important step in the right direction. 
However, of equal importance is the notion of intra-ACP 
political dialogue. In order to prepare ourselves for effective 
and sustained dialogue with our partners, the 76th Session of 
the ACP Council of Ministers adopted a "Framework and 
general principles for intra-ACP political dialogue", which sets 
the broad parameters for political dialogue among ACP States. 
Having agreed on these important building blocks for politi-
cal dialogue, I am of the view that the political dimension of 
the Cotonou Agreement will further evolve and enhance the 
ACP-EU Partnership, in particular its inclusiveness. To this 
end, the ACP Group is confident that the Cotonou 
Agreement provides sufficient scope and flexibility to address, 
in an effective manner, any matter/situation in relation to the 
ACP-EU political partnership. 
Do the recent events in Cuba appear likely to 
compromise Cuba's accession to the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement? What is the position of the 
ACP Group on this subject? 
Cuba's accession to the Cotonou Agreement has to be the 
subject of a joint decision between the ACP Group of States 
and the European Community and its Member States. At its 
recently-concluded 28th Session, the ACP-EC Council of 
Ministers admitted Cuba as an observer, pending its accession 
to the Cotonou Agreement. 
The question as to whether "recent events in Cuba" could com-
promise Cuba's accession would depend on whedier or not diose 
events are considered in die context of the request for accession to 
the Cotonou Agreement. However this question has since been 
overtaken by Cuba's withdrawal of its request for accession. 
The ACP group has just welcomed Timor Leste as the 
79th member of the Group. What are your reflections 
on this subject? 
Timor Lestes membership of the ACP Group should be 
seen as mutually advantageous to both that country and the 
ACP Group as a whole. Its membership amounts to recogni-
tion by a newly independent state of the merit and benefits 
that could be derived from having common purpose with this 
group of developing countries, in a unique development part-
nership with the European Community. For the ACP Group, 
it means that small emerging states on the international scene, 
that are within the geographical areas of its current member-
ship, recognise membership of the ACP Group as being 
important enough for it to advance its national interests. ■ 
ACP-EC Council of Ministers, 15-16 May 
This was the first Joint ACP-EU Council meeting that was attended by representatives from the ten EU acceding countries. 
The Council meeting focused on: 
• The state of play of EPAs. The Council took note of a joint report (ACP-Commission) on the state of play which shows that progress 
has been made but divergences remain. 
• Trade cooperation; the ACP Group presented declarations on sugar, rice and bananas which outline their concerns in these sectors. 
• Development finance cooperation; a decision to use €350 million from the 9th EDF reserves, for debt alleviation in ACP states was 
taken by the ACP-EC Council, and discussion on the need to release EDF funds in a speedy and efficient manner in accordance with 
the objectives of the Cotonou Partnership and the Millennium Development Goals 
• Enlargement of the EU - implications for ACP countries. 
• Zimbabwe: interpretation of the provisions of Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement on consultation procedures: following 
Zimbabwe's presentation regarding its position, a mandate was given to the ACP-EC Committee of Ambassadors to continue to 
search for a mutually satisfactory solution. 
• The Commission presented its Communication on the establishment of an EU Water Fund 
• Prevention and management of conflicts and post-conflict recovery, giving considerable attention to the conflict in the Great Lakes region. 
The ACP-EC Council approved without discussion a series of important joint papers regarding notably political dialogue, the access 
of non-state actors to EDF financing and the preparation of forthcoming international conferences (World Summit on Information 
Society and Conference of the Parties to the Desertification Convention). A draft joint document on the 5th WTO Ministerial 
Conference was referred to and a mandate was given to the ACP-EC Committee of Ambassadors for its further examination. The 
Council welcomed the accession of Timor Leste to the Cotonou Agreement and approved the granting of observer status to 
Cuba. It was announced that the next ACP-EC Council will be held in early 2004 in Gaborone, Botswana. news 
Textiles: 
Last-minute adjustments in the run-up 
to liberalisation 
Sooner or later many sectors of the economy, even the less robust industries, will have to 
face up to one of the necessary corollaries of globalisation: trade liberalisation. No escape, 
then, for the textiles and clothing sector, which for many years has played by its own rules, 
mainly allowing industrialised countries to protect their markets through a system of 
quantitative restrictions. From 2005, import quotas will be phased out and replaced by what 
will in theory be a more open type of trade. It will not be easy to overcome the challenges 
posed by this changeover to an open system and its many consequences. A conference on 
the Future of Textiles and Clothing, held in Brussels on 5-6 May, was a chance to discuss the 
future of this sector and how to deal with the resulting new trade order. 
Kenneth Karl 
The number Of participants at the conference on 
textiles and clothing organised by the European 
Commission in itself bore witness to the importance of this 
sector and the enormity of what is at stake for many coun-
tries. More than 800 people, including sector representa-
tives, industrial associations, clothing experts, trade union-
ists, international institutions and trade ministers from at 
least 70 different countries, took part in the two-day 
forum. It was a chance for them to clarify their positions 
regarding the profound changes that will affect trade in tex-
tiles by 2005. There is no doubt that the end of protec-
tionist measures provided for under the Multi-fibre 
Agreement will have a strong impact on world textiles 
trade. All goods from this sector will come fully under 
WTO rules. Producing countries will have to abolish exist-
ing quotas, necessitating major reforms to enable their 
industry to adapt to the new trade situation. "We are twen-
ty months away from the 'big bang' that will affect actors 
in the clothing and textile industry", said European Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy as he opened the conference. 
While the imminent 'big bang' is viewed with trepidation 
in some quarters, others are already rubbing their hands in 
anticipation of an increase in market share. However, the 
more vulnerable manufacturers will need specific measures 
to enable them to benefit from the opportunities that will 
arise following the ending of quotas. In addition, the con-
ditions of this trade liberalisation must be determined on a 
multilateral level in order to prevent any adverse effects. We 
could well see quotas being replaced by protectionist meas-
ures of a different kind. 
A major sector on the road to liberalisation 
Trade in clothing and textiles ranks high on the scale of 
world trade. In 2002 alone it was worth some €350 billion, 
accounting for six per cent of all world exports. Over the 
last few decades, trade in this sector has grown steadily to 
the extent that it has supplanted that of other exports. 
With a 15 per cent market share in 2001, the EU is one 
of the largest exporters of textile goods, second only to 
China in clothing and textiles exports. However, because of 
its size, the European market also represents an opportuni-
ty for goods from other countries and regions of the world. 
This sector currently employs more than two million 
people in the EU, a figure that will rise to 2.5 million with 
the forthcoming enlargement. 
The textiles sector is even more 
important for many developing coun-
tries whose economies suffer from a 
lack of diversification. These coun-
tries account for a significant percent-
age of world textile and clothing 
exports. Most of them are highly 
dependent on the sector, which often 
constitutes their main source of 
exports and is the primary source of 
employment. Moreover, their exports 
are often concentrated on one or two 
markets, generally the EU and the 
US. Thus, it is the economies that 
depend heavily on this sector that 
risk bearing the brunt of the negative 
effects of the impending market 
liberalisation. news 
However, those in favour of liberalisation argue that the 
inevitable abolition of quotas will be more advantageous for 
the sector, benefiting a vast majority of countries. For the 
Director General of the WTO, Supachai Panitchpakdi, the 
implementation of the agreement on textiles and clothing 
aiming to eliminate quotas should not be considered a new 
negotiation, and as such be called into question. Rather, this 
process is an integral part of an undertaking made during 
the Uruguay Round and must be respected by WTO mem-
bers. According to Mr Panitchpakdi, opening up this sector 
offers many advantages. From a political standpoint it 
strengthens the credibility of the multilateral trade system 
through respect for undertakings made by members. 
Secondly, the abolition of quotas will considerably reduce 
imbalances in the international market and lead to gains in 
production and marketing for many countries. Finally, lib-
eralisation will benefit consumers in importing countries. 
This sentiment is echoed by the European Commission. It 
believes that trade liberalisation in the textiles sector will 
generate global economic efficiency, a belief backed up by 
studies on the subject. However, it is also of the opinion that 
the issue of liberalisation must not be restricted to quota 
reductions alone but rather a more global approach must be 
taken. The success of the liberalisation of the clothing and 
textiles sector will largely depend on the response of indus-
try and companies in terms of improving competitiveness 
and adapting to the new market requirements. This success 
will also rely on the formulation of effective macro-
economic policies, the implementation of an adequate leg-
islative framework, investment, training, etc. In reality, the 
advantages and disadvantages of liberalisation for WTO 
members appear unequal, which suggests that each will be 
strenuously defending its own position over the next twen-
ty months. 
Optimism and uncertainty 
While the abolition of import restrictions on textile 
goods may constitute an opportunity for developing coun-
tries, some harbour reservations. They fear that although 
quotas will be phased out they will merely be replaced by 
barriers of a different kind. It is too good to be true, in the 
view of one participant from a country in the South. He 
believes that industrialised countries have much harsher 
means of protection than tariff barriers or quotas, such as 
anti-dumping regulations and standards. And he is willing 
to bet that they will now play these protectionist cards. 
There is a risk that the new quota-free trade environment 
will in practice naturally exclude the poorer producing 
countries from the international market. These poorer 
countries cannot compete with more powerful trade part-
ners. They are therefore trying to procure a differential sys-
tem, particularly in terms of market access. The Doha 
Development Agenda provides for the improvement of 
market access conditions for manufactured goods in all sec-
tors, without exception. The Doha mandate clearly requires 
WTO members to reduce, or indeed completely eliminate, 
tariff peaks and barriers. The conditions for achieving these 
reductions must be defined by member states by 31 May 
2003. At the same time they will clarify the situation as 
regards the textiles and clothing sector and the system that 
will apply to weaker countries. However, although the 
introduction of special and differential treatment for Least 
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Developed Countries (LDCs) seems fair, particularly in a 
trade round devoted to development, it is viewed with sus-
picion by some countries who believe that this kind of pref-
erential treatment may well create new market imbalances. 
Poorer countries are also demanding assistance to help 
strengthen their production and export capacities under the 
Doha Round. 
The liberalisation of this sector has raised concerns not 
only among developing countries and LDCs. Several textile-
industry representatives from developed countries naturally 
consider this liberalisation in terms of market share. It is 
already obvious who will benefit most from liberalisation. 
The results of many studies point to China as the major 
beneficiary of the abolition of quotas, followed by India. 
According to one European textiles industry representative, 
there will be one big winner, a few smaller winners, and 
many losers. There is no doubt as to China's capacity for 
exports in this sector. A new member of the WTO, China 
has seen a dramatic increase in its market share over the 
last few years. Some industrialised countries are in favour 
of a more gradual liberalisation process governed by rules 
that will protect them against unfair trading practices. 
Indeed, some participants have not ruled out resorting to 
anti-dumping regulations. They accuse China and India of 
economic, social and environmental dumping where 
clothing and textiles are concerned, and fully intend to 
protect their own industries. 
Despite the many problems posed by liberalisation of the 
textiles and clothing sector, it would be difficult for many 
countries to get round it unless they decided not to play by 
the rules, and backtrack on commitments entered into at 
the Uruguay Round. It all depends now on how the sector, 
governments and international organisations concerned 
conduct negotiations so as to reach a compromise that is 
acceptable to as many countries as possible. ■ 
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Financing ACP projects: 
the EIB and the Cotonou Investment Facility 
Between 2003 and 2008 the European Investment Bank (EIB) will provide 
nearly €4 billion in refundable aid to projects in the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) countries. Part of this will be made available through the new 
Investment Facility, provided for under the Cotonou Agreement. 
The Facility was officially launched on 2 June by Presidents Mwai Kibaki 
(Kenya) and Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal) and EIB President Philippe Maystadt. 
Bram Schim Van Der Loeff* 
The EIB will pay special attention to promoting private 
or commercially run projects in the public sector and will 
make money available in two forms. €2.2 billion will be 
provided under the new, revolving Investment Facility (IF) 
funded by EU Member States. €1.7 billion will be lent 
from the EIB's own resources. 
The Cotonou Agreement's financial provisions 
European Development Fund 
European Commission 
Grant aid 
€11,300 million 
European Investment Bank 
EIB's own resources 
Loans for 
investment projects 
€1,700 million 
Investment Facility 
Loans/equity/guarantees 
for investment projects. 
€2,200 million 
Senior debt: 
EIB's own resources 
Pricing: EIB reference rate 
Security: 1st class or 
prime-quality security 
(with possibility of political 
risk carve-out). 
Currency: EUR, USD, GBP 
and ZAR 
Junior/ 
subordinated debt: 
Quasi equity: 
participating or 
conditional loans: 
Equity participation: 
Investment Facility 
Pricing: EIB reference 
rate+ mark-up. 
Security: guarantee 
(international or local) 
or project security 
Currency: EUR (possibility 
of other local currencies) 
Pricing: EIB reference rate 
+ mark-up. 
Security: project guarantee 
or other covenants 
Currency: EUR (possibility 
of other local currencies). 
Pricing: variable 
remuneration as a function 
of performance 
Security, usually unsecured 
or junior status with 
covenants 
Currency: EUR (possibility 
of other local currencies). 
Pricing: dividends/ 
capital gains 
Security: none 
Currency: local currency 
A history of investment 
The EIB has been supporting capital investment in the 
ACP countries for almost 40 years. The bank was estab-
lished to finance capital investment in pursuit of the EU's 
policy objectives. While most of its lending is within the 
EU Member States, it also finances projects outside Europe 
to support the EU's development cooperation and aid poli-
cies. In the ACP states it has operated under mandates 
attached to conventions and agreements negotiated by the 
ACP states and the EU. 
One of the EIB's oldest overseas mandates was given in 
1963 to finance projects in 18 associated African states 
and Madagascar (EAMA) as part of the first Yaoundé 
Convention. Since then the EIB has operated as a devel-
opment finance institution on the basis of the successive 
Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions. Between 1963 and the 
beginning of this year, when the Lomé IV Convention 
was superseded by the Cotonou Agreement, the EIB 
channelled over €9 billion into investment in the ACP 
countries. 
Cotonou 
Under the Cotonou Agreement, negotiated by the 77 
ACP and 15 EU states, the EIB will continue to provide 
repayable development finance alongside grant aid from 
the European Commission. The Cotonou Agreement 
states that the central objective of cooperation between 
the EU and the ACP countries is "poverty reduction and 
ultimately its eradication; sustainable development; and 
progressive integration of the ACP countries in the world 
economy". 
The Agreement aims to foster entrepreneurship since the 
private sector is seen as the motor of development and 
growth. Its purpose is to contribute to sound corporate gov-
ernance and to market conditions that will lead to long-
term sustainable economic development and the alleviation 
of poverty. 
Revolving facility 
In line with these aims, the IF is a risk-taking financial 
instrument designed to support the development of the pri-
vate sector. It will take project-related risks and expects a 
commensurate return, because it has been established as a 
revolving facility and is intended to become self-sustaining. 
The IF will support the growth of local enterprises, and 
Θ 
the Courier ACP-EU n° 198 may-june 2003 I EIB President Philippe Maystadt  Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade 
finance foreign direct investment and commercially viable 
public enterprises. 
A particular effort will be made to improve the access of 
ACP's small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to risk-
sharing instruments and to "term finance". Support for 
SMEs will be channelled through the local financial sector. 
The objective is to help strengthen the sector and increase 
its capacity to mobilise domestic savings. In this way it 
should transform the domestic ACP capital markets into 
long-term, effective channels for financing and developing 
small businesses. 
Flexible terms 
Various forms of "senior" and "junior" debt and risk-
sharing financing instruments are available through the IE 
These allow flexibility in setting terms and conditions, 
which can be adapted to the nature of a project. This can 
be done, for example, by varying the EIB's remuneration 
depending on the performance of a project. The EIB's own 
resources offer long-term, senior debt on very favourable 
financing conditions for larger operations in the financial 
sector and for those with lower risk. 
The EIB bases its lending conditions for the Investment 
Facility, and for lending from its own funds, on its "AAA" 
credit rating. It can pass on these advantages as it operates 
on a non-profit basis. The difference is that with the 
Investment Facility the bank accepts more risk and sets the 
pricing for lending accordingly. When lending from its own 
resources the bank takes a low level of risk, which it miti-
gates by guarantee and security arrangements. 
The Investment Facility will be managed as a "Special 
Business Unit" within the EIB group. This new structure is 
designed to reinforce the EIB's role as the European devel-
opment finance institution (EDFI) for refundable aid. In 
doing so it will operate alongside and in cooperation with 
the Member States' EDFIs with which it has bilateral agree-
ments covering support, services, expertise and networks. 
In this way the EIB and the EDFIs will be able to profit 
from comparative advantages and ensure efficient use of 
resources and the maximum impact from joint European 
assistance. 
ACP responsibilities 
This risk-sharing Investment Facility replaces the former 
risk-capital funds of the Member States of the EU, which 
were also managed by the EIB. Another innovation is that 
the IF will be revolving: money coming back into it will be 
redeployed in ACP projects. So it needs to be self-sustain-
ing through repayments and remuneration. 
At the IF launch, EIB President Philippe Maystadt 
underlined the significance of Cotonou in that it sees 
poverty reduction as dependent on economic growth, and 
economic growth, in turn, dependent on better governance 
and greater integration into the world market economy. 
"The private sector is identified as the real motor of growth, 
which by releasing talent and enterprise, and creating jobs, 
can also spread prosperity and generate the means to deploy 
more resources on social reform". ■ 
* Information and Communications Department 
For further information please go to: lutp://wwu cih.o^/letulii^/ac p. 
phone ++ 352 4379-3234 or write a.schinivanderloel'ffoeih.orti 
Can also be download at: 
http:/Avw\v.eih.orti/lendimt/acp/docs/acp en .pelf. 
littp://\v\\\\-eib oru/lendinu/acp/does/applun eii-pdl and/or 
http://www.eih.ort:/lendintj/acp/does/coii>nou en.pdl. 
Left to right: the Minister of Finance of Kenya, David Mwiraria, . . 
; and EIB President Philippe Maystadt 
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Civil society participation in European 
Community development policy 
International conference on 5-6 May 2003 in Athens, Greece 
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Civil society is gradually becoming one of the key partners in EC development ■ 
policy. Civil society organisations - or non-state actors - are expected to 
participate in the design and implementation of policy but also to take part in 
the review process. A conference on 'Civil Society Participation in European 
Community Development Policy' - held in Athens under the auspices of the 
Greek Presidency of the EU and Hellenic Aid - provided an opportunity for a 
range of civil society actors from the North and the South to exchange views 
and ideas on how to strengthen their participation in the development process 
and how to build partnerships between Northern and Southern civil societies. 
Maria Badekas* 
Θ 
European Community (EC) development policy is 
based on the recognition that, for any development policy to be 
successful, all sectors of society need to be involved in the devel-
opment process. The recently adopted Communication on the 
Participation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy' 
by the Commission aims to strengthen the participation of civil 
society in the development process. The aim of this conference 
was to discuss this policy further with civil society representa-
tives and provide an opportunity to civil society representatives 
from the North and the South to jointly explore ways forward. 
Representatives of a variety of non-state actors, social and 
economic partners, media, academia and NGOs from 49 
countries from Africa, Central Asia, the Pacific and Latin 
America, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, 
Europe (EU Member States and the 10 acceding Member 
States) attended the Conference. 
The conference was structured around three working 
groups, under three broad thematic areas: 
• the tole of Northern and Southern civil society in 
poverty reduction and sustainable development; 
• civil society in EC development policy; 
• the global role of the EU: solidarity and sustainable 
development. 
It adopted conclusions that provide an operational framework 
for the relations between Northern and Southern civil society. It 
also allied for more participation of Northern and Southern civil 
society actors in the formulation of EC development policy. 
the Courier ACP-EU n° 198 may-june 2003 
The conference also provided a good basis for taking part-
nerships and cooperation between all segments of Northern 
and Southern societies a step further in future discussions. 
Indeed, the Greek Presidency suggested that the meeting in 
Athens become a starting point for a permanent mechanism 
of dialogue and cooperation for civil society. ■ 
* Development Policy. Coherence and Forward Studies unit, 
DC, Development. European Commission 
1. COM (2002) 598 Final. This Communication gives an overview of the current 
practices and clarifies the expectations of tile EU regarding the level and scope 
for dialogue and consultation with non-state actors. It focuses on the need to 
strengthen non-state actors in the developing countries, on the importance of 
capacity huilding and on the role of Northern non-state actors in transferring 
their know how and expertise to the other development actors in the South. 
The Cotonou Agreement provides a broad range of new 
opportunities for non-state actors. For the first time, the 
participatory approach in their cooperation is a legally 
binding obligation for both the EU and the ACP States. Civil 
society is now being directly involved in the programming, 
implementation and review process, as well as in 
implementation. The Cotonou Agreement also foresees 
improved access to funding and capacity-building support. 
The challenge is to make these new opportunities 
operational. The diversity of regions and actors, the 
different political contexts and traditions for a participatory 
approach, the level of organisation of civil society actors 
and their capacity means that there can be no single model 
for non-state actor participation. In many ACP countries, 
there are promising signs that civil society is organising 
itself to enter into dialogue with their governments, to 
help shape policies and to explore the scope for joint action 
between public and private actors. news 
ACP cinema: 
call for proposals 
The EU has published the fourth call for proposals within the 
programme of support for ACP cinema. Endowed with a six 
million euro envelope, this programme was launched in 
September 2000 to boost the cinema in ACP countries, and reinforce 
and turn professional the support given by the EU to ACP cinema. 
This fourth Call for proposals is devoted exclusively to 
production. The budget available is €820.000. Projects must 
concern production of full/medium/short-length feature and 
animated films, documentaries (full-length), television films, 
fictional or animated series, animated films for television. 
Projects must be implemented mainly in either an ACP coun-
try or an EU Member State, but prefer-
ence will be given to projects whose 
action is set in an ACP country. 
This call for proposals is available 
on the EU's website: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
europeaid/tender/index_en.htm 
Once on that page, click on 
"Tender and calls for proposals 
notice". Then, on this new page, 
on the left, in the menu "Other", 
select: "FED/Budget"; in status, select: "open"; in type, 
select: "grants"; and in region, select "all"; and launch the 
research ("research"). 
It is essential to read the eligibility criteria very careful-
ly and to add to the application all the documents 
required in the check-list. Only complete applications will 
be examined. 
As for the previous calls for proposals, the Technical 
Assistance Desk is in charge of the evaluation of the applica-
tions and of the follow-up of the selected projects. We are at 
your disposal for any information related to the programme 
of support. ■ 
Technical Assistance Desk - ACP cinema 
112 rue des Palais B-1030 Brussels 
tel: +32 2 242 00 08 
fax: +32 2 242 40 12 
mat@cincmasacp.filmfestamiens.org 
Junior Professional Officer 
Opportunities in the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) 
UNDP is the UN's global development network, advocating for change and connecting countries to 
knowledge, experience and resources to help people build a better life. Our focus is helping countries build 
and share solutions to the challenges of democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and 
recovery, energy and environment, ICT for development and HIV/AIDS. 
We are on the ground in 166 countries, working with them on their own solutions to global and national 
development challenges. As they develop local capacity, they draw on the people of UNDP and our wide 
range of partners. 
The UNDP Junior Professional Officer (JPO) Programme currently provides more than 200 young 
professionals, pursuing a career in development, with hands-on experience in multilateral technical 
cooperation. They serve primarily in the field and are involved in the design, implementation and evaluation 
of the UNDP activities. 
JPOs are usually under 32 years of age, hold a Master's degree and have a minimum of one to two years' 
working experience. They are sponsored by participating donor countries for a period of two to four years. 
A limited number of posts is open to developing country nationals who fulfil the selection requirements. 
If you want to know more about the UNDP JPO Programme and how to apply, please visit our website, 
available in three languages: www.jposc.org (under "Presentation" and "How to apply? I DC Candidates"). 
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Giving peace a chance 
in the Congo 
Conclusion of the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue 
The signing ceremony of the Final Act of the 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue was held in Sun City, 
South Africa on 3 April 2003. The adopted 
documents included the All-inclusive Agreement 
on the Transition in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, which provides for peace and 
reunification of the country after almost five years 
of war, during which more than three million 
people may have perished. 
Richard Wyatt* 
The Signatories included some 24 Congolese leaders, 
most notably Foreign Minister Leonard She Okitundu for the 
government, Adolphe Onusumba for the Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD) and Olivier Kamitatu 
for the Mouvement de Liberation du Congo (MLC). The 
signature took place in the presence of President Thabo 
Mbeki of the host country and the leaders of Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Botswana while the Facilitator, Sir Ketumile 
Masire and the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General, 
Moustapha Niasse, witnessed the event. 
The inter-Congolese dialogue had opened some 15 months 
earlier, also in Sun City. 
"These agreements offer the Congolese people the best 
chance of restoring peace and promoting national reconcili-
ation that they have had since the beginning of the conflict", 
noted UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in his message to 
the final Sun City session. 
In the margins of the long negotiating process the EU Special 
Representative, Aldo Ajello, accompanied by representatives of 
the Commission, played an active role in trying to narrow dif-
ferences between the Congolese parties. 
Cautious enthusiasm 
However, enthusiasm at the gathering was tempered by an 
awareness of the difficulties which lie ahead, continuing news 
of conflict in the Eastern Congo and by the absence of 
President Kabila and the leader of the MLC, Jean-Pierre 
Bemba. The absence of the President was however, at least offi-
cially, motivated by the choice as location of Sun City instead 
of Kinshasa, rather than by a lack of commitment to the out-
come. President Kabila apparently showed his commitment to 
the outcome by promulgating the new Constitution in 
Kinshasa on 5 April and was sworn in as the "new" President. 
Mr Bemba also rapidly made known his support for the 
Constitution, while the MLC designated leading figures to 
senior positions in the new state authorities. On the other 
hand, ihc RC'1 ) expressed the concern, both in Sun City anel 
after the promulgation, that this act should have been carried 
out before a new president of the supreme court of justice, 
rather than the one who had been appointed five years ago; 
these acts were thus not legally valid in their view. 
In all, some 36 resolutions were adopted by the final session 
of the inter-Congolese dialogue. The All-inclusive Agreement 
provides for the post of president and four vice presidents, a 
transitional government composed of 36 ministers and 25 vice 
ministers and a national assembly. All these posts are distributed 
among the parties to the agreement according to an agreed for-
mula. The Agreement also provides for the holding of the first 
free and democratic elections in the country since 1960 -
although logistical difficulties in organising these elections could 
result in their postponement for up to one year. A monitoring 
commission chaired by President Kabila has been set up to pro-
vide for the effective application of the Agreement and to resolve 
any differences which may arise among signatories. At the same 
time an international accompanying committee will follow the 
implementation of the Agreement and act as a forum for arbi-
tration of difficulties. This international committee is being 
established with membership of the five permanent members of 
the UN Security Council, Belgium, South Africa, the African 
Union and its troika (Zambia, RSA and Mozambique), Canada 
and the EU Presidency and Commission. 
Army restructuring 
The Agreement provides for the creation of an integrated 
and restructured national army, including the armed forces 
of the government, the MLC and the RCD. However, the 
precise structure and composition of this new army proved 
to be a highly sensitive issue throughout the later stages of 
negotiations. Finally, the exact distribution of posts in the 
army was not clearly settled amongst the former belliger-
ents and this issue thus remains to be settled in the context 
of the Monitoring Commission. Potential problems also 
remain on the matter of security in Kinshasa, particularly 
on the side of the RCD, so that it will be of critical impor-
tance to establish the neutral international force and mixed 
police provided for in the Agreement as quickly as possible. 
Only two days after the Sun City gathering news broke of 
the massacre of a large number of civilian victims in a three-
hour orgy of inter-ethnic violence in eastern Congo. Efforts 
to address these problems are being made through the local-
ly established Ituri Pacification Committee, but there is a 
clear relationship between this violence in eastern Congo, the 
division of the country and the involvement of Uganda and 
Rwanda in the affairs of their large neighbour. In fact, the 
difficulties in the east are certainly a major factor complicat-
ing the establishment of the transitional government in 
Kinshasa. At the same time, the establishment of the transi-
tional government is virtually a precondition for achieving a 
lasting peace in eastern Congo. This situation arises from the 
complex web of alliances between local groups, the parties in 
the inter-Congolese dialogue and the Ugandan and 
Rwandan authorities, all of whom feel that their interests are 
threatened by the possible evolution of the volatile and 
unstable situation. Following the massacre of civilians, a 
recent meeting of the UN Security Council called on all 
Congolese parties to ensure that the transitional government 
in the DRC is established as soon as possible and to cooper-
ate with the newly created Ituri Pacification Committee. 
There is little doubt that an overwhelming majority of 
Congolese now desire reunification and an end to the long 
war which has caused a major setback to the country's devel-
opment, in addition to so much human suffering. This desire 
is no doubt shared by most of the country's political leaders. 
But the maximum political will needs to be deployed to 
overcome inevitable resistance from those within the various 
groupings who feel that they may be losers because of the dis-
mantling of the existing power structures. The international 
community should therefore do everything possible to assist 
the transition with political and diplomatic support. 
The international donor community has also indicated will-
ingness to come forward with increased development assis-
tance. At a World Bank Consultative Group meeting in Paris 
last December, donors announced or confirmed financial 
contributions for a total exceeding $2.5 billion following a 
focus 
Destroyed houses, the result of fighting between Ugandan 
and Rwandese troops in Copo, a district of Kisangani. Congo 
has been at the centre of what has been called Africa's 
world war. Governments and troops from Angola, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Uganda and Rwanda have all been involved in 
the conflict. As many as three million people may have 
perished in the Congo during the conflict, either as a direct 
result of fighting or because of disease and malnutrition. 
period in which many donors had been partly or entirely 
absent from the country. In practice, however, much of this 
funding will only appear if continuing progress is made with 
implementation of the transition. 
In January 2002, EU Commissioner Poul Nielson signed a 
National Indicative Programme for €120 million, which is 
now 85 per cent committed. In February 2003 Mr Nielson 
wrote to President Kabila informing the President of his readi-
ness to sign the new agreement under the 9th EDF for an 
amount of €205 million as soon as the All-inclusive Agreement 
has been adopted and the new transitional government is in 
place. The EU will also pursue substantial humanitarian assis-
tance and provide regional funding through SADC and 
COMESA for transnational projects benefiting the DRC. The 
EU Council recently adopted a common position committing 
the EU to lending "its support to the transitional government 
for die reconstruction and development of the country, ensur-
ing that such support benefits all the Congolese people and all 
regions of the DRC, and that it contributes dynamically and 
proactively to the peace process by promoting the restoration of 
the Congolese state, good governance, and improvement in the 
economic situation and respect for human rights". 
Security and demobilisation 
A particular priority over the next few years will be the 
reform of the security sector. 
The EU is a major contributor to the Multi-Country 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) for 
the greater Great Lakes Region. The creation of the new army 
should lead to substantial demobilisation of ex-combatants. It 
is believed that as many as 120,000 troops from the govern-
ment and rebel armies could be demobilised over the coming 
three to four year period and qualify for assistance in the frame-
work of a national demobilisation and reintegration pro-
gramme for the DfvC. 
The DRC should not only be seen as a candidate for the 
receipt of development assistance. The country's vast natural 
resources would certainly attract substantial foreign invest-
ment, most immediately in the mining sector, in the case of 
peace being secured and a satisfactory standard of governance 
being established. The potential rewards of peace for the coun-
try are immense. And the restoration of stability and econom-
ic and social progress in the DRC would result in incalculable 
benefits for the greater Great Lakes region and indeed the 
African continent. 
Let us hope that the Congolese political leadership responds 
to the great challenge and opportunity by being present at its 
rendezvous with history through the effective implementation 
of the Sun City agreements. ■ 
* Girai Likes coordinator. DirreuvnilcAwrncnil Kir Development, European Commission 
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Kamenge Youth Centre 
An antidote to civil war 
Also known as the "alternative Nobel prize", the Right Livelihood Award for 
2002 was presented to the Kamenge Youth Centre (KYC) at the annual 
December prize-giving ceremony in Stockholm. KYC, a youth centre in Burundi, 
is a strong contrast to the surrounding devastation created by the civil war that 
has torn the country apart since 1993. At KYC, Hutus and Tutsis take part in 
shared activities and spend time together. The Centre now has over 20,000 
members and works to counteract the effects of ethnic conflict. 
Dorothy Morrissey 
The Right Livelihood Award was established in 1980 to 
award "oustanding vision and work on behalf of our planet 
and its people". Throughout the world, there are people who 
do inspiring and remarkable work, but which defies standard 
classification. Their work can involve great personal sacrifice, 
even danger, and they are often opposed by powerful forces 
around them. The award's purpose is to strengthen the posi-
tive social forces that its recipients represent and provide sup-
port and inspiration to make them a model for the future. 
According to Frank Schwalba, Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP), "A hundred years ago Nobel had the idea 
of rewarding innovation. I imagine that if he were alive today 
he wouldn't be too happy. The categories of the Nobel prize 
are now so specialised that to be a laureate, apart from in lit-
erature or for peace, you have to come from Princeton, or 
Japan, or the US, etc. This is why Jakob von Uexkull, a 
Swedish writer, lecturer, professional philatelist and former 
Member of the European Parliament, decided to create an 
'alternative Nobel prize' to pay homage to those who work in 
the name of civil society and/or for sustainable development". 
Scars 
Burundi's history has been marked by cyclical ethnic con-
flicts. Nine years of the most recent civil war — from 1993 to 
2002 — brought ethnic hatred, upheaval and many deaths. 
The capital, Bujumbura, has not been spared. Its neighbour-
hoods have experienced their share of atrocities, plus other 
problems particularly common to rampant urbanisation: 
alcoholism, drug abuse, prostitution, 
HIV/AIDS, unemployment, criminality 
and general hopelessness. Created against 
this backdrop in 1991, the Kamenge 
Youth Centre is the dream of three Italian 
missionaries, Marino Bettinsoli, Victor 
Ghirardi and Claudio Marano. Their aim 
was to find a place where the youth of the 
Between 1,000 and 1,500 young 
people attend the Centre 
each day, and take part in a 
broad range of activities. 
"Our aim is not to get people to love one another - it is far more ambitious than 
that", says Claudio Marano, one of the founders of the centre, here with volunteer 
teacher Guillaume Harushimana. 
neighbourhoods could come and take part in activities 
together· "We work in north Bujumbura, the town's largest 
quarter where about 200,000 out of the capital's population 
of 350,000 live," explains Claudio Marano. "Overall there 
are 40 per cent Hutus and 40 per cent Tutsis, with the rest 
being a mix of people from the Democratic Republic of the 
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Congo, Rwanda and Tanzania. The aim of the centre is not 
to get people to love one another — it is far more ambitious 
than that. People need to learn how to respect one another in 
their everyday lives. We have adopted a group work 
approach. Every day young people can take part in their 
choice of some thirty activities, rather than spending all day 
looking at the sky and the clouds or waiting for the shooting 
to end. We want to push them to lead an active life and find 
work. In this way they meet others, taking classes together 
once or twice a week for four to six months. One day they'll 
say hello, another day ask 'Where are you from?', the third 
start to talk a bit and by the fourth day they will have struck 
up a friendship. People begin to respect one another. And 
that's the beginning of a greater Burundi." 
Claudio Marano jokes that Burundi is just one big village 
where everyone knows everyone else, what region they are 
from, to which family they belong. The work of the centre is 
founded on diversity and its mission is to convert this diversi-
ty into the foundations of democracy. "We work not only with 
ethnic differences but also with differences between nationals 
and non-nationals, with religious differences — we have three 
main religions, Catholic, Protestant and Islam - differences 
between rich and poor, political differences. We are trying to 
learn, in a country that has barely known democracy, what 
democracy is. We are trying to build a new society." 
Range of activities 
Between 1,000 and 1,500 young people attend the centre 
each day. Membership is free. They take part in discussions 
and seminars, study days, sports and cultural activities, and 
use the library's 14,000 books, attend remedial classes, and so 
on. Courses are offered in a broad range of subjects; comput-
ing, sewing, typing, language classes (English, French, 
Spanish, Arabic, German, Italian), mathematics, science, 
accountancy, the highway code, human rights, etc. All are 
taught by volunteers. The centre is also involved with local 
schools. As one teacher, Guillaume Harushimana, explains, 
"We mainly organise sports and cultural activities in the 
schools, but we are also working to raise H1V/A1DS aware-
ness. According to the latest UNAIDS figures, 13 per cent of 
the population aged between 15 and 49 is now infected with 
the virus. In Bujumbura's northern neighbourhoods, some 
20-25 per cent of people are infected". 
With over 20,000 members, the centre also prides itself on 
achieving an ethnic balance between Tutsis and Hutus. 
However, the number of girls who attend the centre might seem 
surprisingly low to some. "Five per cent! To a foreigner that is 
very low, but to an African it is a lot," says Claudio Marano. 
"Five per cent of 20,000 members means that 1,000 girls leave 
their houses, leave their work and come to the centre to take 
part in activities, use the libran' or study. In the past we tried 
organising girl-onlv activities but that did not work. A few years 
ago we opened all activities to girls. In some competitions girls 
play right alongside boys, and the same goes for schooling. It is 
also a victor)· over another African prejudice; girls on one side, 
boys on the other, and each in their own world." 
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As well as the Kamenge Youth Centre, there were 
three other laureates this year: 
Martin Green (Australia) - Honorary Award - "for 
his dedication and outstanding success in responding 
to the key technological challenge and moral 
imperative of our age: the harnessing of solar energy"; 
The Kvinna Till Kvinna Foundation (Sweden), 
"for its remarkable successes in healing the wounds 
of ethnic hatred and war in the Balkans, by helping 
women, often the prime victims, to be the major 
agents of reconciliation and peace-building"; 
Martin Almada (Paraguay), "for his outstanding 
courage and persistent efforts to expose and bring to 
account the torturers and to set his country on a new 
course of democracy, respect for human rights and 
sustainable development". 
The centre is also making waves beyond Africa. In summer, 
it is not unusual to see Europeans here. "We work on the prin-
ciple of positive globalisation," says Claudio Marano. "This 
means meeting others and understanding the problems and 
pleasures of other countries. Obviously, it is not with the 
intention of encouraging Burundians to leave their homeland 
because it is at war. Many here believe that escaping to anoth-
er country would mean the end of their problems. When the 
opportunity arises to go abroad, to study, take part in seminars 
or international meetings, we encourage the young people at 
the centre to go. Reciprocally, we welcome young people, stu-
dents or teachers from other countries who come to stay at the 
centre for a week or two. They are usually Italians, French or 
Swiss. They come mainly during the summer when we organ-
ise work, construction and training camps." 
In the midst of the centre there is a military station, a 'gift' 
from the army during the war. About 300 soldiers are mem-
bers of the centre, as are residents of a nearby camp of 
Bagnamulenge refugees. According to Claudio Marano, "it is 
an incredible, potentially explosive mix, but it works here. 
Bagnamulenge refugees, soldiers, rebels, Hutus, Tutsis, 
Rwandans, Congolese, Tanzaniane... all these people can live 
together. They just need to be given the chance." 
Peace and reconciliation 
During the war, the centre was attacked and looted, its 
workers threatened and many of its members killed. Despite it 
all, it endured, proving that conflict is survivable. In fact, dur-
ing the wat years the centte helped bury the dead and sup-
ported displaced people by distributing food, medicines and 
emergency materials. In an effort to help the peace-building 
process, it also organised inter-ethnic meetings, discussion 
groups and a summer camp for 1,000 young people. Together 
with two other NGOs, the centre is the principal coordinator 
of an Office for Community Associations of the Northern 
District, which now has 300 member groups. The Office pro-
vides them with technical support, help with projects and 
fundraising, financial and other assistance with micro-
projects. It works on various programmes of peace, reconciliation 
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and reconstruction with the local authorities, the churches, 
the schools and with departments of the national government. 
Each month the centre publishes a newsletter, Arc-en-Ciel 
(Rainbow) where young people can express their ideas. 
Financed mainly by the European Community and 
Austrian, Canadian and American partners, the Kamenge 
Youth Centre is a full-time operation, employing 50 full-time 
workers and 40 volunteers. It is attracting more and more 
visitors, including many ambassadors. "They are brought here 
to see a place where Burundians live together," explains 
Claudio Marano. "They can see with their own eyes what they 
could not believe existed. They often ask whether they are real-
ly in Burundi, seeing Tutsis and Hutus together. To them, it's 
a miracle. To us, it is proof that after ten years of war it is pos-
sible for the people of Burundi to live in peace, to be able to 
build a different country." ■ focus 
EU enlargement and development 
The Czech Republic: 
an emerging partner for ACP countries 
Accession of the Czech Republic to the European Union on 1 May 2004, now 
supported by more than 60 per cent of the country, is awaited with high 
expectations; but also with an understanding that membership carries with it 
responsibilities - not least towards the EU's partners in the developing world. 
Jaroslav Olsa, jr.* 
Most Czechs look forward to some aspects of EU 
membership, such as free movement of labour and easier travel, 
but they also have questions and concerns. They also appreci-
ate that the responsibilities of membership mean, among 
other things, participation in joint and bilateral development 
cooperation projects. So the Czech authorities are preparing 
for an increase in Czech official development assistance. 
Development cooperation will probably not be substantial 
immediately after the country's accession. Nevertheless, the con-
cerns expressed from time to rime that the new Member States 
will be more of a burden than a support to the ACP countries, 
will soon prove unfounded in the case of the Czech Republic. 
A history of trade and cooperation 
There is a long tradition of contacts between the historical 
Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia) and the territories 
and lands that are now ACP countries. Czech explorers and 
traders travelled the world and promoted Czech skills such as 
glass manufacturing. 
The independent Czechoslovak Republic established in 
1918 was among the most industrialised countries in Europe 
and the world. Soon companies were selling their products on 
every continent, and Czechoslovak society was well informed 
about even most distant regions. The government soon realised 
that its support was crucial to the success of these companies 
and made enormous efforts to promote foreign relations. 
A decade after its independence, Czechoslovakia already had 
more than 90 diplomatic and consular missions around the 
world, including consulates in Africa, Asia and the Americas. It 
became an active member of the League of Nations, where it 
often became involved in the mediation of political disputes 
outside Europe. 
The Cold War era 
World War II changed everything. Czechoslovakia became 
part of the socialist Eastern bloc of countries led by the Soviet 
Union. As the countries of Eastern Europe rebuilt themselves 
in the aftermath of war, they anticipated overproduction and 
wanted to find markets in newly-born independent states. 
But soon ideology overshadowed this trade interest and 
Eastern bloc involvement in the developing world largely fol-
lowed political ties. It grew mainly in those countries that 
indicated sympathy with the Marx-Leninist worldview. It is 
difficult to draw a line between aid and trade in those early 
years, as most aid was in a form of soft loans to cover the pur-
chase of goods. Nevertheless the sharing of experience and 
know-how became more and more important. Typical 
examples of Czechoslovak aid recipients in the 1950s were 
Egypt, Indonesia and Guinea. 
Massive development aid and cooperation followed in the 
1960s, '70s and '80s, when Czechoslovakia became involved in 
a number of ACP countries, including Ethiopia, Angola, 
Tanzania, Cuba, Ghana and Zambia. Thousands of 
Czechoslovak specialists worked abroad on every kind of proj-
ect, from building paper factories to creating artificial ponds for 
fish farming. Czechoslovak doctors as well as experts in tropi-
cal agriculture, geologists and vets travelled to remote parts of 
their host countries in an effort to support development. 
Such projects were often commercial in their origins, but 
political motivation soon prevailed. As a result the emphasis 
changed to more straightforward development aid. 
Constructing dams and building museums was seen as more 
of a political imperative in the global race for supremacy 
between socialism and capitalism. Successful projects were 
regarded as the symbols of the inevitable triumph of socialism. 
But whatever the ideological motives, such projects did in fact 
provide huge support in the development of these countries. 
Humanitarian and development aid in the past decade 
The collapse of the Eastern bloc in 1989 was followed in 
1993 by the peaceful division of Czechoslovakia into two 
independent countries, the Czech Republic and the Slovak 
Republic. These events inevitably had a limiting effect on 
cooperation with the countries of Asia, Africa and the 
Americas as the Czech Republic focused its attention on 
becoming a full member of the community of democratic 
European nations. 
But even in 1994 it was clear that the new republic was not 
entirely overlooking its responsibilities towards the developing 
world. The Czech Republics ambassador to the UN, presid-
ing the Security Council meetings, relentlessly fought for UN 
action in Rwanda during the genocide. Czech humanitarian 
assistance to Rwanda and Eastern Zaire immediately followed 
the end of the war there. Since then Czech humanitarian aid 
has reached many more African countries, such as war-torn 
Somalia and Mozambique during the floods. 
More recent destinations for humanitarian aid have includ-
ed refugee camps in the eastern parts of Guinea, Ghana, also 
devastated by floods, and the drought-stricken Ogadcn region 
of Ethiopia. The Czech Republic has also taken part in various 
peacekeeping operations in Africa. Since the early 1990s sev-
eral dozen military officers have participated in UN missions 
in Namibia, Angola, Somalia, Mozambique and Liberia. 
Recently Czech military observers were involved in operations 
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in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
on the Ethiopia/Eritrea border. 
In the early 1990s there were hardly any Czech NGOs in 
the field of development and humanitarian aid working in 
Asia or Africa, but in recent years several have started opera-
tions abroad. Among them is the Czech branch of the human-
itarian agency ADRA. The People in Need Foundation is a 
nonprofit, non-governmental organisation which started its 
activities in war-torn Yugoslavia and other Balkan countries in 
the early 1990s, but soon expanded to have aid programmes 
world-wide. 
Openness to other cultures 
Although the Czech Republic has reached only 60 per cent of 
the EU's economic average, and only the capital, Prague, is 
above it, there is no danger that development assistance to far-
away countries might be regarded by the public as a waste of 
resources that could be better used at home. Czech society is 
traditionally open and interested in contacts with other cultures. 
Ethnographic material and art from various African coun-
tries as well as from the Pacific form permanent collections, 
open to the public. Cultural contacts are on the rise. Charles 
University in Prague has a Masters programme in African 
studies since the mid 1960s, and the tradition of Arabic stud-
ies dates back to the mid 19th century. 
Future prospects 
Soon after the internal political and economic consolida-
tion, the Czech government adopted, in 1995, legal principles 
for providing foreign development assistance, in line with EU 
policy. Since this new legal instrument was adopted there has 
been a steady increase in the volume of aid, the number of 
projects and the number of countries helped. Most ofthat aid 
has gone to other countries undergoing ttansformation, such 
as the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union. 
In 1999 Czech development assistance was only USS16.78 m. In 
2001 it reached US$35.5 m. It is still only 0.063 per cent of GNP, 
but the government is planning to reach its goal of 0,108 per cent 
of GNP, including its contribution to the European Development 
Fund, by 2007. With further increases in aid after that, the aim will 
be to reach the EU target of at least 0,33 per cent of GNP 
The Czech government has discussed its obligations in the 
area of development cooperation after accession to the EU, 
which will have financial, institutional and organisational 
implications. In January last year it approved a foreign aid pro-
gramme for the period until 2007. 
A Development Centre has been created within the foreign 
ministry. It will have an advisor)' role and will consist of repre-
sentatives from government, NGOs, the academic community 
and other bodies. It will in the future be expanded into a fullv-
fledged development agency. 
Multilateral aid cooperation will initially account for up to 
60 per cent of total Czech aid, but in due course greater impor-
tance will be given to bilateral cooperation. So, criteria for 
choosing development partners have been laid down, with 
emphasis on the level of social and economic development, the 
rule of law and the level of democrac)' achieved. Sectoral prior-
ities will include environmental protection and support for sus-
tainable development, health care, water management, educa-
tion and support for good governance programmes. 
The government is currently in the process of selecting 
future development assistance partners within the ACP coun-
tries. The first under consideration are those in which develop-
ment programmes have already started, such as Namibia, 
Angola, Mali, Burkina Faso, Zambia and Ethiopia. 
While cooperation programmes in Africa are already in place, 
Czech involvement with the Caribbean and Pacific countries is in 
its infancy. The Republic has already established diplomatic rela-
tions with all the CARICOM countries (except the Bahamas) 
and with five countries in the Pacific region'. Discussions with 
the others began in 1999. Development programmes should 
undoubtedly start in these regions too. Cooperation in the field 
of education with, for example, the University of the South 
Pacific, is one possibility, which would benefit several Pacific 
states. But this is a question for the future. ■ 
* Czech Ambassador to Zimbabwe and former director of the African department of 
tile Czech Foreign Ministry. 
1. Papua New Guinea.Vanuatu, Solomon Islands. Fiji and Samoa. 
Chechen capital Grozny. The war-torn 
Republic of Chechnya ranks among 
the most ravaged areas in Europe. 
j Much of the Czech Republic's aid has 
traditionally gone to neighbouring 
regions, inclujçljng the former Γ 
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Rum maturing in oak barrels 
Adding punch 
to the Caribbean rum industry 
Originally known as 'rumbullion' or 'killdevil' because of its potent effect, rum has been 
produced in many ACP Caribbean island nations from as early as the mid-1600s in 
tandem with sugarcane cultivation. It has become an indigenous industry throughout the 
region with global sales. In the wake of threats from cheaper rum exports through global 
trade liberalisation, the European Union (EU) is adding strength to the industry with a 
€70 million grant to Caribbean producers in 15 ACP countries to improve the all round 
international competitiveness of their products. The measures are important for poverty 
prevention, since the industry employs an estimated 10,000 Caribbean-wide, with many 
more dependent indirectly on the industry for their livelihoods. 
Debra Percival 
This four-year programme, which took off in 
August 2002, is a "one-off" to the industry, says Brian 
Kelly, counsellor at the Barbados-based EU delegation to 
the Eastern Caribbean, designed to offset the predicted 
losses to the industry in the wake of a gradual opening of 
the global market for white spirits since 1996. 
In November 1996, in a round of world trade talks, the US 
and the EU agreed to open international markets for white 
spirits such as gin and vodka in return for better access to the 
US technology market. Under the Most Favoured Nation 
(MFN) agreement in world trade rules, any concessions had 
to be extended to all exporters, the upshot being the opening 
of the EU market to -white spirits including rum from 
producers in Brazil, Panama, Mexico and Venezuela. 
This gave rise to the fear that purchasers of bulk white 
rum in the EU might in future opt to source their white 
spirit for their blends amongst cheaper suppliers, to the 
detriment of the West Indian Caribbean product. Since 
January 2003, as a result of the 1996 deal, all but a global 
residual duty on white spirits remains and will be phased 
out before 2010, say industry experts. 
For Patrick Mayers, current chairman of the West Indies 
Rum and Spirits Producers' Association (WTRSPA), the 
long-standing body which facilitates trade in West Indian 
rum, the deal done in the world trade talks highlighted "yet 
again the flaws in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and constraints in the body for consultation of small island 
states' trading issues". Mayers estimates that the Caribbean 
producers collectively stood to lose US$260 million per 
annum from what was the seemingly innocuous deal in the 
1996 round of talks in Singapore. It was another blow for 
the region after jolts in recent years to the banana industry, 
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new threats of global competition for the sugar industry 
and the precarious nature of tourism, currently the eco-
nomic mainstay of many of the islands. 
More open EU market 
Ironically, Caribbean rum producers have never had such 
an open EU market for their products. In the past, the rum 
protocol of successive Lomé Conventions allowed only 
restricted amounts of both the aged brown rums and bulk 
white rum to enter the EU market. Quantitative restric-
tions were put in place because of French fears of competi-
tion for their rum from their overseas departments; 
Martinique, Guadeloupe and Reunion. The ACP 
Caribbean industry successfully lobbied to dismantle these 
restrictions and allow unlimited amounts to flow into the 
EU market under the Cotonou Agreement. 
Brian Kelly explains that the EU programme will reduce 
dependency on the "commodity rum" or white spirit, and add 
value and increase sales of the "dark" or "golden" aged rums. 
The rum industry is a risky business and production is in 
terms of years. As one spokesperson for the industry points 
out, "excellence requires time". Take the products of Mount 
Gay, one of the leading rum manufacturers in Barbados 
which celebrated its 300th anniversary this year. It produces 
rum of between 2-10 years maturity. Harvested sugar is 
boiled to produce the treacly molasses substance, to which 
is added the unique coral-filtered Barbados water in huge 
oak vats in the initial fermentation. 
Two different distillates are then produced: "Coffey still" 
which gives rum a subtle character, and traditional copper 
"pot" stills in use since the 1700s, which imparts a stronger, 
aromatic flavour. The two distillates are stored for several 
years and then placed in barrels where they gain flavours. 
Once matured, they are "married" by the master blender 
whose craft is highly skilled. 
Cotonou declaration 
The starting point for the EU programme was a declara-
tion attached to the Cotonou Agreement replacing the for-
mer restrictive rum protocols. 
The 2 February 2000 declaration on rum reads: "The 
Parties recognise the importance of the rum sector for the 
economic and social development of several ACP countries 
and regions and its major contribution in providing 
employment, export earnings and Government revenues. 
They acknowledge that rum is a value added agro-industri-
al ACP product capable, if appropriate efforts are under-
taken, of competing in a global economy". 
It further stated: "rum, arak and tafia orginating in the 
ACP countries or falling under HS code 22 08 40 shall be 
imported under this Agreement and any successor agreement 
to this Agreement, duty free and without quantitative limita-
tions". 
And added: "The Community undertakes to ensure fair 
competition in the Community market and that ACP rum 
is not disadvantaged or discriminated against in the EU 
market, in relation to third country rum producers". 
Mayers says that those eligible for grants must produce 
rum which is fermented and distilled in ACP countries and 
must come exclusively from sugarcane - no beet is permit-
ted. A recipient must be a producer, or distiller, or be eligi-
ble to sell rum. 
Beneficiaries of the programme are expected to come 
from any of the following rum producing ACP nations; 
Barbados, Suriname, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Grenada, St Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia, 
Dominica, Antigua, St Kitts and Nevis, Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Belize and the Bahamas. 
The programme has been drawn up to benefit both the 
larger, better-known companies, as well as the smaller ones 
seeking to develop and market their products. Brian Kelly 
explains that costs will be shared with the beneficiary who 
will put up a big percentage of the grant. For example, the 
EU could provide a grant of up to 50 per cent of the total 
cost of a "business plan", but just 28 per cent maximum of 
the costs of, say, upgrading a distillery. This sliding scale of 
grants is to ensure that smaller businesses in particular are 
given a boost and also that grants comply with World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) subsidy rules. 
Grant windows 
Each of the four "windows" in the programme has a sep-
arate budget and ceilings governing the maximum grant to 
an eligible recipient. The programme is financed from 
unallocated European Development Fund (EDF) monies. 
The windows are intended for modernisation and 
upgrading of facilities, marketing and distribution, waste 
treatment and business plans. A sizeable sum outside these 
windows will also go towards the development of 
Caribbean "marques" or brands. 
The €70 million is allocated as follows: 
• €14.7 million for modernisation and new equipment for 
distilleries. 
• €21.7 million for distribution and marketing; 
• €9.8 million for waste treatment and other environmen-
tal aspects of the disposal of molasses, important for both 
citizens' health on the islands and for the tourism-based 
economies whose selling points are pristine beaches and 
translucent, unpolluted sea; 
• €3.5 million to develop "business plans" to help small 
companies in particular. 
Outside these windows, some €2.1 million is earmarked 
for WIRSPA itself to help run the programme. A four-per-
son office set up in the Hastings, Barbados, will field grant 
applications and act as an information point. 
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into an even more effective lobby for the Caribbean rum 
industry and anticipates that more producers will join the 
body. Currently 80 per cent of the region's producers are 
members. An active lobby is vital since the region is cur-
rently negotiating a regional free trade agreement with the 
Americas and is also negotiating Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs) with the EU. 
€16.1 million will go to develop Caribbean "marques" 
for rum. Patrick Mayers mentions the possible develop-
ment of a device to help consumers identify genuine 
Caribbean rum, others suggesting alternative trademarks. 
A €1.4 million sum for technical assistance is also budget-
ed. Brian Kelly says that periods of highly qualified expertise 
will be needed to assist with the programme, for example to 
advise on intellectual property rights. 
Up-beat 
Despite the looming global competition, there are 
signs of untapped markets across the globe and 
enthusiasm in the Caribbean industry. 
Laurie Barnard has a small family-run business in 
St Lucia and says his sales are "holding up." He has 
to import molasses from Guyana since St Lucia no 
longer produces sugarcane. 
Malibu, which sources all its molasses from the two 
remaining sugarcane factories in Barbados, is famous 
for coconut and lime-flavoured rums. 
Chairman of Foursquare, Sir David Seale, says that 
the distillery is to re-start grinding sugarcanes for the 
venture. For Barbados Prime Minister Owen Arthur, 
Foursquare's new production is a sign of optimism 
for the agro-industrial sector: "There is still a future 
Above: Disused sugar grinder, St Vincent and the Grenadines. 
Below: Barbados; the rum industry has grown alongside sugar cultivation. 
for Barbadian manufacturing, but manufacturers from the 
outset have to plan their facilities to be world-class, to be 
export-oriented, and to use modern technology to the 
fullest," he commented at the launch of this new rum project. 
The problems facing the industry give rise to wider reflec-
tions from Patrick Mayers on what the Caribbean is up 
against as global markets are liberalised. He feels the "lack of 
a level playing field" in international trade is unjust, and 
draws attention to the heavy subsidises given to Brazil's sugar 
industry. He says that Caribbean nations should be singled 
out for special assistance. 
He draws a parallel with the EU's own Treaty of 
Amsterdam which underlines the need for special assistance 
to the Union's own far-flung shores such as Madeira, the 
Azores and Reunion due to their "unique situation" being 
"far from markets" and with special topography. 
The jury is obviously still out on how much the pro-
gramme will be able to achieve to help the region meet the 
competition. Patrick Mayers suggests that €200 million may 
be required in total to help the industry get a foothold 
between now and 2010 after the 1996 blow. The EU's current 
programme, which is poised to approve its initial grants to the 
industry, is providing a start. ■ 
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OECHO/TGoemans 
UN Dossier 
Post-conflict rehabilitation 
The multiplication of conflicts, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is one of the major obstacles to 
ACP-EU cooperation. Article 11 of the Cotonou Agreement concerns peace-building policies, conflict 
prevention and resolution. However, as Adam Higazi explains, although a new political framework is 
now in place, the adoption of rehabilitation programmes is a complex and delicate operation. 
Rehabilitation is in the "grey zone" between emergency aid and long-term development actions. 
François Grünwald looks at evolutions in the concept of LRRD - the link between relief, 
rehabilitation and development. The EU has also adapted its rehabilitation actions as far as possible 
to the realities on the ground, attempting to overcome the difficulties caused by the diversity of 
procedures and instruments and the variety of players involved. Jeannette Akua Eno and 
Sonja Siegmund look at concrete programmes implemented respectively in Sierra Leone and in the 
Pacific. Nicky Hitchcock looks at how the nature of peacekeeping has shifted, from being purely 
military to including civilian-managed activities. In the case of demobilisation of ex-combatants, 
Vanessa Farr evokes the underestimated role played by women in war, as a consequence of which 
they are often overlooked in demobilisation planning. Children are among the most vulnerable 
victims of conflict, and UNICEF describes its work in protecting children during wartime and its 
aftermath. Markus Kostner describes a regional approach to demobilisation and disarmament in the 
greater Great Lakes region. Finally, Marion Horroff-Travel describes the work of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in the post-conflict period, and the dilemmas often faced. Dossier 
The proliferation of conflicts 
within the ACP has been a 
major cause of impoverishment 
and suffering, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa, and 
constitutes one of the major 
political and developmental 
challenges of ACP-EU 
cooperation. Conflict 
prevention, resolution and 
rehabilitation are addressed in 
Article 11 of the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement, which 
is some indication that at the 
level of policy-making, conflict 
issues are now being taken 
more seriously. But even with 
this new policy framework in 
place, the challenge remains to 
put it into practice. 
Adam Higazi* 
There are perhaps four key dilemmas which surface in 
implementating rehabilitation programmes. The first is when to 
engage; the second is the strategic approach needed to match the 
complexities of conflict; the third is the institutional arrangements 
ret]tiired for the effective implementation of policies; and the fourth 
is ensuring a coherent political response to a given conflict. These 
dilemmas of course overlap; so policy-makers must address them in 
an integrated and coherent way. They are likely to be relevant areas 
of concern in development cooperation generally, but they are inten-
sified during interventions in areas of conflict or in fragile states. 
This is particularly so for the European Commission (EC), a large 
donor with a complex organisational structure. If the EC is to 
respond effectively to conflicts there has to be good coordination 
among its different elements, and consistency between the decisions 
it makes at the supranational level with those made by intergovern-
mental bodies.' 
When to engage? 
The message that emerged in all of the studies undertaken by 
ECDPM was that rehabilitation programmes should start as early as 
possible. This is necessary to address both the immediate humani-
tarian needs that arise from conflict and to support the longer 
processes of political, economic and social development that tackle 
the underlying causes of conflict and aim at resolution and stability. 
In this understanding, rehabilitation constitutes part of a broad 
strategy that addresses the different levels and patterns of conflict in 
both the short and long term. This means moving away from linear 
conceptions of conflict and rehabilitation, which in reality do not 
correspond to the complexities of conflict situations. What has been 
shown is the need to respond to situations of much greater volatili-
ty, where there are fluctuations in the intensity of violence both tem-
porally and regionally, and where there is a fine line between stabil-
ity and renewed upheaval. For this reason the distinction between 
relief and development programming is artificial: rehabilitation 
should integrate the two. This helps to lessen disruptions in plan-
ning and funding during crises, and points to the need for a 
Dilemmas and definitions 
in post-conflict rehabilitation 
coherent response that starts early and also incorporates conflict pre-
vention into development policies.
2 
One of the most successful instances of this "integrated" strategy 
of rehabilitation was the intervention by the EC in the Liberian war. 
The war went through three main phases throughout the early to 
mid-1990s (the third phase was ended by the Abuja II Accords in 
1996), but the EC intervention referred to here relates to the first 
Rehabilitation Programme for Liberia, implemented with consider-
able success between March 1994 and February 1998. The approach 
in this case was to ensure that the minimum conditions for stability 
and cooperation emerged through well-targeted policies, rather than 
waiting for minimum conditions to be met at the outset. The 
implementation of EC rehabilitation policies helped to reduce con-
flict in Liberia by maintaining — and even launching - rehabilitation 
activities at peak emergency times. These targeted the principal caus-
es of conflict and the main obstacles to the peace process, and were 
implemented in lieu of strategies set out in the National Indicative 
Programme that was drawn up from the Country Strategy Papet 
prior to the emergency. As the conflict became more serious the 
responsibilities of the National Authorising Officer were taken over 
by the EC's Chief Authorising Officer, enabling the desk officer in 
Brussels to coordinate the EU's response. The basic principles of the 
strategy were a neutral approach and the stimulation of key services 
and infrastructures, both preconditions for a sustainable rehabilita-
tion. The continued and increased engagement of the EC during the 
crisis also gave it more leverage in its mediation efforts to encourage 
a resolution and helped to enable cooperation from Member States. 
Strategic considerations 
The second dilemma, strategic considerations, concerns in par-
ticular the adaptations that are needed to link relief, rehabilita-
tion and development (LRRD) in the challenging environment 
of fragile states. This calls for systematic and ongoing political 
dialogue with governments and non-state actors (NSAs) to assess 
the situation and identify adequate response strategies at different 
stages of the conflict (as foreseen by Article 8 of the Cotonou 
Agreement). Strategic planning is needed, but this is best served 
by a broad framework approach - not by the kind of detailed pro-
gramming where all activities and expected results are specified 
and intricately mapped out. The strategic framework adopted 
must be multi-dimensional — to ensure that it incorporates dif-
ferent actors and addresses the different levels of conflict — and 
flexible, ro allow for quick responses to what are often rapidly 
changing situations. Policies should of course be implemented in 
accordance with the specific needs of the different people and 
regions affected by conflict. 
A participatory approach to keep track of changing needs 
among the population is also essential, as weak or collapsed state 
structures cannot usually direct aid to the sections of the popula-
tion where it is most needed. Technical and financial assistance, 
as well as humanitarian relief, therefore have to be directed main-
ly through local actors. This normally calls for a local-level pres-
ence on the part of the donor. The wide spread of EC Delegations 
in the ACP and its connections to local and international NGOs 
should mean that decentralised cooperation and participation 
strategies are a strength of EC rehabilitation efforts, but in fact 
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"deconcentrate" decision-making procedures, which should give 
more autonomy to Delegations, are therefore to be welcomed. 
Furthermore, the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, with its 
inclusion of NSAs in development cooperation, should be used as 
an incentive to support a more structured dialogue and involve-
ment of NSAs in rehabilitation efforts. The combination of 
decentralisation and local-level participation is perhaps the best 
means of promoting capacity development, which is essential for 
the ongoing process of rehabilitation, during and after conflict. 
The International Rescue 
Committee estimated in 
April 2003 that at least 
3.3 million people, and 
perhaps as many as 
4.7 million, have died as a 
direct result of the war in 
the Congo between 1999-
2003, 85-90 per cent of 
these through starvation 
and disease. This means it 
has taken more lives than 
any other conflict since 
World War II and makes it 
the deadliest documented 
conflict in African history. 
Local actors 
In the ECDPM case stud-
ies there were several exam-
ples of EC decentralised 
cooperation strategies that 
have already been put in 
place. For example, in the 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), the European 
Community Humanitarian 
Aid Office (ECHO) has 
been funding ILD pro-
grammes — "Initiatives 
Locales de Développement" 
- and local health commit-
tees. In Rwanda the EC 
channelled resources directly 
to the prefecture and com-
mune level, but maintained 
total programming autono-
my, and a similar approach 
was adopted in Burundi. 
One of the main difficulties 
in conflict and post-conflict 
Difficulties of coordination have been 
encountered in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), where the response 
has been focused through ECHO in the 
east and EDF programmes in the west. 
states, however, is finding suitable local actors to 
work with. This may be due to damage done to 
the capacity and functioning of civil society 
organisations during conflict, highlighting the 
need to link participation to capacity-building 
measures. But part of the problem arises from 
the need for an inclusive partnership - one that 
attempts to bring together different local actors 
on an equal basis. This is an important part of 
the peace-building process in conflict-affected 
countries, but can be very difficult to achieve 
because civil society groups and local govern-
ments are often polarised. Participatory 
approaches therefore encounter problems that have to be managed 
very carefully: there is a fine line between policies that reduce ten-
sions and those that inflame them. 
Dealing with local "authorities" 
A further challenge is that, for the implementation of decen-
tralised approaches, there will usually need to be some level of 
cooperation from state or regional authorities as well. This has 
been one of the problems faced by the EC during its operations in 
Sudan, a complex and long-running political emergency. Whilst 
the EL) suspended official development assistance to Sudan in 
1990, it has continued to provide humanitarian aid through 
ECHO, often in the "grey zone" between relief and rehabilitation. 
In the north the Government of Sudan (GoS), and in the south 
the main opposition group, the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement/ Army (SPLM/A), have tried to establish leverage over 
donor activities. Both the GoS and the SPLM have had vested 
interests in the way that humanitarian operations have been con-
ducted. This has raised dilemmas in terms of how best to respond 
to unwarranted political interference - particularly awkward to 
resolve because both engagement with the "authorities" and the 
disengagement (which can mean the withdrawal ot operations) 
can have very negative humanitarian implications. In Sudan 
things have been further complicated because it is a divided coun-
try where only the GoS has formal political recognition (for exam-
ple, it is the representative of Sudan at the UN) — and vet it lias 
little control over the south, where the SPLM/A has de facto 
authority. The GoS closely controls donor activities in the north 
through the Humanitarian Assistance Committee (HAG) whilst 
the SPLM has set up a humanitarian wing, the South Sudan Rel iel 
and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), to try and control inter-
national relief work in southern areas. 
The GoS has in the past broken agreements it made with donor 
agencies and NGOs - its commitments through the HAG and to 
the scheme Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) - by frequently 
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blocking aid flights to the south. For its part, the SPLM under-
took long consultations with humanitarian agencies and then 
issued a "Memorandum of Understanding" (MoU) that was sup-
posed to be signed by all implementing organisations active in 
south Sudan as an instrument to govern assistance more clearly. 
This stipulated the conditions under which agencies could oper-
ate, but in doing so breached the customary principles of neutral-
ity and independence of relief operations. An agreement whereby 
the SPLM would be able to levy taxes on humanitarian operations 
(including relief flights), hire and fire staff, and vet projects was 
not acceptable for most of the humanitarian agencies. Meanwhile, 
the non-signing of the MoU meant that the security that the 
SPLM/A was supposed to provide to the implementing organisa-
tions would be lost. In Februaty 2000, when the SPLM eventual-
ly threatened to evict and subsequently ousted those humanitari-
an agencies that would not sign the MoU, the EC decided to 
suspend funding from SPLM controlled areas, but continued to 
fund in the other areas of southern Sudan not controlled by the 
SPLM/A at the time — mostly in the Upper Nile region. In the 
summer of 2000 the European Commission reviewed its position, 
and it was agreed that it would consider financing urgent human-
itarian actions in locations of acute and immediate humanitarian 
needs, provided that these actions could be implemented in accor-
dance with internationally recognised humanitarian principles. 
When the MoU was not in the end applied to the letter by the 
SPLM, in 2001 ECHO gradually resumed its Rinding for human-
itarian efforts in south Sudan, where finally most humanitarian 
actors signed the MoU, and from 2002 ECHO has again been 
funding assistance in all areas of southern Sudan. 
As Lehtinen has written, "[T]he issue of the MoU has high-
lighted the problem of how to deal with local 'authorities' at a 
minimum level, without 
legitimising them politically". 
This has indeed been an acute 
strategic dilemma in Sudan, 
but in various ways it is a 
problem encountered in most 
interventions in conflict-
affected/fragile states. 
Furthermore, dilemmas of 
political engagement are also 
inherent in capacity-building, 
for although this is an essen-
tial aspect of the rehabilita-
tion process, the structures to 
be supported must have some 
degree of legitimacy. 
Nonetheless, as policies else-
where have shown (most 
notably in Liberia), "con-
structive engagement" and 
carefully targeted measures 
can produce positive out-
comes with respect to the 
strengthening of both gover-
nance and civil society. 
Capacity-building without political recognition remains a very 
major challenge in Sudan, but it may be that where humanitar-
ian/development strategies can co-opt rather than undermine 
civil society and local-government structures, sustainable reha-
bilitation could become more of a possibility. It does seem that 
in this respect the EC has begun to move away from past poli-
cies where responses to the crises in Sudan focused more or less 
exclusively on the delivery of humanitarian aid. Whilst such aid 
has been crucial for the survival of large numbers of people, it is 
not in itself an adequate response to a complex humanitarian 
emergency. Short-term humanitarian aid does not allow for the 
capacity building of local actors, nor long-term development 
planning by NGOs. Worse still, in Sudan aid has been manipu-
lated as a weapon of war by all sides in the conflict. A more inte-
grated strategy is needed that also paves the way for rehabilita-
tion; current EC strategies - especially the Humanitarian Plus 
programme but also the EU-Sudan political dialogue - perhaps 
reflect a shift in this direction. 
Regional approach 
A further dimension of rehabilitation strategies is that they 
often need to be regional in scope. Conflicts tend to spill over 
borders, so their regional fallout needs to be addressed; but equal-
ly the causes of conflict frequently have important regional 
aspects. In Sudan, the case for both a regional and multilateral 
approach to rehabilitation is indicated by measures needed to 
address the flow of refugees into Kenya and rebel groups into 
northern Uganda, water resource issues with Egypt, and the pos-
sible fuelling of the war through investments by foreign oil com-
panies in southern Sudan. A regional response implies good coor-
dination between actors that spans the geographic and social 
In Sudan aid has been manipulated as a weapon of war by all sides in the conflict. 
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donor agencies split between Khartoum and Nairobi. The impact 
of the conflict on neighbouring countries and the role that they 
may have in its resolution is also very important. Dialogue and 
peace-building initiatives along these lines have taken place 
through the multilateral framework of the Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development (IGAD) and were made evident in 
the Machakos Protocol of July 2002. ' 
Institutional arrangements 
The third dilemma is the specific institutional qualities and 
adaptations that are required for rehabilitation strategies to be 
effectively implemented. In a nutshell, these are flexibility, 
responsiveness, and very high levels of coordination between 
units and between policy-makers at different levels. It is especial-
ly important that institutional arrangements are in place that 
allow for effective responses to changing situations on the 
ground, and where comprehensive regional strategies for rehabil-
itation can be coordinated. This is most difficult to achieve in 
divided countries — as in Sudan. ' 
Difficulties have also been encountered in the DRC, where the 
response has been focused through ECHO in the east and EDF 
programmes in the west. The problem here is that the division in 
the EC's response between east and west DRC has not been based 
on a needs assessment, but is due to "the lack of an adaptable 
mechanism for disbursing aid in rebel-held territories" (Bourque 
and Sampson, 2001: 29). Furthermore, the EC's response to the 
war in the DRC has also lacked coordination at the regional level 
- but no single donor has managed to address all levels of crises 
in the DRC.
5 In particular, inter-communitarian conflicts have 
received scarce attention, despite the destruction they have 
caused. Some of these connect to inter-communitarian conflicts 
with their roots beyond the borders of the DRC — most promi-
nent here are the Interahamwe Hutu militias which crossed into 
the DRC from Rwanda. By and large, conflict in the DRC has 
been fuelled by the involvement of armies from surrounding 
countries in the fighting, so that although the fighting has taken 
place on the territory of the DRC, it has in another sense been a 
truly regional conflagration. There does seem to be a regional 
awareness in the political initiatives of the EC - "solutions with-
out borders must be found to problems without borders" 
(Bourque and Sampson, 2001: 10) - but, it has proved difficult 
to translate this into a strong regional approach to the coordina-
tion of aid delivery and rehabilitation. Moreover, EC develop-
ment initiatives have not been backed up strongly enough with 
the political pressure that needs to be exerted at the governmen-
tal level, on the multitude of countries with a stake in DRC's war. 
Coherent political response 
The forth dilemma in rehabilitation programming is ensuring 
a coherent political response at the EU level. Ultimately, without 
political back-up — within the Commission or from amongst 
Member States - there can be no EU response at all. 
Development practitioners can be heroes in the field but their 
work also has to be valued by political decision-makers at the 
centre, otherwise it will be seriously constrained. This highlights 
the fact that rehabilitation policies need to be integrated at many 
different levels, with interventions located within a broader polit-
ical framework. Many of the problems that emerge are the result 
of tensions between development goals and foreign policies. This 
is what happens in cases where the strategic interests of donors 
differ from the development or humanitarian needs of the coun-
try affected by conflict. Within the EU this is further complicat-
ed by the lack of coherence between the foreign policy objectives 
of different Member States. In particular, this suggests the need 
for more cooperation within the framework of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and a clearer role for the 
CFSP in relation to conflict intervention and rehabilitation. But 
this is something that the Commission has often had problems 
with, especially where rehabilitation projects are financed using 
EDF money, the flows of which can be disrupted in cases of dis-
agreement amongst members of the EDF Committee (an inter-
governmental body). In the context of the Cotonou Agreement, 
this perhaps indicates the need for more cooperation with ACP 
countries, so that at least decision-making can be made with lead-
ers from whichever region is affected. 
All of this points to the need for a higher tolerance of risk than 
would be expected in other types of development programmes. 
Risks need to be taken into account in performance criteria and 
indicators. Management procedures have to be adapted so that 
risk is accepted but at the same time minimised without losing 
operational effectiveness. This can be a difficult balance to 
achieve, particularly in cases of media and public scrutiny where 
immediate, concrete results are often expected. Part of the prob-
lem here consists of judging and then communicating the effec-
tiveness of rehabilitation in light of the difficult operational con-
text in which it takes place. Clearly, achievements have to be seen 
as relative to the general circumstances of a situation rather than 
assessed in any absolute terms, but if progress is to be made in the 
implementation of rehabilitation strategies, then innovative solu-
tions are probably needed. ■ 
* Researcheron Political Dimensions of ACP-ELJ Cooperation, European Centre for 
Development Policy Management (ECDPM). 
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The concept of emergency 
humanitarian aid developed 
around the paradigm of saving life 
and relieving suffering. The great 
famines in the Sahel in the 1970s 
demonstrated that emergency aid, 
particularly food aid, could often 
have unanticipated negative side 
effects, such as the disappearance 
of local production systems, 
dependence on imports, the 
predominance of "free" services 
making the creation of 
economically viable systems 
difficult. Therefore, the idea of 
linking relief, rehabilitation and 
development (LRRD) began to 
figure on the humanitarian aid 
agenda. The challenge was to 
provide better thought-out 
emergency aid to prevent such 
detrimental effects arising further 
down the line. 
François Grünewald* considers the 
evolution of the LRRD concept. 
Before, 
during and after crises 
better linking of relief, 
rehabilitation and development 
Until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, most conflicts 
were on hold. The link between relief and development was par-
ticularly relevant in cases of natural disasters, articulated around 
the concept of a linear continuum between relief and develop-
ment. Conventional emergency aid was what NGOs, interna-
tional agencies and institutions did best. However, people's needs 
in the affected countries were much more diversified than the 
range of relief options on offer could cover. In 1979, the late Sir 
Robert Jackson, the UN General Secretary's special representative 
People displaced by conflict or natural catastrophe are a humanitarian challenge, and also a challenge for 
reconstruction. Salvador, after the 2002 earthquake. 
with the UN relief operation in Kampuchea, devised the concept 
of emergency rehabilitation. Kampuchea, in a war situation and 
suffering an embargo because of the presence of the Vietnamese, 
was desperately in need of aid to guarantee its food security and 
to set up health and education structures. The concept of "emer-
gency rehabilitation" paved the way for "quasi-development" and 
for meeting people's real needs. 
Supporting populations' survival strategies 
Long-term crises shape aid, as they require a combination of 
humanitarian principles and development tools. Such crises can 
cancel out multi-generational development achievements and 
result in the "donor fatigue" that relief agencies so fear. They often 
end up meeting indifference, no longer of interest to the politi-
cians who hold the purse strings. But failing to acknowledge 
theses long-term crises or neglecting them means that resources 
are not mobilised. Furthermore, the absolute need for impartiali-
ty vis-à-vis the parties to a conflict also makes any involvement in 
the work of strengthening institutions or infrastructures difficult. 
Nevertheless, classic emergency aid very quickly loses its rationale 
and could even become counterproductive. But, a new approach can 
be developed using as a starting point an analysis of the survival 
strategies of populations affected by crises (reorientation of produc-
tion systems, re-allocation of scant resources, modification of rev-
enue sources, etc.), and by expanding progressively to the manage-
ment of living conditions as a whole. This new way of viewing aid 
enables populations to become actors and to throw off the status of 
"passive recipients". This approach, which was highly innovative 
when introduced by the ICRC (International Committee of the Red 
Cross) in Sudan (1988) and Somalia (1991-92), has been tested else-
where in Africa, in the Balkans, Afghanistan 
and other countries. The application of a more 
inspired approach to development in preference 
to emergency intervention has become estab-
lished practice for a number of humanitarian 
agencies, and donors have also been won over. 
Progressive adoption after the Wall 
came down 
The end of the Cold War facilitated a reso-
lution to certain conflicts, essentially conflicts 
in countries without real economic assets 
(little or no underground resources) or coun-
tries of lesser geostrategic importance, such as 
Mozambique, Kampuchea, Nicaragua, El 
Salvador and others. 
A solid UN mandate, weariness on the part of 
the population and society's upper echelons, the 
unlikely eventuality that one of the parties might 
be victorious and a low profile in the media 
appear to be key to a reasonably successful tran-
sition from war to peace and from emergency aid 
to aid for reconstruction. The conventional tools 
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of the relief/rehabilitation/development continuum can be employed, 
including participatory and partnership strategies. What this involves 
is genuine participation of the affected people in the conception, 
setting-up and evaluation of the humanitarian action. This type of 
involvement means that it is more likely that the post-humanitarian 
aid period will be considered, understood and prepared for. 
Furthermore, the creation of partnerships with local NGOs 
promotes skill transfer. Putting mechanisms in place, whereby the 
participation of the local people in the programmes of interna-
tional actors progressively leads to the opposite situation — in 
which those same international actors support and become 
involved in local initiatives - is a difficult but absolutely necessary 
reversal of roles. As demonstrated by the situation in Afghanistan, 
mechanisms have to be devised that provide reassurance for the 
embryonic national authorities and that enable actors to retain 
the impartial status they need for intervention to be continued 
should the political/military situation deteriorate. 
As well as managing the conventional form of the relief, rehabilita-
tion and development "continuum", there is also a "contiguum"; a sit-
uation in which a country is divided into zones: zones of calm where 
development programmes are possible; zones of acute crisis where 
emergency aid is required; and intermediate zones where there is a 
combination of great vulnerability and extreme volatility. Who to 
turn to? Which office to mobilise? Which budget line to tap into? 
This dilemma has arisen regularly over the past decade, as in Somalia, 
for example, to mention just one case. The same questions also arise 
in recurrent crises, such as in Angola, which furthermore prevent 
emergency aid and development aid from functioning properly. 
incidents, etc - all are tell-tale signs. Despite an abundant literature 
describing what conflict prevention involves, there is currently 
little experience and reference material to go on. Perhaps develop-
ment and the promotion of international law in general and of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) in particular will provide 
some pointers as to how to limit the risks of war or, at the very 
least, to reduce its impact on civilian populations. Advance crisis 
management must, in the long term, involve a new development-
policy paradigm. As wealth is created, will we examine the fair or 
unfair nature of the redistribution of the products of growth or 
simply allow inequalities - sources of conflict - to develop? How 
will we manage the challenge of increasingly fragile land to be 
shared out amongst increasingly large population groups? 
How, finally, in such an unstable world, will we include crisis-
management capability (warning systems, preparation strategies, 
etc.) at the very heart of development agendas? 
Popular participation in development strategies is far from 
common practice. On this subject, URD's global study on 
Consultation with and Participation by Beneficiaries and 
Affected Populations in Humanitarian Interventions attempts to 
provoke reflection on this issue '. Another future challenge is 
improving the quality of humanitarian interventions and post-
crisis actions. Here, again, an entire series of promising initiatives 
has emerged in the last few years
 
2, initiatives that, in fine, pro-
mote humanitarian intervention that not only saves but also, 
because of its quality, ability to adapt and capacity to strengthen 
resilience, restores hope, dignity... and a future. This is what links 
relief and development. ■ 
Advance crisis management 
There is always a "run-up" to a crisis: a period of economic dif-
ficulty or social/ethnic tension, human rights violations, border 
* François Grünewald i.s Chairman of the Groupe URD Otelicf/RehahilitatiotVDcvelopment (»roup; 
\\\\ w m. ι ) ami Assi niitti- h'olt'wir ai the ι diversity of Paris XTl/Crctcil, where he is Director 
of the "Humanitarian and Development Action - NGO Management" post-graduate diploma. 
1. cf. wwwa-Joh.ihtiulyparlk ip.ilionajj'j; 
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Rehabilitation is the term used 
to describe the intermediate 
stage between emergency 
relief and development. It 
covers a multitude of very 
different situations and 
variable time spans. In the 
field, rehabilitation attempts 
to bridge the gap between 
emergency assistance and the 
long-term development 
strategies set up in 
conjunction with the 
beneficiary countries. 
Translating theory into 
practice has often come up 
against the diverse and 
complex range of instruments 
available and the multiple 
players concerned. However, 
with the benefit of 
experience, rehabilitation is 
becoming increasingly 
effective. 
François Lefèbvre 
Post-conflict rehabilitation 
and the EU: 
at the crossroads 
Southern Sudan. Violent conflict has been on the increase since the end of the Cold War, principally in 
sub-Saharan Africa. These wars bring desolation in their wake: loss of life, human suffering, mass 
displacement of people, an economy on its knees, and destruction of the environment... 
Violent Conflict has been on the increase since the end of the 
Cold War, principally in sub-Saharan Africa. These wars bring 
desolation in their wake: loss of life, human suffering, mass dis-
placement of people, an economy on its knees, and destruction of 
the environment. When weapons fail or fall silent, the scars of 
war are all too present - in many countries, the industrial pro-
duction apparatus has broken down, the social fabric has been 
torn to shreds and infrastructures wiped out. The fragile nature 
of the economy of a country in the post-conflict era, the precari-
ous condition of its institutions and genera! lack of stability mean 
that it is difficult to rapidly implement conventional long-term 
development programmes. At the same time, emergency human-
itarian aid runs out as resources dry up and the instruments avail-
able are unable to satisfy economic and social reconstruction 
needs. 
Transition from war to peace is a complex process involving 
making a country safe and secure, protecting the population, 
reintegrating displaced populations and refugees, rebuilding 
infrastructures, relaunching the economy, promoting good 
governance, establishing political dialogue and restoring the 
social capital. Violent conflict poses the biggest challenge to 
rehabilitation programmes, greatly complicating the establish-
ment of coherent and consistent links between relief, rehabili-
tation and development. It is only in very rare cases that crises 
evolve in a linear fashion; they swing between deterioration, 
escalation, disorder, periods of calm, hope, and a return of the 
old situation, as illustrated in the cases of the Middle East, 
Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burundi, 
amongst others. In such precise cases, the link between relief 
and development is not a chronological transition, because the 
continuum can, at any moment, be broken, at least in certain 
areas. 
Special Initiative on Africa 
In 1993, the European Commission began to implement its 
rehabilitation operations within the specific framework of the 
Special Initiative on Africa. Initially, it covered Ethiopia, Eritrea, 
Mozambique, Angola and Somalia, and was later extended to 
other countries, such as Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Rwanda, Liberia, Haiti, Afghanistan, Cambodia, the 
Lebanon, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. According to 
the Commission, rehabilitation is defined as "an overall, dynam-
ic and intermediate strategy of institutional reform and re-
inforcement, of reconstruction and improvement of infrastruc-
ture and services, supporting the initiatives and actions of the 
populations concerned, in the political, economic and social 
domaines, and aimed towards the resumption of sustainable 
development. People — both victims and participants in violent 
conflicts - must be reintegrated into civil society, in its econom-
ic, social and political aspects"'. In other words, there must be a 
human dimension. Rehabilitation actions supported by the EU 
also cover such areas as the relaunching of the production appa-
ratus, material and functional rehabilitation of basic social and 
administrative infrastructures - including demining — return of 
populations and social reintegration - particularly of refugees, 
displaced persons and the demobilised military - and the re-
establishment of institutional capacities, particularly at local level. 
In slightly more than 20 years, EU support to countries emerg-
ing from crisis has been considerably stepped up. For example, in 
2002, €30 million was allocated to supporting the peace process 
in Angola and €50 million to rehabilitation in Somalia. 
No single model 
A number of factors have in the past and may still in the future 
present obstacles to operations or programmes, as their success 
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depends on relative stability in the field, a minimum level of secu-
rity, the soundness of any peace accords and the political will on 
the part of the former belligerents to leave conflict behind them. 
There is also the matter of the availability of financial resources, 
which depends, in particular, on the international community's 
real commitment to supporting the transition. 
Coordination and flexibility are two more inextricable prob-
lems. Coordination may be hindered by a lack of planning and 
coherence between financing arrangements, by poor monitoring 
and evaluation processes, or by a divergence of interest between 
the many parties involved. Flexibility may be reduced. Length and 
multiplicity of procedures and the time they take slows down the 
realisation of programmes, thereby expanding the "grey zone". 
Furthermore, rehabilitation is not restricted to the transition 
between emergency relief and development: it is supposed to con-
tribute to a country's structural stability. Consequently, conflict 
and catastrophe prevention and the strengthening of institutions 
are an integral part of its work. 
Adaptation 
Although there can be no single model for rehabilitation, the 
Commission has put forward a number of guidelines. In its 2001 
Communication
2, the Commission stresses the need for relevant, 
country-by-country analysis of the structural causes of conflicts 
and the establishment of global frameworks defining priority sec-
tors and measures. It also advocates a balance between measures 
aimed at political, economic, legal, social, environmental and 
military stabilisation, in order, ultimately, to bring about conver-
gence of the interdependent objectives of peace and development. 
The communication also calls for improved coordination, 
between the services of the Commission, between the 
Commission and Member States and between donors. In this 
connection, the establishment of strategy documents to provide a 
framework for ACP-EU cooperation, facilitates analysis and 
coherence between different EU policies, as well as coordination 
and complementarity between different donors. The "circle of 
friends" approach involves the broadest possible number of inter-
national donors coordinating their actions. This approach has 
already been adopted in Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, East 
Timor and Tajikistan. 
Independently of the commitments entered into by the signa-
tories of the Cotonou Agreement (in terms of promotion of 
peace, conflict prevention and resolution), the permanent politi-
cal dialogue put forward in the text can or should play a major 
role. It establishes regular discussions on the political situation of 
beneficiary countries. In Burundi, for example, the EU was thus 
able to remain committed, despite the continuation of the con-
flict. It supports the peace process, demobilisation and the disar-
mament of the rival factions while at the same time exerting pres-
sure for negotiations and directly supporting civil society. 
The progressive adaptation of financial instruments and the 
déconcentration process aiming to increase the capacities of the 
EU Delegations should also reinforce the impact of rehabilitation 
programmes on the ground. In addition, ECHO (the European 
Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office) is now refocusing its 
activities on its "core business" of emergency relief. 
For their part, NGOs are calling for words to be rapidly trans-
lated into actions, for greater involvement on the part of civil 
society in the process of reflection on rehabilitation and the pre-
dominant role that prevention should have. 
The EU (European Communities + Member States combined) 
provides more than 50 per cent of international aid and repre-
sents broad political interests, and could play a central role in 
coordinating rehabilitation programmes. However, financial 
instruments and procedures would have to be adapted. 
Given the intermediate position of the rehabilitation phase, the 
procedures relating to it should be between emergency proce-
dures such as those used by ECHO and those applied in tradi-
tional development. Moreover, the Cotonou Agreement stresses 
effectiveness and flexibility in mechanisms which facilitate the 
transition between relief and development. Furthermore, it is 
pointless to seek to improve rehabilitation operations without 
adequate financial and human resources being made available. 
Lastly, with a view to improving its capacity to react, the EU 
should perhaps accept a higher level of risk. This means choosing 
between greater speed and flexibility in its actions on the one 
hand, and being able to guarantee maximum control and quality, 
on the other. ■ 
1. Communication from the Commission on Unking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development [COM (96) 153 final of 30.4.1996] 
2. Communication from the Commission on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and 
Development [COMÍ2001) 153 of 23 April 20011 
Projects earmarked in 2002 
for the Post-Conflict and Socioeconomic 
Rehabilitation sector 
Country /Region 
Angola 
Burundi 
Central African Republic 
Congo Brazzaville 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Djibouti 
Dominican Republic 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Guinea Bissau 
Malawi 
Namibia 
Rwanda 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
"All countries" envelope 
Tota! 
Amount in euro 
53,705,000 
9,600,000 
4,150,000 
7,498,000 
10,000,000 
1,999,525 
7,000.000 
16,623,380 
6,673,436 
3.000,000 
38,000,000 
1,242,000 
3,200,000 
50,000,000 
150,000 
5,995,000 
14,600,000 
40,000,000 
277,236,341 
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Efforts to help ex-combatants 
disarm, demobilise and 
reintegrate into their societies 
(known as DDR programmes) 
have become an integral part of 
transition from war to peace in 
Africa and other parts of the 
world. Here Markus Kostner* 
looks at the development of a 
"multi-country demobilisation 
and reintegration programme" 
(MDRP) in the greater Great 
Lakes region' of Africa. 
The end Of the MobutU era in Zaire and the installation of 
Laurent Kabila as president of a new "Democratic Republic of the 
Congo" (DRC) in 1997 did not bring an end to civil war. It was not 
until July 1999 that the six African countries and the rebel move-
ments involved in the fighting signed the Lusaka ceasefire agreement. 
This provided hope for an end to protracted conflict in the region. 
One of the issues addressed by the agreement was the existence in 
the DRC of thousands of armed soldiers who had to be returned to 
civilian life. It was clear that without a massive programme of re-
habilitation any peace would remain precarious. In addition there 
were serious implications for the country's economy and a need to 
avoid wasting their lives further. 
At first the signatories did not implement the Lusaka agreements 
provisions and plans for demobilisation came to nothing. But in 
January 2001 Laurent Kabila was assassinated and a new government 
under his son Joseph was installed in Kinshasa. This led gradually to 
an environment that was more conducive to progress. 
Demobilisation 
and disarmament: 
a regional approach 
to reintegrating ex-combatants 
in the Great Lakes 
The need to work across borders 
The international community started to re-engage the authotities in 
a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programme. 
Elsewhere, a DDR programme re-started in Rwanda. The Arusha 
peace agreement, signed in August 2000, had given impetus to DDR 
planning in Burundi. And a programme in Congo-Brazzaville had 
already been launched. 
With increasing DDR activities in neighbouring countries, which 
had clearly related challenges, the advantages of a regional approach 
became ever more apparent. The hope was that this would enhance 
the prospects for peace and recovery by encouraging regional stake-
holders to move ahead quickly with demobilisation. By August 2001 
the World Bank and the UNDP had independently engaged in 
regional DDR planning, and donors started to commit substantial 
resources. 
These efforts culminated in the preparation of the Multi-Country 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). Its objec-
tives are to provide a comprehensive framework for DDR efforts, to 
establish a consistent mechanism for coordinating donors and mobil-
ising resources, and to serve as a platform for national consultative 
processes. The MDRP is a five-year programme that aims to demo-
bilise and reintegrate some 350,000 ex-combatants, including former 
members of national armies, members of irregular groups and child 
soldiers. The cost of the programme is estimated at USS500 million. 
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Genesis of the MDRP 
Previous efforts at helping ex-combatants to return to civilian life 
had usually been less than comprehensive or nationwide in their 
approach. In Uganda, for instance, the programme focused on 
short-term measures to the detriment of longer-term reintegration. 
In Mozambique, while a range of international bodies implemented 
the programme, government participation remained limited. Under 
such conditions DDR assistance risked being both more expensive 
and less effective. With development aid generally decreasing, ensur-
ing its effectiveness had become even more important. So the idea of 
a framework to coordinate the work and to mobilise resources was 
welcomed. 
It was clear from the start of this latest, multi-country approach in 
the greater Great Lakes region that commitment would be needed 
on the part of all international actors interested in DDR in one or 
more of the countries in the region. Design of the programme fol-
lowed the premise that no single donor or agency could address the 
complexity of DDR issues. 
In particular it was felt that the World Bank and the UNDP, both 
agencies with long-standing DDR experience in Africa and else-
where, needed to reach consensus on the framework for such a 
regional programme. Moreover, it was essential that it should aim to 
complement national and regional peace initiatives by providing 
support for the social and economic reintegration of ex-combatants 
and their families, and that it should not be construed as a substitute 
for political solutions to the conflicts. 
Preparation involved over 30 bodies and progressively expanded 
the boundaries of collaboration between them. Consultations were 
also held with most governments in the region, all of whom 
expressed their full support for a regional approach. 
Partnership 
Today, the MDRP involves over 40 partners: governments in the 
region, bilateral donors, UN agencies, international financial insti-
tutions and regional organisations. Each partner has identified a 
technical point of contact (a "focal point") for MDRP-related mat-
ters. These are in regular contact with each other and the MDRP 
Secretariat on regional and country issues. They undertake joint mis-
sions and regularly monitor MDRP performance. 
In each country, a lead agency (the UNDP or the World Bank) 
coordinates assistance by the international community in close col-
laboration with, and under the overall guidance of, national author-
ities. The MDRP Secretariat, through its representations in Kinshasa 
and Kigali, supports the lead agency. 
Achievements 
Bringing together nine countries, many of which have been at war 
with each other, and so many international partners with a variety of 
mandates and procedures, under one regional framework, has been 
a significant achievement in itself. Although the implementation of 
DDR activities in participating countries has proved to be a daunt-
ing challenge, progress so far is very encouraging. 
The MDRP framework has enabled governments to tap into a 
wide range of technical know-how and to benefit from lessons 
learned from DDR practitioners. The MDRP provides an assurance 
of technical quality and financial accountability, and ensures 
consistency in design while responding to local needs. It also ensures 
that there is no ambiguity in the position of governments, bv requir-
ing them to submit a letter stating their polio' on demobilisation, as 
part of the eligibility criteria for taking part in the MDRP. 
In contrast to many single-country DDR programmes that have 
not been able to raise money quickly, around US$330 million has 
been pledged by donors during the opening phase of the MDRP. As 
a result national programmes in Rwanda and Angola, the two pro-
grammes launched so far, have been able to start without a gap in 
funding. By encouraging strong engagement in the planning, imple-
mentation and monitoring of individual DDR activities, partners 
are able to influence the course of action to be taken and gain a sense 
of ownership. 
Yet the MDRP also challenges partners to be disciplined and 
transparent in their activities, and not to undertake work outside the 
agreed framework. This helps to minimise duplication of effort and 
reduce the administrative burden on governments. Through such 
coordination, partners are also in a stronger position in relation to 
governments on critical issues, such as the content of their letters on 
demobilisation policy. 
Problems 
There have been problems in implementing the MDRP All part-
ners have endorsed it as a common regional framework. 
Nevertheless some tend to act according to their perceived immedi-
ate individual interests, for example, by providing technical assis-
tance to national authorities or carrying out DDR related missions 
without consultation with other partners. It has also proved difficult 
to balance institutional interests and agendas with what is best for 
the countries concerned. So it is important to foster understanding 
and trust between partners with different traditions and to acknowl-
edge their different roles and responsibilities. 
While the World Bank has adopted simplified procedures for 
financing special projects, there is still a concern among partners that 
they may lack flexibility and speed. Furthermore, some may sec the 
World Bank — as MDRP lead agency, trust fund administrator and 
single most important donor - as too dominant a partner. 
Continuous commitment and effort on the part of all is therefore 
required to establish and maintain the identity of the programme as 
a true partnership. 
Scope for replication 
The MDRP is more than an effort to help disarm, demobilise and 
reintegrate ex-combatants in the greater Great Lakes region. It repre-
sents a vision of how the international community can work together 
to provide development assistance that is centred on a country's needs 
in the most effective and sustainable way. The MDRP is a framework 
for coordinating and mobilising resources. So it can be replicated in 
any sector and any country, following a conflict or in more normal cir-
cumstances. What is needed is a willingness on the part of donors and 
agencies to share a common vision and to work together for the devel-
opment of the countries they serve. ■ 
* MDRP Manager, World Bank. For more information contact MDRPOworlclbank.org. 
1. l'or the purposes of the MDRP. the greater (¡real Lakes region comprises all those 
countries involved in or affected by one or more conflicts in central Africa.These 
include:Angola, Burundi, tile Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia. Rwanda. Uganda, and Zimbabwe. 
n° 198 may-june 2003 the Courier ACP-EU (Ί?) Dossier 
n post-con 
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Mine risk reduction project - Cambodia. 
Since the end of the Cold War 
"traditional" peacekeeping has 
undergone dramatic changes, at 
both the conceptual and 
operational level, in response to the 
increase in intra-state conflicts and 
in complex humanitarian 
emergencies. Peacekeeping has 
shifted from being purely military 
to including a wide range of 
civilian-executed activities such as 
humanitarian assistance, human 
rights monitoring, election 
monitoring, police observation, 
disarmament and reintegration, 
de-mining and sanctions 
monitoring. This article illustrates 
how the nature of peacekeeping 
has changed and how an expanded 
role for both civilian and military 
peacekeepers in the realm of post-
conflict rehabilitation' has resulted 
in a number of challenges. It 
emphasises the need for enhanced 
civil-military coordination and for 
empowering local communities to 
continue with reconstruction efforts 
once the peacekeepers have left. 
Nicky Hitchcock* 
These new civilian-executed activities often relate to post-
conflict tehabilitation and reconstruction; thus the line between 
peacekeeping and peace-building activities, and the people under-
taking them, is becoming increasingly blurred. Military and civilian 
peacekeeping personnel often find themselves engaged in monitor-
ing ceasefires, protecting humanitarian personnel across borders, 
peace enforcement and at the same time undertaking traditional 
post-conflict activities such as assisting in the return of refugees and 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). There is a 
growing interest in viewing peacekeeping plus humanitarian opera-
tions in a longet term perspective, to ensure that the conditions 
which created the crisis do not return. During the UN general 
debate of 19 November 1993 on strengthening the co-ordination of 
humanitarian assistance by the UN, a number of representatives 
expressed the view that peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance 
should be part of the continuum to post-conflict rehabilitation and 
development.· 
Modern peacekeeping 
Previously, peacekeeping operations primarily consisted of moni-
toring ceasefire agreements, assisting in troop withdrawals, providing 
buffer zones and helping in the implementation of a final settlement. 
Modern peacekeeping, in an environment of intra-state conflicts 
where a range of economic, political and social issues must be 
addressed simultaneously, is now described as multilateral, multi-
dimensional and multinational.' Military and civilian agencies now 
work in parallel to fulfil varied functions undertaken in a peace sup-
port operation (PSO). The military's task is, theoretically, to re-
establish order and create a level of security that allows civilian 
organisations to carry out their humanitarian and political functions. 
Peacekeeping revisited 
the role of peacekeepers 
ct rehabilitation 
ECHO/Y Hildebrand 
Reconstruction of a hospital in Zaranj - Afghanistan. 
Once the situation has stabilised, the military should begin to reduce 
the size of their forces. Four strategic components of post-conflict 
rehabilitation have been identified by D. Last — security, governance, 
relief, development and reconciliation - who argues that each 
involves a wide range of tasks, and each task requires associated 
skills.' Modern peacekeeping has taken on the additional task of 
containing the violent conflict and promoting or supporting post-
conflict rehabilitation efforts. This is evident in the expanded role for 
civilian and military peacekeepers and also in the increasing number 
of civil-military coordination centres in PSOs that aim to facilitate 
the interaction between civilian agencies and the military compo-
nent of a mission. 
The lack of skills of military personnel in some areas, such as 
building cooperative relationships, calls for improved civil-military 
coordination. Through these centres, military peacekeeping person-
nel coordinate efforts with international humanitarian staff and local 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to build roads, develop 
watet projects, build youth centres and assist in economic recon-
struction, etc. For the successful completion of a peace support oper-
ation, in terms of achieving post-conflict social, political and eco-
nomic rehabilitation, there is a serious need to empower local civil-
ian peacekeepers to continue rehabilitation once the military per-
sonnel have left. Modern peacekeeping, in other words, requires 
harnessing its "civilian" wagons to its "military" horses .
2 
Recognition for multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations 
began in the early 1990s. In 1992, former UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Ghali issued the Agenda for Peace which laid the founda-
tions for a broader interpretation of what peacekeeping should 
entail, including "comprehensive efforts to identify and support 
structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense 
of confidence and wellbeing among people." This is the concept of 
"peace-building," a defining featute of multidimensional peacekeep-
ing operations.
5 
Further evidence is found in the Report of the Panel on UN Peace 
Operations, commonly referred to as the Brahimi Report, which 
stated that peace-building in some cases was vital to the success of 
peace-keeping. In such complex operations today, "peacekeepets 
(ss) the Courier ACP-EU n° 198 may-june 2003 work to maintain a secure local environment while peace-builders 
work to make that environment self-sustaining. Only such an envi-
ronment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peace-
keepers and peace-builders inseparable partners."'
1
 
It is important that a PSO provides for certain mechanisms to lay 
the groundwork for post-conflict rehabilitation. A good example of 
where a PSO assisted with post-conflict rehabilitation, and should 
be a model for other PSOs, is the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC)." The Paris Accords gave UNTAC the task of 
planning and coordinating an international effort to begin the 
process of rebuilding Cambodia through projects designed to meet 
immediate and medium-term needs. Projects coordinated by the 
Rehabilitation Office included the return of refugees as the first step 
to bringing national reconciliation, and programmes to rehabilitate 
the country's human and physical infrastructure. The PSO also 
undertook a number of Quick Impact Projects that were labour-
intensive and facilitated the reintegration of ex-combatants and 
refugees." The UNTAC rehabilitation unit laid the groundwork for 
Cambodia's eventual reconstruction by developing a plan, setting 
priorities and co-ordinating donor assistance. It was then up to the 
Cambodians to keep the process going." 
Challenges for merging peacekeeping 
and peace-building activities 
Peacekeeping and post-conflict rehabilitation were previously 
conducted as separate activities involving completely different 
organisations. Today, post-conflict rehabilitation activities are 
undertaken by a variety of political, civilian, police and military 
personnel who find themselves working shoulder-to-shoulder 
and their roles often overlapping. ' This results in a number of 
challenges for civil-military coordination and for both civilian 
and military peacekeeping personnel. The list below is not 
exhaustive but illustrates a few of the most pressing challenges for 
peacekeeping personnel: 
• civil-military coordination: although both the military and 
civilian personnel in a PSO have a similar objective, their dif-
ferent concepts of operations and structures can be a source of 
conflict. Lack of communication and understanding between 
them has resulted in numerous complications that have length-
ened the duration of a mission. Many civil-military coordination 
centres have been established during PSOs and this has proven 
to greatly reduce the confusion and overlapping of military and 
civilian roles; 
• funding: the character of the UN system in terms of peace-
keeping does not allow for the easy design and funding of very 
comprehensive and integrated PSOs that include support for 
post-conflict rehabilitation. Therefore international and local 
NGOs and UN agencies, that rely on donor support, carry out 
most rehabilitation efforts. Because there is often a lack of fund-
ing for such programmes during an operation, local civilian 
peacekeepers need to be empowered to continue the process 
once the military peacekeepers have left; 
• misinterpretation/misunderstanding of mandates: very 
often the role and function of peacekeepers, as outlined in their 
mandate, are misundersrood and subject to variable interpreta-
tions. For example, a mandate may state that the peacekeeping 
forces will assist in establishing "stability"; but how one meas-
ures stability may differ. It is therefore important that mission 
mandates are clear and well distributed; 
• exit strategies: another challenge concerns the exit strategy of a 
PSO. The Secretary-General's Agenda for Peace identifies pos-
sible UN activities that should be undertaken before or during 
the mission. These include support for economic development 
programmes, humanitarian and electoral assistance, and sup-
port for human rights. This calls for institutional rehabilitation 
so that the UN peacekeeping mission can withdraw and at die-
sarne time ensure that rehabilitation programmes continue;·' 
• leadership: the issue of who is ultimately in charge can also 
pose a problem in terms of civil-military coordination. For 
example, a Force Commander in a mission may be in charge of 
the military movements, but often civilian agencies are inde-
pendent and their cooperation with the military does not nec-
essarily fall under the UN's command; 
• local authorities: if local authorities do not accept the peace-
keepers, or do not have the capacity to undertake rehabilitation 
efforts, immense pressure is placed on the peacekeepers. Firstly 
they need to gain the respect and acceptance of local authorities 
and partner with them, or undertake rehabilitation pro-
grammes while continuing their normal or mandated activities. 
The rehabilitation of local authority also becomes crucial to the 
end product and success of the peacekeeping operation. 
Classical peacekeeping operations have extended into the areas 
of reconstruction and rehabilitation. The ongoing effort to estab-
lish a more comprehensive doctrine and practice of peacekeeping 
must be closely integrated with the long-term goals of sustainable 
post-conflict rehabilitation. Peacekeepers, both military and civil-
ian, need to expand their efforts to ensure that any post-conflict 
rehabilitation exercises they engage in are sustainable. They also 
need to ensure that their activities are coordinated and include 
strategies to empower local communities to continue the work 
after they have left. ■ 
• Programme officer in the peacekeeping initiative ACCORD (African Centre for lhe 
Constructive Resolution of Disputes ). based in South Africa. 
1. In lilis paper, the term post-conflict rehabilitation is used as synonymous with peace-
building defined as: activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the 
foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something 
that is more than just the absence of war... including reintegrating former combatants 
and... strengthening the rule of law, thereby aiding in political ami socio-economic recon-
struction. (Report of the Secretary-General on An Agenda for Peace (1992) 
A/47/277/S/24111 www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html ) 
2. Marks, E. (2000) UN Peacekeeping in a Post-Cold War World. 
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3. Ramsbotham, O. et.al. (2000) The Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation. 
Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 
www.bcrghof-ccnter.org/liandbook/woodhousc/abstracl 
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6. "Report of the Panel on united Nations Peace Operations" released in August 2000. 
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8. Quick Impact Projects were funded by the UNDRNGOs and the UNHCRThey helped to 
facilitate not only the refugees'reintegration but also, by pumping cash into the local economy, 
rallied the villagers'support for UNTAC. Some of these projects, which included the repair or 
construction of roads, bridges, hospitals, dispensaries, schools, and latrines, and the digging of 
wells and ponds, were similar to work done by other agencies of IINTAC, especially in lhe 
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the improvement of Cambodia's infrastructure. Start-up loans were offered: vegetable seeds, fish-
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unexploded ordnance (UXO) -
also known as explosive 
remnants of war - remain a 
critical factor in post-conflict 
rehabilitation. Their presence in 
practically all theatres of 
conflict, their non-discriminatory 
nature and, above all, their 
continued presence make them 
insidious obstacles that 
complicate and delay 
rehabilitation and increase the 
costs of the process. 
Dr Jean-Benoît Burion* explains 
why the removal of mines and 
bombs and assistance to victims 
are essential components of any 
post-conflict rehabilitation 
process. 
e-mining 
and aid to victims: 
a critical element in post-conflict 
rehabilitation 
Awareness-raising meeting on the dangers of mines 
Even today, antipersonnel mines and UXO affect 90 coun-
tries. In 2001, new casualties were recorded in 69 countries and 
all regions. Ironically, over 50 per cent of those countries are no 
longer at war. The estimated number of casualties varies between 
15,000 and 20,000 every year. In addition, about 70 per cent of 
reported casualties are civilians. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, acci-
dents caused by mines have been recorded in 18 countries'. 
UXO is at least as significant a problem as antipersonnel mines, 
with studies conducted in Kampuchea and Kosovo (2000 and 
2001) demonstrating that accidents involving UXO are usually 
ratal and most frequently affect children
2. This macabre series of 
figures is evidence, if any were needed, of the primordial impor-
tance of demining in the rehabilitation process. 
Consequences both large and small 
By their very nature, mines and UXO remain after a conflict and 
continue to mutilate lor many years. Every accident radically trans-
forms the life of the victim and that of his or her immediate kith and 
kin. The impact is at once physical, moral and social. At a national 
level, the ever increasing number of accidents reduces economic 
activity and increases the "welfare burden", using up a significant 
amount of the resources allocated to health and social services. 
The presence of even a few mines can mean that huge tracts of 
normally inhabited or exploited land become out of bounds. The 
mere suspicion that mines might be present, often in the wake of 
an isolated accident, instils fear and can immobilise entire com-
munities, the presence of mines preventing displaced populations 
from returning home, thereby modifying human distribution, 
economic networks and the ecology of a region. 
Mines and UXO also halt the rehabilitation of public infra-
structures, essential for economic recovery. They curtail access to 
drinking water and irrigation systems, the practicability of roads 
and paths and the use of public amenities (schools, hospitals, 
markets, power-production sites). Furthermore, the reopening of 
businesses that generate employment is impossible without an 
area first being demined. 
The continued existence in a given region of mines or UXO 
also slows down the peace process and the political and adminis-
trative settlement of a conflict. People remain distrustful and any 
wayward elements can continue to exploit such explosives for the 
purposes of déstabilisation. 
Articulate responses... 
The anti-landmine campaign concentrates on two main areas: 
the prevention of accidents and the provision of assistance to 
casualties. Prevention is addressed not only in the diplomatic and 
political arenas, with the practically global acceptance of the 
Mine Ban Treaty (the 1997 Ottawa Convention), but also in 
operational terms, with activities directly linked to demining. 
Currently, the Mine Ban Treaty has 147 signatories out of the 
194 countries worldwide, with 133 
of these having ratified the agree-
ments ·'. 
Assistance to casualties involves a 
number of aspects: medical assis-
tance, fitting-out with prostheses 
and physical rehabilitation, psycho-
logical support, economic and social 
reintegration, defence of rights, etc. 
Conventionally, "humanitarian 
demining" comprises four compo-
nents aimed at prevention or at the 
very least at reducing the human, 
social and economic consequences 
of the presence of mines: 
1. raising awareness of the dangers 
of mines; 
2. actual demining (gathering and 
processing of data, cartography, 
marking-out of affected areas, 
removal and destruction); 
3. assistance to casualties; and 
4. witness statements and the provi-
sion ofinformation to promote uni-
versal acceptance of the Mine Ban 
Treaty. Those involved in humani-
tarian demining concentrate on one 
or more of these components. 
The scale of humanitarian de-
mining and of assistance to casual-
ties varies in accordance with the 
nature of conflicts. Recent military interventions of the "preven-
tive" type incorporate from the outset the notion of post-conflict 
rehabilitation. However, the majority of wars at present are recur-
rent or latent, and involve non-state groups. Rehabilitation poli-
cies are therefore more complex and difficult to implement. In 
all cases, the more stable the conditions that can be guaranteed, 
the greater the impact of demining activities and assistance to 
casualties. 
... in an unfavourable structural area 
The majority of countries faced with the problem of landmine 
and UXO victims have a low or, at best, average Human 
Development Indicator (HDI) '. Such countries face economic and 
social challenges that are already enormous, and fewer than half have 
specific legislation and/or policies concerning handicapped people. 
Very often, government measures for assisting casualties are imple-
mented by the military, but are deficient in meeting the needs of 
civilian casualties. Medical management is generally limited by the 
accessibility of structures: most areas affected by mines are to be 
found in the countryside, whilst hospital infrastructures are in 
towns and cities, as are services for the fitting of prostheses and for 
physical tehabilitation. As regards social and economic-reintegration 
needs, if these are taken into account by governments, it is very 
often by means of simple allocation systems and rarely by means of 
vocational reclassification policies. 
The lessons of Mozambique 
On 10 April 1992, after 28 years of war, the parties to the conflict 
signed the General Peace Agreement. Mozambique's experience has 
demonstrated that the problem of mines and UXO is particularly 
critical in the immediate post-conflict period. The country was faced 
with the problem of the reestablishment of five million displaced 
persons, 1.7 million of whom were refugees, in areas that were 
heavily mined \ Although the problem of mines is still present and 
still requires demining activity, it is nowadays less critical. The expe-
rience of Mozambique has highlighted the importance of coordinat-
ing demining and rehabilitation activities. In Mozambique, such 
coordination has been poor in general and practically non-existent at 
national level. The gathering of data and their analysis, with a view 
to determining priorities and evaluating the impact of actions, have 
been deficient owing to a lack of a systematic approach and stan-
dardisation. This should not, however, detract from the fact that 
there have indeed been effective initiatives that have had a local 
impact - the intervention of the NGOs has confirmed the impor-
tance of operators being flexible and independent''. 
It might seem obvious that post-conflict rehabilitation pro-
grammes must incorporate the issue of landmines and UXO. 
However, this evidence is not always taken into consideration. Be it 
accident prevention or casualty assistance, coordination between the 
planners, donors and operators involved in rehabiliration is essential. 
Furthermore, the impact of demining and assistance to casualties on 
rehabilitation is strengthened by pragmatism on the part of planners, 
guaranteed budget control in the case of donors and freedom of ini-
tiative and of movement for operators. ■ 
* Director General, Handicap International - Belgium 
1. source: Landmine Monitor Report 2000 - loa ard a Mine-live World. International 
Campaign to Han Landmines, Washington DC, 2002 
2. Source; Explosive Remnants of War - t iie.yploded Ordnance and Post-Conflict 
Communities, Landmine Action Λ The Cooperative Hank. 2002 
3. Situation as at 9 May 2003 
4. Indicator calculated on the hasis of life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate, education 
index and GDP index per inhabitant. 
5. 1 37-i mine or UXO affected areas (502 square km), of which approximately 200 square 
km have been cleared to date. Source: Landmine Survivors Rehabilitation Database. 
www Isndatahasc org 
6. Source: A Study of Socio-Econoniic Approaches to Mine Action, UNDP<jeneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. 2001 
The presence of even a few mines can mean that huge tracts of normally 
inhabited or exploited land become out of bounds 
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after conflict 
Predominant stereotypes see 
women as innately peaceful and 
men as inevitably warlike. But 
there are also many examples of 
women participating in conflict, 
either as active combatants or 
serving a central function 
through other forms of support, 
such as supplying information, 
food, clothing and shelter. 
Women's participation in war-
related work can be overlooked 
because of stereotypical notions 
of gender-appropriate 
behaviour. To address the 
challenges faced by women and 
girl combatants after war, 
demobilisation planning has to 
take cognisance of the different 
needs of fighters of both sexes, 
and not to assume that one plan 
of action will be suitable for all 
ex-combatants. 
Vanessa A. Farr, PhD 
Significant attention has been paid to the ways in which 
men and ideas about masculinity are mobilised as part of the war 
machine, and this attention has not always been negative. But it 
is only in recent years that we have begun to understand how 
women, and deeply-held beliefs about femininity, are also both 
militarised and mobilised in support of the ideology of war. 
Feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe notes that the manipulation of 
notions of gender-appropriate behaviour is a central component 
of ethnic nationalism, and holds that the "militarisation of 
women has been crucial for the militarisation of governments and 
of international relations. The militarisation of women has been 
necessary for the militarisation of men". 
Recognising a pattern in the ways in which societies manipu-
late gender ideologies, feminist scholars have worked to nuance 
our understanding of how women's roles, and the identities they 
take on to fulfil these roles during the build-up to war, in 
wartime, and afterwards, are strategic and shifting. Arguing 
against predominant stereotypes of women as innately peaceful 
and men as inevitably warlike, researchers have urged that we 
recognise the complexity of gender ideologies and the multiple 
roles they play in drawing different social actors into war. 
Peacebuilders and combatants 
In peacetime, as in wartime, women and girls display a wide 
variety of responses to organised and/or state-sanctioned forms of 
violence. There is a long and much-celebrated history of feminist 
pacifism, and some women, as peace activists, play essential roles 
in maintaining social connections, build coalitions across com-
munities divided by violence, and therefore are ideally positioned 
to play important roles in rehabilitation, reconciliation, re-
integration support and peace-building roles in the aftermath 
(Anderlini, 2000; Farr 2000). At the same time, however, there 
are also many examples of women embracing "revolution with 
hope and war with enthusiasm" Even if they do not enlist as sol-
diers, women and girls can, and do, participate in conflict 
Demobilising women 
and girls 
through supporting and maintaining guerrilla forces. They sup-
ply the essentials of war: information, food, clothing and shelter. 
They nurse soldiers back to health, even if it means they will have 
to return to the battlefield. Yet, like the work undertaken by other 
women - both peacebuilders and combatants - these contribu-
tions ate all too frequently overlooked after conflict has come to 
an end. As Linda Grant De Pauw writes, "Women have always 
and everywhere been inextricably involved in war [but] hidden 
from history... During wars, women are ubiquitous and highly 
visible; when wars are over and the songs are sung, women dis-
appear" (De Pauw, 1998 p. xiii). 
While many feminists have remarked that women's peacebuilding 
activities receive too little recognition in the period of reconstruc-
tion, it is also true that women who saw active combat are not 
allowed to participate, as leaders, in the development of transition 
and reconstruction processes. They are ignored in veteran's associa-
tions, where a recognition of their support is reduced to that expect-
ed from their kinship to male soldiers: they are acknowledged only 
as mothers, sisters, wives or daughters. The contributions made by 
girl soldiers are particularly overlooked. However varied their levels 
of involvement in the business of war, women and girls remain at the 
margins of political, economic, and social power, and their voices 
and experiences tend to disappear when peace processes begin. 
To address the problems that result from their invisibility, care-
ful attention must be paid to the question of what happens to 
women and girl soldiers before, during and after demobilisation. 
Demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration planners also 
have to deal with the needs of some of the other — even more 
invisible — women and girls associated with the military or with 
militarised structures, a group which includes military nurses, the 
wives of male soldiers, war widows, and sex workers. Despite the 
significant contribution they make to the support and mainte-
nance of male soldiers, these women are often denigrated as mere 
"camp followers."
1 This makes invisible the fact that they serve a 
central function during wartime and present both a challenge 
during the period of demobilisation and reintegration, and a 
potential strength in the reconstruction process. Like women and 
girl combatants, these military women form a group whose needs 
are neglected during the demobilisation phase and in the process 
of reintegration that follows armed conflict. 
Stereotypes 
Women's participation in war-related work can be overlooked 
because stereotypical notions of gender-appropriate labour are 
often re-mobilised after war when a society strives to return to 
"normal." In many southern African countries, popular images of 
liberation wars have reinforced the belief that women, old and 
young, made their greatest contribution as wives, mothers and 
sisters. Women who challenged the re-imposition of patriarchal 
authority in the post-colonial era were vilified, and those who had 
seen active combat became objects of shame. In Namibia, 
observes ex-combatant Teckla Shikola, 
"[N]o one mention[s] the contributions women made during 
the... struggle. That's true all over the world. You never find an 
appreciation of what women did. Men appreciate women who 
cook for them, and they respect women who fought the wat with 
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Women volunteers in the Iraqi army. While there is a long history of feminist pacifism, 
there are also many examples of women embracing "revolution with hope and war with enthusiasm 
them, but after independence, they [don't] really consider women 
as part of the liberation movement"
:. 
Similarly, in South Africa, during the hearings of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), women only spoke out 
about what had happened to their male partners and kin. It was 
not until a group of feminists activists challenged the TRC to 
hold private hearings for women that their stories began to 
emerge (Goldblatt and Meintjes, 1996)'. 
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The exclusion of women and girl soldiers 
from decision-making positions is a partic-
ularly important problem when demilitari-
sation is set in motion, because women and 
girls who have seen active combat are likely 
to be even more marginalised than other 
women in the society under reconstruction: 
they do not occupy a position that can be 
easily reconciled with predominant gender 
ideologies, and so militarised women pose a 
unique set of challenges in the demobilisa-
tion phase. Unlike male combatants, they 
are drummed out of the army, excluded 
from new political structures, refused access 
to re-training or land, overlooked in veter-
an's organisations, and regarded with fear 
and suspicion when they attempt to return 
to the lives they lived before war broke out. 
Their experiences prove that, even though 
some of the normally accepted ideas about 
"womanly" behaviour might be suspended 
during wartime, women who contradict the 
stereotype of appropriate female behaviour 
through active participation in the violence 
of war "are often regarded as more deviant or 
unnatural than men". ' To address the challenges faced by women 
and girl combatants after war, demobilisation planning has, there-
fore, to take cognisance of the different needs of fighters of both 
sexes, not to assume that one plan of action will be suitable for all 
ex-combatants. An analysis of accounts of demobilisation which do 
not highlight the experiences of women and girl combatants shows 
that, unless the different needs of male and female ex-combatants 
and military supporters are differently addressed, any instruments 
that are designed to facilitate demobilisation and reintegration are 
likely to assume, re-establish or reinforce unequal gender relations 
in the society under reconstruction.
s As is evident in the increased 
rates of gender-based violence after war, this has serious implica-
tions for the possibility of establishing a culture of respect for 
human rights in the longer term. ■ 
A fuller version of this paper. "Gendering Demilitarization as a Peacebuildlng Tool," 
BICC Paper 20, 2002, can be found at In lp://\vww.bicc.de/gencral/paper20/contcnt,html 
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Because men are engaged in the business of killing, historically, women have been allie-
to take on new social roles in limes of conflict, for example, in the medical field or in 
industries considered essential for war uhe famous World War Two poster of "Rosie the 
Riverter" is probably die best known example of recruitment propaganda aimed at lur-
ing women into non-traditional forms of labour in war). Attempts are usually made to 
remove women from these professions as pan of lhe process of re-imposing notions of 
gender-appropriate behaviour when war ends 
5. UNlFEtM has commissioned a pieve ot research on Tibe Gender Aspects of United 
Nations demobiilsetion, Disttmutmeni >wd Reintegration Processes: A Study of 
Lessons Learned which will measure the extent to which the I'N's stated commitment 
to include gender perspectives in 1>DR processes has t»ccn rt-aliscd- Research results 
are expected to he published by the end of 2v*0.s 
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More than a decade ago, in 
September 1990, the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
entered into force, and is now the 
most universally ratified 
instrument of human rights. It is 
the standard against which we 
measure the success or failure of 
our efforts to serve the best 
interests of children. Article 38, 
for example, imposes an 
obligation to ensure protection 
and care for children whose lives 
are caught up in conflict - an 
obligation we have failed to fulfil. 
During the past decade the world has witnessed a grow-
ing number of armed conflicts in which children have been 
directly involved. Internal wars have emerged as a characteristic 
of the post-cold war era. They are not to be understood accord-
ing to the old world order, where conflict was seen as a temporary 
state of instability in the formation of nation states. Rather they 
are symptoms of protracted disorder, in which women and chil-
dren have become routinely subject to violence and abuse. The 
profits of war are not new, but increasingly conflict is stabilised 
through the exploitation of resources, creating an "economy of 
war" in which civilian populations are the victims. 
Children are the most vulnerable. Prolonged conflict disrupts 
their education and destroys their futures. We must ask why, in a 
period marked by rapid economic growth and unprecedented 
technological improvements, we are faced with evidence of a sus-
tained state of violence and exploitation. In such cases conflict for 
profit has proved more attractive than development. 
Ethnic, religious and tribal tensions are cultivated in order to 
destabilise populations and seize power, together with mineral 
resources and land. In the past decade we have witnessed the tar-
geting of women and children, the slaughter of civilians, the 
training of children to torture and kill, the abduction of young 
girls for sexual slavery and campaigns of mass rape. Children's 
interests have been flouted with impunity. 
Children, armed conflict 
and the role of UNICEF 
Aid, poverty and the cost of conflict 
The ever-widening gap between the wealth of the developed 
countries and the poverty of the developing world has added to 
the conflict and instability that characterised the 1990s. Limited 
official development assistance (ODA) has been accompanied by 
serious imbalances in the distribution of aid. Whereas Bosnia and 
Herzegovina received US$238 per person in ODA during 1998, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo received only US$3 per 
person. In sub-Saharan Africa, where the combined effects of 
armed conflict and HIV/AIDS have devastated populations, 
ODA dropped by nearly 60 per cent between 1990 and 1999. 
The conflicts themselves are proving more and more costly. The 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict has estimated 
that the major conflicts of the 1990s, excluding Kosovo, cost che inter-
national community around US$200 billion. Unless there is a sus-
tained increase in aid to developing countries in the coming decade, 
the poor will become even more excluded from the world economy 
and millions more children will grow up in deprivation. And more 
pressing still is the specific challenge to provide protection and 
humanitarian assistance for children trapped by the machinery of war. 
UNICEF's priorities 
Protecting children in armed conflict is integral to UNICEF's 
medium-term strategic plan, which focuses on five priorities: 
• girls' education; 
• integrated early childhood development; 
• immunisation 'plus'; 
• fighting HIV/AIDS; 
• improved protection of children from violence, abuse, exploita-
tion and discrimination. 
Each of these priorities needs its own strategy during emergen-
cies. For example, if schools are in danger of being targeted for the 
abduction of girls or the recruitment of child soldiers, special 
arrangements with school and local authorities are needed to 
ensure children's safety in the classroom. Efforts have been made to 
Going home... 
UNICEF has led a major programme in 
Sudan to demobilise child soldiers 
Uh cater for children's early development during emergencies through 
the creation of "child-friendly spaces", particularly in camps for 
refugee or displaced populations. "Days of tranquillity" have been 
negotiated between warring parties, to suspend hostilities and allow 
access to immunise children during conflict. HIV/AIDS education 
and prevention can be combined with landmine awareness in the 
school curriculum of war-affected communities. 
Zones of peace 
Whether they are unable to reach distribution centres, or are 
isolated by hostilities in areas where food, clothing and other 
humanitarian aid cannot reach them, the denial of access height-
ens children's vulnerability to disease and malnutrition. UNICEF 
promotes the concept of "children as a zone of peace", in order to 
ensure access to children during armed conflict. 
The idea was first conceived in the 1980s, on the grounds that 
targeting children during hostilities could never be justified or 
tolerated in any circumstances. As a practical way to ensure their 
protection, UNICEF has often helped negotiate days of tranquil-
lity, during which services for children, such as immunisation and 
supplementary feeding can be organised. 
This was first done in 1985 in El Salvador. Since then ceasefires 
have been arranged for immunisation in numerous conflicts, 
including those in Afghanistan, Angola, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Somalia. In some 
instances "corridors of peace" have been designated to allow the 
delivery of food, medicine and other supplies. 
These measures are limited and temporary in scope, and can-
not replace the broader protection afforded by bringing conflict 
to an end. The General Assembly has endorsed the concept of 
children as zones of peace and the Security Council has called for 
such measures in its statements and resolutions. 
Child-friendly spaces in refugee camps 
Child-friendly spaces were first established in 1999, to provide 
integrated care for children in Albanian refugee camps. The 
approach has gained recognition as a successful and innovative 
model for promoting the rights of refugee and internally displaced 
children. The concept has since been adapted to serve the needs of 
war-affected children in Angola, the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor, Guinea and, most recently, Liberia. 
Services include infant feeding and nutritional support; hygiene, 
water and sanitation services; early childhood care; psycho-social 
counselling; education and recreation; and basic health care. Toys, 
such as puzzles and puppets, and creative art supplies are provided 
for psychosocial support and early childhood development. The 
key to the success of this approach is building the participation of 
children and communities into the planning of their activities. 
Giving education back to children 
In addition to its humanitarian aid programme in Afghanistan, 
involving food, clothing, medicines and other necessities, 
UNICEF has in recent years worked in villages and towns to sup-
ply learning materials. Schools have been rehabilitated and last 
year accelerated classes were held for girls to catch up on their 
studies in time for the start of the new school year. 
Milestone decisions for safeguarding children 
1995: UNICEF publishes The State of the World's Children, on children 
in war, with the first child-based anti-war agenda. 
1996: Graça Machel's report Impact of Armed Conflict on Children 
introduced at the 51st session of the UN General Assembly. 
1996: First Security Council briefing on children in armed conflict. 
1996: Olara Otunnu appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict. 
1998: Adoption of the Rome Statute for an International Criminal 
Court, to adjudicate, inter alia, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes against children and women. 
2000: Adoption of an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child establishing 18 as the minimum age for 
children's participation in hostilities. 
2000: International Conference on War-affected Children, Winnipeg, 
Canada. 
2001: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1379 on children and 
armed conflict. 
2002: The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict enters 
into force on 12 February 2002. 
2002: On 11 April 2002, the 60th ratification of the Rome Statute for 
an International Criminal Court was deposited, ensuring its entry 
into force on 1 July 2002. 
2002: Security Council meeting on children and armed conflict, on the 
occasion of the General Assembly special session on children. 
Training new teachers is a priority of the back-to-school cam-
paign. A new curriculum has been developed locally. The learn-
ing materials are adaptable to the learning environment of the 
child. Ongoing support includes sustained advocacy to encourage 
parents to register their children, especially girls. 
Giving child soldiers back their childhood 
A child soldier is any child — girl or boy - under the age of 18, 
who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or 
armed group — combatants, cooks, porters, messengers and any-
one accompanying such groups other than as family members. It 
includes girls and boys recruited for sexual purposes or forced 
marriage. It is not confined to children who carry weapons. 
A child may be recruited forcibly or voluntarily by armed forces 
or groups. Children are susceptible to recruitment by manipula-
tion or they may be driven to join armed groups because of 
poverty or discrimination. Very often they are forcibly abducted 
by the military from school, on the streets or at home. 
Last year saw two milestones in the fight against child recruitment. 
One was the entry into force of the Optional Protocol of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, on the involvement of children in armed con-
flict. The second was the Secretary-General's list called for by Security 
Council resolution 1379 of November 2001 on children and armed con-
flict. As an annex to the Secretary-General's yearly report on children and 
armed conflict, the list reports on parties to armed conflict that recruit or 
use children in violation of their international obligations. The Secretary-
General's list draws the attention of die international community to the 
recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in violation of their 
rights. It offers great possibilities as a tool of advocacy, to improve die sit-
uation of children in armed conflict and to remove diem from it. 
Since the mid-1980s, UNICEF has been regularly involved in the 
demobilisation of child soldiers, advocating and securing the release of 
children from the armed forces and armed groups in Angola, Burundi, 
Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, 
Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Sudan. ■ 
1. Based on -Children Affected By Armed Conflict: UNICEF Actions". UNICEF Office or 
Emergency Programmes, New York, May 2002. 
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Conflict in the Pacific countries 
of Fiji, Papua new Guinea and 
Solomon Islands has caused 
serious economic, social and 
political disruption. As well as 
causing loss of life and property, 
conflict negates progress in 
reform programmes that 
the governments had been 
undertaking. It has used up 
resources that would otherwise 
have gone to improving the 
delivery of basic services. Now, 
within the framework of the 
Lomé and Cotonou Agreements, 
the EU is engaged in post-
conflict rehabilitation in the 
region. Here Sonja Siegmund* 
looks at what is being done and 
assesses its impact. 
The geopolitical Significance of the Pacific region is being 
increasingly recognised. The recent terrorist attack in Bali has 
drawn global attention to it. There is concern about potential 
future attacks on tourist destinations and about possible havens 
for terrorist cells in the region. American policy in East Asia and 
the Pacific has clearly identified combating terrorism as part of its 
strategy for achieving regional stability. 
The European Union takes an alternative route to achieving 
the same objective, believing that in the long tetm, the growth of 
terrorism can only be prevented by supporting development and 
encouraging capacity building, to ensure good governance and a 
more stable society at grassroots level. The linkage between 
underdevelopment and poverty on the one hand, and conflict 
and instability on the other, is widely recognised. 
The threat of terrorism in the Pacific ACP countries is most 
frequently linked to a more general deterioration in law and 
order. In 2000, both Fiji and the Solomon Islands witnessed 
coups, and conflicts between ethnic groups escalated. The nine-
year separatist war in the Bougainville province of Papua New 
George Gwyer 
Post-conflict rehabilitation 
in the Pacific 
Guinea was finally resolved in 2001. These three countries are sit-
uated in Melanesia, relatively close to Indonesia and the 
Philippines, both especially vulnerable to terrorism. 
Consolidating peace in Bougainville 
With the Bougainville Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 
August 2001, the Papua New Guinea (PNG) government finally 
acknowledged the Bougainvilleans' aspiration for autonomy, with 
the prospect of a teferendum on independence in 10 to 15 years. 
During the civil war 60,000 people were displaced and an estimated 
10,000 died, mostly due to the devastating impact of government 
sanctions. Bougainvilleans now expect social and economic advance-
ment and an autonomous administration. The peace process 
depends to a considerable extent on how these expectations are met. 
The intetnational donor community — particularly the EU, 
Australia and the UN - is investing in economic revitalisation, 
within the framework of post-conflict rehabilitation. Economic 
progress will be necessary to secure the revenue needed for the 
redevelopment of social services and the island's infrastructure. 
The European Community's contribution focuses on education 
and the rehabilitation of cocoa production, with special attention 
to the reintegration of ex-combatants. 
The EC funded cocoa nursery in Bougainville visited by Commissioner Nielson. 
Under the Cocoa Rehabilitation Programme, the EC has been 
distributing cocoa plants to farmers — among them ex-combat-
ants - and creating facilities for cocoa nurseries and the training 
of farmers. A feeder road programme is designed to enable cocoa 
farmers to get their produce to markets, and a port infrastructure 
programme to ensure transport to ovetseas markets. The overall 
aim of the three programmes, funded under STAB EX at a cost of 
€2,578,817, is to contribute to the recovery of the cocoa sector. 
Before the civil war this used to provide a large part of the popu-
lation with income. The quality of local cocoa products means 
that it could once again have substantial export value. 
There are other programmes for education and vocational train-
ing. The Vocational Training Centre Development Programme, also 
funded under STAB EX and costing €1,020,400, is related to the 
rehabilitation of the cocoa sector. It is designed to train young 
people (with special focus on ex-combatants) in the supplementary 
skills that are essential for cocoa fermentation and dry-
ing. Under the Human Resource Development 
Programme, €1,150,000 has been approved to build 
and tefurnish facilities at the Hutjena Secondary School 
in the North Solomons Province. 
These projects are at an advanced stage and are 
closely related to the needs of the population. 
Nevertheless, the reintegration into society of ex-
combatants from the two armed forces remains one of 
the most testing challenges. There is a popular per-
ception that they receive too much attention, and 
that being an ex-combatant is just a business to ben-
efit from reintegtation programmes. But this group 
cannot be neglected since the peace process is still 
fragile and arms are still available. One other danger 
is that the focus on cocoa as an agricultural export 
product might contribute to over-dependency in the 
future if market prices fall. awawawWãwawawaaaW 
Sustainable economic recovery and the development of human 
resources cannot be achieved without good governance. Early last 
year a conflict prevention mission ' went to Bougainville. It rec-
ommended facilitating links between the village level and the new 
autonomous government. It is important that its recommenda-
tions should now be put into effect with EC support. Another key 
factor is the growing instability on the PNG mainland and in the 
neighbouring Solomon Islands, which threatens the Bougainville 
peace process. So the EC needs to maintain a firm commitment 
to strengthening political dialogue and helping to build capacity. 
Growing disorder in the Solomon Islands 
In the Solomon Islands, conflict has arisen between the people 
of the main island, Guadalcanal, and those of Malaita. The latter 
have for generations migrated within the islands and have long 
dominated national politics, the economy, the police and the pub-
lic services — especially in Guadalcanal. Between 1998 and 2000 
tension escalated into violence and caused 100 deaths and dis-
placed some 20,000 people (mostly Malaitans). The conflict has 
since developed from inter-ethnic fighting into lawlessness more 
closely related to political, economic and criminal opportunism. 
This has spread to the country's other islands, including Western 
Province, which has social and kinship ties to Bougainville. 
Along with other international donors, the EC has encouraged 
the government to restore law and order, and to prepare a coher-
ent economic recovery plan prior to further financial commit-
ments. Meanwhile, €16,975,000 from STABEX and National 
Indicative Programme (NIP) funds has been spent or committed 
for social and security reforms as part of a conflict rehabilitation 
programme. The EC has launched an education programme to 
cover student fees and secondary school grants, and is planning a 
post-conflict support programme for farmers to encourage the 
reintegration of ex-combatants and displaced persons. The EC 
also supported the December 2001 elections and is currently co-
financing a British police commissioner and two assistants whose 
tasks are to reform and to re-establish confidence in the police 
force. 
In the long term, the EC current post-conflict rehabilitation 
programme in Solomon Islands, and other donor initiatives, will 
only contribute to sustainable peace if the root causes of the con-
flict are targeted. Particular efforts need to be made to create gen-
uine income-generating opportunities, especially for the young, 
to ensure that arms lose their economic value. The Farmer 
Programme should be designed carefully so that it does not gen-
erate jealousy towards the target groups or provoke new tensions, 
since displaced persons are mainly Malaitans. 
Unresolved causes of conflict in Fiji 
The threats to stability and security in Fiji are linked to unre-
solved questions of control over land and resources, and of unequal 
development between indigenous Fijians and Fijians of Indian ori-
gin, as well as within the indigenous Fijian population. The con-
flict escalated with a coup against the Indian-led government in 
May 2000 and a military mutiny in November, followed by attacks 
on the Indo-Fijian population. The uprising was initiated by a 
small economic and political elite of indigenous Fijians that used 
Children in an ethnic mixed 
school in Fiji. 
the historic rivalry between 
the two ethnic groups in 
their struggle for power. 
The armed forces that 
remained loyal brought the 
situation under control and 
new elections were held in 
August 2001. The violence 
cost relatively few lives but 
displaced more than 
10,000 people; some 
6,000, mostly Indo-Fijians, 
emigrated. One serious 
concern relates to the new 
government, dominated by 
indigenous Fijians. It has 
yet to meet the constitutional requirements to include the Fiji 
Labour Party, and it continues to disseminate the doctrine of 
indigenous Fijian supremacy. 
The aim of the EC's post-conflict activities is to promote inter-
racial reconciliation, democracy and good governance. Last year's 
conflict prevention mission helped to shape the National Indicative-
Programme (for the 9th European Development Fund), with a 
focus on rural education and mixed schools where feasible. In line 
with Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, the Community has 
put pressure on the government to respect the constitution, which 
provides for representatives from other parties in government. 
The EC also chose Fiji as one of its 30 "focus countries" for the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR). It has already allocated €1,458,000 to suitable local 
organisations and institutions since 2001. Changing attitudes, 
and building trust and confidence within and between ethnic 
groups, is clearly a long process. Meanwhile, it is important that 
inequality in economic opportunities and in political participa-
tion is not allowed to exacerbate tensions once again. 
The way ahead 
The EC's post-conflict rehabilitation programmes in the Pacific 
region are designed to meet the different needs of each country, 
with particular attention paid to the reintegration of ex-combatants 
and displaced persons. Insensitively planned programmes promote 
jealousy and rivalry within broader society or simply become a 
money-making opportunity for the target groups. The EC also 
needs to be careful that concentration on a particular economic 
sector does not outweigh the principle of economic diversity. 
The worrying situation on PNG's mainland as well as in neigh-
bouring Indonesia, which could have a devastating impact on the 
stability of the whole region, are also major causes for concern. To 
meet this challenge, international donors should encourage 
efforts by the Pacific Islands Forum to create a "coalition of the 
willing" to enhance regional peace and stability. This will be an 
important task for the Pacific leaders who are due to meet in 
Auckland in August this year. ■ SS 
* Trainee In the Pacific Unit of the European Commission's development directorate-general. 
1. The Conflict Prevention Mission look part within the framework of the Rapid Reaction 
Mechanism (KRM) anu also included the Solomon Islands and Fiji. 
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More than a year has passed 
since President Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah declared an official end 
to war and the fighting factions 
disarmed and demobilised. Yet 
one of the greatest challenges 
facing Sierra Leone today 
remains the reintegration and 
settlement of its youth. 
Jeannette Akua Eno* describes a 
programme which attempts to 
engage constructively with 
young people in Sierra Leone as 
it emerges from civil war, 
offering them positive 
opportunities and support. 
Young people played a central role in Sierra Leone's brutal 
conflict as both fighters and civilian casualties. Marginalised youth 
and the relative ease with which the various armed factions recruit-
ed them fed on a longstanding crisis of blocked education and 
employment opportunities for young people. Child soldiers were 
recruited by all groups: the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) and the Kamajors /Civil Defence Forces (CDF). 
Boys and girls were reportedly the main victims of RUF abductions, 
rape, torture, killings, forced labour and combat training. In RUF 
camps, the drugging of youths to desensitise them was common. 
War brought an end to formal education for most young girls 
and boys in Sierra Leone. Since the early 1990s, many Sierra 
Leonean youths from poorer rural households have grown up 
knowing only war and without ever going to school. Deprived of 
education and training opportunities, health care and income-
generating activities, their lives have thus far been ones of pover-
ty, dependency, dislocation and family separation. This has had a 
dire effect on the entire country. 
A huge task lies ahead for Sierra Leoneans to transform their 
severe youth crisis into an opportunity for post-conflict growth 
and stability. It must be remembered that war exacerbated, rather 
than created, Sierra Leone's youth crisis. One of the greatest caus-
es identified is the country's persistent political, social and eco-
nomic decline, brought on by decades of ill-conceived fiscal poli-
cies, mismanagement, corruption and political instability. The 
magnitude of this youth crisis, if ignored, is likely to impede 
efforts for a lasting peace and increase the country's social, polit-
ical and economic instability. The outbreak of armed conflict in 
neighbouring Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire poses further dangers, as 
Tackling 
Sierra Leone's youth crisis 
disaffected young people and ex-combatants will be much more 
likely to migrate and enlist as mercenary fighters there. Engaging 
with young people constructively and offering them positive 
opportunities is therefore crucial. 
In an effort to prevent young men and women being lured into 
such dangerous occupations as mercenaries or diamond digging, 
Conciliation Resources (CR) has initiated community level 
youth-focused programmes in the diamond district of Kenema in 
eastern Sierra Leone and the town of Bo in the south. The "Youth 
in Progress" programme grew out of a series of discussions with 
young people that aimed to identify their immediate and medi-
um term needs, develop micro-projects and raise awareness on 
key issues of peacebuilding, conflict analysis, rights-based issues 
and civic education. 
Since September 2000, CR-Sierra Leone has focused on pro-
viding recreational facilities for existing youth clubs in the shape 
of drop-in centres for 14-25 year olds. These are places where 
young people can "hang out", play indoor and outdoor sports 
and take time to discuss and think about what they want to do 
with their lives. Regular football, netball and volleyball tourna-
ments for men and women are supported, along with various cul-
tural and theatre activities. Small libraries at the centres are also 
well stocked with donated books and computers. Over 2,000 
youths have attended Kenema's drop-in centre, and more than 
1,000 in Bo, which opened later in 2002. Both centres are co-
managed by a democratically elected Youth Coordinating 
Committee, made up of equal numbers of males and females. In 
Kenema, youths from the drop-in centre collaborated with 
United Nations Volunteers (UNV) and UNAMSIL to rehabili-
tate the town playing field and build new changing rooms. 
The project has seen an increase in the self-confidence and self-
esteem of the young men and women involved. It has won sup-
port not just from local youths but also from community leaders, 
parents, government officials and educational institutions. In 
December 2002, the Kenema drop-in-centre coordinated a Youth 
Festival, which attracted thousands of people from the surround-
ing region for almost five days of music, dance, theatre, sports 
and public debates. The whole event passed without any violence 
— a remarkable achievement proving that young people can 
behave in a responsible way, given the opportunity. 
Transforming young girls' lives 
The damage that young people have suffered physically, psy-
chologically, socially, politically and economically, if left 
unchanged, will render them incapable of effectively fulfiling 
their economic and reproductive roles in society. The long-term 
effects of the widespread sexual abuse and exploitation of young 
girls should not be underestimated and will require long-term 
and non-harmful strategies to transform young girls' lives. In 
order to develop appropriate responses to the needs of young 
women attending the drop-in centre in Kenema, CR-Sierra 
Leone carried out a gender needs assessment last year. It found 
that females on average had between one to seven years of formal 
schooling, whilst males had ten to twelve years. One girl suc-
cinctly summed up the cultural beliefs that underpin the contin-
uing marginalisation of women in Sierra Leonean society: "My 
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kitchen. It is therefore a waste to send girls to school". 
The gender needs assessment also found that many youths have 
no marketable form of skill training and that young women 
wanted skills training and income-generation support. Training 
programmes were subsequently designed to emphasise gender 
equality within the youth groups, staff and volunteers at the cen-
tres. These included training sessions for a group of twenty young 
mothers who set up and now run a very successful canteen in the 
Kenema centre. Their training took into account the extra pres-
sures on them as mothers, by holding sessions at convenient 
hours and providing childcare allowances. 
Other training activities with young people in the drop-in-
centres have continued to focus on conflict handling and life 
skills, along with some HIV/AIDS prevention sessions in collab-
oration with the non-governmental organisation International 
Rescue Committee (IRC). Over 60 per cent of the youths that 
CR-SL works with are in the high-risk age group of 15-25 years 
for sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS. While 
HIV/AIDS infection rates in Sierra Leone are relatively low for 
Africa — around three per cent — there is real concern that rates 
have risen because of the high level of rape and sexual abuse used 
as a war strategy by some combatants, and also because many 
peacekeeping soldiers were from heavily infected countries. 
Health education, with a special focus on HIV/AIDS, therefore 
Young band players preparing for the procession to launch the Youth in Progress 
Drop-in Centre in Bo, southern Sierra Leone. (November 2002) 
poses a significant challenge in the country's post-war recon-
struction. 
The future of the country will be lost if we continue to ignore the 
glaring needs of young men and women and their potential. 
CR welcomes recent moves by the government of Sierra Leone 
through its Ministry for Youth and Sport, which has begun to form-
ulate inclusive, cohesive and constructive strategies around youth 
engagement, and has initiated dialogue around a National Youth 
Policy. Nevertheless, the efforts of government, NGOs, the business 
community and young people must be harnessed to transform the 
old order into opportunities for a just and lasting peace. ■ 
* West Africa Programme Manager for Conciliation Resources, an international 
non-governmental, non-profit organisation for conflict prevention and resolution 
Contact: Melissa Jones - Conciliation Resources 
173 Upper Street, London Nl IRC, - United Kingdom 
Tel: 020-7359 7728 ext 237 - Fax:020-7359 1081 - Mob: 44+79033-5882 - Email: nijonestfiy-rtmi 
EU-Sierra Leone Rehabilitation and Resettlement Programme 
The primary objective of this project was to help create income, employment and training opportunities for ex-combatants and unem-
ployed youths, to improve the availability of basic social services (education, health, water and sanitation), to increase the amount of 
household disposable income and, finally, to rebuild community infrastructure (road network, markets, etc).The first phase of the pro-
gramme started in March 1997 but implementation was disrupted between May 1997 and July 1998 by a coup, followed in 1999 and 
2000 by the evacuation of the technical assistance team for security reasons. 
Phase 1 implemented projects in the agricultural sector and in related income generation. To address the needs of war-affected 
farmers, seeds were distributed, agricultural tools provided, 25,032 acres of tree crop plantations were rehabilitated and assistance was 
provided to cultivate vegetables; agricultural stores, drying floors and crop processing equipment were supplied; fishing boats, canoes, 
fish-washing platforms and nets were provided; animal pens were built, and poultry, goats, sheep and pigs were distributed. 
In the educational sector, the project addressed skills training, building of schools and renovation of vocational training centres, and 
supply of school furniture. 
In the health sector a number of hospitals were rehabilitated, peripheral health care units were built or renovated; and medical staff 
received refresher training. 
Projects for ex-combatants provided paid labour: amongst other activities they cleared 20 miles of waterways, 7,000 attended civic 
education and peace-building workshops, while 748 received skills training. 
From the success and the lessons learned during phase 1, the second phase emerged, covering July 2002 to June 2005. The overall objec-
tive is to contribute further to increased security, social stability and economic revival by helping the population and communities affect-
ed by the conflict, as well as former combatants, to return to normal, productive lives. These objectives will be accomplished through assis-
tance to war-affected populations and communities to resettle in their areas of origin through agricultural assistance programmes, sup-
port for reintegrating ex-combatants into society through paid employment concentrating on rehabilitation of infrastructure and improv-
ing the provision of basic social services in the health, sanitation and education fields. 
The shift from the focus on ex-combatants to a focus on war-affected communities and the integration of ex-combatants is in recogni-
tion that no single group should be given preferential treatment in the process of rebuilding social stability and economic revival. 
The programme now covers the entire country, projects are primarily designed to benefit whole communities or groups. The flow of 
requests for assistance is constant. The programme is providing much-needed support in re-launching Sierra Leone's economy and re-
establishing basic social services, and a return to normality in Sierra Leone. 
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when weapons fall silent, are 
the theatre where many major 
ICRC (International Committee 
of the Red Cross) actions take 
place. Such periods may be 
the prelude to genuine, 
long-term peace, or to a 
resumption of hostilities. 
In this article, 
Marion Horroff-Tavel* 
examines the ICRC's 
responsibilities and the 
definition of the limits within 
which it can act in a post-
conflict rehabilitation period. 
When active hostilities come to an end, humanitarian 
problems persist and may even become more acute. Where the 
health-care infrastructure and water-supply systems have been 
destroyed, people often have no access to medical care and are 
obliged to live in insalubrious conditions which are a fertile breed-
ing ground for disease. In many cases prisoners of war who should 
have been released at the end of the hostilities remain in detention. 
Nothing is done to find out what happened to people reported 
missing, and their families endure prolonged anguish. Refugees 
and internally displaced people are too afraid to return to their vil-
lages. Mines and other unexploded munitions continue to take 
their toll. Finally, reprisals and acts of revenge claim new victims. 
This picture, incomplete as it is, gives some idea of the scale of the 
task facing humanitarian organisations and development agencies. 
When active hostilities cease, the parties to a conflict have not 
only many ongoing humanitarian obligations to fulfil, but new 
ones, too. Within the context of international armed conflicts, one 
of the parties' new obligations is to repatriate prisoners of war 
"without delay". While the internment of prisoners of war is jus-
tified during the hostilities to prevent them taking up arms again, 
this reason cannot be invoked once fighting is at an end. However, 
the 1949 Third Geneva Convention stipulates that those who are 
subject to criminal proceedings may be held until proceedings 
finish and, if appropriate, until the completion of the punishment 
handed down. Civilian internees still in detention when active 
hostilities end must also be released at the earliest opportunity. 
In non-international armed conflicts - involving fighting 
between a state and armed groups or armed groups fighting each 
other — there is no special provision determining what should hap-
pen to prisoners, whether combatant or non-combatant, at the 
end of hostilities. Such prisoners are sometimes held for years after 
the guns have hiilen silent, under sentence for criminal activities, 
or as an administrative measure, or for purposes of "re-
education". Whatever the circumstances, such prisoners must be 
treated humanely. 
Ideally, the ICRC will normally have had access to detainees 
from the moment they were incarcerated, to check on their treat-
ment and conditions of detention. It will have seen every one of 
them on repeated occasions and will have interviewed them with-
out witnesses, that is, in private, so that they are able to speak 
freely. Consequently, the ICRC is concerned by the repatriation 
Humanitarian challenges 
as the weapons fall silent 
process: sometimes it is invited to act as witness, to ensure that the 
correct procedures are followed. On other occasions it plays an 
essentially diplomatic role as a neutral intermediary, putting the 
former belligerents in contact with each other so as to arrive at an 
understanding on the repatriation procedure. It might also act as 
an implementing agency, ascertaining the wishes of the prisoners 
prior to their repatriation, providing the necessary logistical sup-
port, facilitating the crossing offrant lines, or even conducting the 
operation itself. At all times, it reminds the parties of the human-
itarian rules governing such repatriations. Finally, it continues its 
visits to people protected by humanitarian law who remain in cap-
tivity, for example those who are too seriously wounded to travel, 
those against whom criminal proceedings are pending or who are 
serving sentences, and also those who are being held in detention 
in violation of humanitarian law. 
Placing limits 
The challenge for the ICRC during a period of transition is not 
to identify the activities to be carried out, but rather, to place lim-
its on those activities. Naturally, it helps displaced persons, but for 
how long, given that there are millions of such people throughout 
the world, many of them with little hope of returning home? It is 
vital to assist the most vulnerable, but what is to be done if the 
state is incapable of taking responsibility for them or has no inten-
tion of setting up a social welfare safety net and if no other 
humanitarian organisation is ready to take over the aid pro-
gramme? How is the distinction to be made between those who 
have left their homes for economic reasons, hoping to find a bet-
ter life elsewhere, and those whom the ICRC is mandated to assist 
because they have fled armed conflict? Is any such differentiation 
justifiable ethically when they are all in a situation of distress? And 
how are the most vulnerable displaced persons to be located in an 
urban environment when they simply merge into a population 
that is itself impoverished? 
Faced with such dilemmas, ICRC delegations have always acted 
on the basis of the urgency of the needs, and in consequence have 
not always come up with a uniform response. Attempts have been 
made to establish limits. Strict criteria have been laid down to 
identify the groups most at risk. In certain delegations, the ICRC 
has focused on providing assistance in rural areas, leaving urban 
areas with their proliferation of shantytowns to others. The ICRC 
has approached the authorities in certain places, in an attempt to 
pursuade them to tackle the problem at its source; to grant dis-
placed persons official status, to simplify administrative formalities 
they have to go through to receive help, or even to discriminate 
positively in their favour. 
The ICRC recently adopted guidelines covering assistance in 
transition periods. These recommend that, until some other solu-
tion has been found, residual assistance continue to be given for 
two categories of war victims: those who would be placed at risk 
if aid programmes were to be interrupted (such as tuberculosis 
control programmes), or those for whom the commitment needs 
to be long term (such as disabled people receiving 
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ICRC. 
Central prison, Kigali. Visiting a sick prisoner and 
interviewing a prisoners' representative. In many cases 
prisoners of war who should have been released at the 
end of the hostilities remain in detention. 
prosthetic/orthotic services). It may also decide to embark on new 
activities if they are intended either to meet urgent needs (e.g. 
those of populations that were inaccessible during the conflict 
and who are in a critical situation). Finally, where it is not a 
question of responding to urgent needs, the ICRC has established 
The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement 
is made up of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the National 
Societies. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross is an 
impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose 
exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives 
and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to 
provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates 
the International relief activities conducted by the 
Movement in situations of conflict. It also endeavours to 
prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening 
humanitarian law and universal humanitarian principles. 
Together, all the components of the International Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the "Movement") 
are guided by the same seven Fundamental Principles: 
humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, volun-
tary service, unity and universality. Thus, many large-scale 
ICRC operations take place during "transition" periods, 
which begin when the guns fall silent and which may 
lead to a real and lasting peace... or to a resumption of 
hostilities. 
http://www.icrc.orQ 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
19, avenue de la Paix 
CH-1202 Geneva - Switzerland 
lelephone+41 22 734 60 01 
Telefax +41 22 733 20 57 
criteria allowing it to establish its priorities. It will tend to favour, 
for example, programmes which enable it to achieve other objec-
tives in the area of protection (especially of the civilian popula-
tion), which are likely to ease tension between antagonistic com-
munities, or that require the services of a specifically neutral insti-
tution. 
The ICRC has also modified its working methods for a number 
of reasons: the conviction that relief, rehabilitation and develop-
ment (RRD) do not constitute a linear sequence but often over-
lap, so that even during the emergency stage thought must be 
given to future development; the desire to help communities and 
individuals make the choices which affect them, rather than decid-
ing for them what tomorrow will bring; the desire to repair, 
through humanitarian actions, the torn social fabric. In short, the 
ICRC's approach during the transition period is participatory, to 
strengthen local capacities and to improve infrastructures. 
Distribution of aid will continue for the most vulnerable (the eld-
erly, children, etc.) until a social welfare safety net has been set up 
by the authorities, but will be limited for other groups, to avoid 
creating dependency. Partnerships will be sought as a priority, in 
the hope that development agencies will be interested in taking 
over the ICRC programmes. 
A number of actions are just as important as assistance pro-
grammes in a period of transition, ranging from the identification 
of the dead and wounded, support for victims' families, cam-
paigning against the use of certain weapons (mines), promoting 
international law and human rights and contributing to the 
upholding of the law. Regarding the latter, however, the ICRC 
refrains from giving evidence in court in order to retain its impar-
tial status. 
Finding solutions to humanitarian problems in a post-conflict 
period is the daily lot of the ICRC in the Balkans, Angola, the 
Southern Caucasus, Sri Lanka, East Timor, Afghanistan, Sierra 
Leone, Ethiopia/Eritrea and, in the wake of recent events, Iraq. As 
long as its humanitarian action lasts, it will endeavour to intervene 
in a way that suits the context, so that yesterday's victims can 
tomorrow be the masters of their own destiny. ■ 
* Deputy Director lor International Law and Cooperation, International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement 
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Botswana 
Botswana has made remarkable social and economic progress since independence in 
1966. No country in the world, over a period of more than three decades, has had 
higher growth rates. Even the Asian tigers have not been so successful. Sound 
economic management has enabled the country to transform itself from being one of 
the poorest countries in the world to its current status as a middle-income country. 
Botswana also has the distinction of being the only country ever to have "graduated" 
from the Least Developed Countries (LDC) group, in 1994. 
Such formidable growth, though, has been dependent on mining, especially diamonds. 
Economic diversification is vital to ensure continued prosperity, and the government 
has been exploring new avenues which will allow the utilisation of human resources to 
support new service-based economic sectors. These include, for example, financial 
services, information technology and tourism. 
Progress in the economy has been accompanied by significant advances in human 
development. The population is now reasonably educated. The health system is very 
efficient. 
On the downside, the government has to deal with high rates of poverty and 
unemployment. But the major 
threat to Botswana's progress is 
the severe problem of 
HIV/AIDS, which is casting a 
shadow over the country's 
economic growth and human 
development. 
Report and photos (unless otherwise 
indicated): Maurizio Carbone „country report: Botswana 
Africa's best kept secret: 
Botswana as 
"a shining liberal 
democracy" 
Botswana's impressive performance is one 
of the success stories of development in 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
It has won international recognition for its 
high rates of growth, prudent economic 
management, political stability and an 
efficient welfare system. Despite this 
progress, Botswana still faces significant 
economic and social challenges, including 
poverty, unemployment, the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, and the need to develop the 
private sector further. 
Sean Foster- Seba Botswana  Gaborone 
In marked contrast to most African states, 
Botswana has experienced remarkable growth, moving from 
being one of the poorest countries in the world to its present 
classification as a "middle income country" by the World Bank. 
Between 1966 and 1980, Botswana's Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) grew at an annual rate of 14.5 per cent, and was for a 
long time one of the fastest growing economies in the world; 
per capita GDP quintupled over the first 20 years of inde-
pendence. During the 1990s, as global integtation intensified, 
Botswana's growth slowed, but GDP still rose by slightly below 
ten per cent a year. In 2001/2002 real GDP growth was only 
2.3 pet cent, considetably lower than the 8.4 per cent achieved 
in 2000/01; however, according to officiai national forecasts, it 
should recover and reach about five per cent in 2002/03. 
The role of the state 
Discovery and exploitation of abundant reserves of dia-
monds have underpinned the economic miracle, but this 
remarkable development performance would not have been 
possible without fiscal discipline and political stability. 
Botswana has benefited from diamonds, but unlike many 
other developing countries that enjoy a similar bonanza in 
the form of mineral oil or other commodities, it has man-
aged its diamond revenues wisely and spent large sums for 
the benefit of the population as a whole. 
Inextricably linked with this record of economic growth is 
the cteation of what can be described as a "developmental 
state". Although Botswana is often perceived as following a 
capitalist mode of development, with its emphasis on market 
forces, the state has played a crucial role in promoting eco-
nomic growth and development. Since independence it has 
promoted a series of policies aimed at fostering economic 
growth and social development, and has adopted a planning 
process that presented development plans with achievable 
goals. Overall, the quality of all development plans has been 
very high and their implementation impressive, including the 
successful management of the diamond boom. Over the 
years, the thrust of the development strategy has been to 
achieve rapid and large returns from intensive capital invest-
ment in mining and to re-invest those returns to improve the 
living standards of the people, the Batswana. 
Human development 
The average citizen of Botswana has thus benefited from 
this phenomenal economic growth through the provision of 
social services in the form of health facilities, free education, 
clean water and other welfare services. The educational sys-
tem is considered to be among the best in Africa. Primary 
and secondary education is provided free of charge, even 
though the government recently announced the introduc-
tion of cost sharing in the provision of education. More than 
90 per cent of children complete primary school and 70 per 
cent continue to secondary school. Yet much remains to be 
done as the education system has not kept up with the needs 
of the country. A well educated, skilled workforce is essential 
to achieve the government's goal of economic diversification. 
Recognising this, in the past two years the government has 
given high priority to the development of vocational and 
technical training. 
In health care, the government has invested heavily in 
infrastructure and the training of personnel. Access to 
health care is very good: virtually all urban residents and 
more than 80 per cent of the rural popularion is within 
15 km of a primary health facility. 
Botswana's record in human development has been 
impressive, with one exception: HIV/AIDS. According to 
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UNAIDS, 38.8% of adults are now infected with HIV; life 
expectancy declined to 44 in 2001. HIV/AIDS has substan-
tial implications for progress in human capital and increas-
ing productivity as it mostly affects the skilled and produc-
tive sections of the population. The government has intro-
duced several programmes to fight the pandemic, including 
the anti-retroviral therapy programme, the prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission programme, and the 
Botswana-Harvard HIV reference laboratory, which con-
ducts research. Increased demand for health care from peo-
ple with HIV-related illness is over-stretching the public 
health system, causing government spending to increase 
sharply; part of these resources has been devoted to educat-
ing the public about the HIV/AIDS scourge. 
Despite its impressive economic performance, Botswana is 
still riddled with a high level of poverty and unemployment. 
Recent data show that almost half of the households live in 
poverty, with a higher concentration in rural areas. It should 
be noted, though, that there are some non-quantifiable ben-
efits in the form of infrastructure development, provision of 
housing plots, universal education and health services, which 
are not included in the measurement of income poverty. 
Democratic practices 
Botswana is a unique case in terms of political stability. It 
has held free and fair elections every five years since inde-
pendence in 1966; it has a reputation of being almost total-
ly free of corruption; the judiciary is independent; the 
human rights record has remained relatively clean; there are 
no political prisoners. Some major reforms have been 
undertaken in the past years: an Independent Electoral 
Vision 2016 
In 1996, on the occasion marking the country's 30 years of 
independence, the then President, H.E. Sir Ketumile Masire, 
launched the "Framework for a long-term vision for 
Botswana". After extensive nation-wide consultation, the 
framework was developed into a document: "Vision 2016: 
Towards Prosperity for All", which sets out the long-term goals 
for the people of Botswana, identifying the challenges implied 
by those goals and proposing a set of strategies to meet them. 
Botswana's development plans are based upon four principles: 
democracy, development, self-reliance, and unity. A new prin-
ciple is now introduced: Botho, which is a Setswana (the 
national language) word for respect, good manners. 
According to Vision 2016, by 2016 Botswana will be "an edu-
cated and informed nation" (all people will have quality educa-
tion and access to reliable information and technology services); 
a "prosperous, productive and innovative nation" (the econo-
my will be diversified, males and females will have equal oppor-
tunities, and the environment will be preserved); a "compas-
sionate and caring nation" (poverty will be eradicated and the 
negative impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic will be reversed); a 
"safe and secure nation" (violent crime will be eliminated and 
human rights will be fully protected); an "open, democratic and 
accountable nation" (civil society will play a full part in the 
development of the country and the role of traditional leaders 
will also be enhanced); a "moral and tolerant nation" (there will 
be tolerant social attitudes towards people of different cultures, 
ethnic traditions, religions and disabilities); a "united and proud 
nation" (sharing common ideals, goals, and symbols). 
Despite active advertising campaigns and the widespread free 
distribution of condoms, the transmission of HIV has accelerated 
throughout the country 
Commission has been appointed to manage elections; the 
voting age has been lowered from 21 to 18; and an 
autonomous office of the ombudsman has been created to 
curb abuses in public administration. 
However, there are a number of weaknesses, including a 
fragmented opposition, a weak civil society, and an under-
developed media sector. The Botswana Democratic Party 
(BDP) has been in power since independence, and even 
though its support has gradually eroded, the opposition, 
because of splits and a proliferation of political parties, has 
never managed to oust it. Apart from some sporadic cases, 
civil society has not been very vocal. Furthermore, even 
though the number of private media has grown, the state 
still controls the major newspaper (the only daily paper, 
which is free of charge), the biggest radio station, as well as 
the only television station in the country. 
The issue of Basarwa 
For more than a decade, the government has launched 
successive campaigns to persuade the Basarwa, a minority 
group, to leave the Central Kalahari Game Reserve. Many 
Basarwa moved over time to the new purpose-built settle-
ments, partly forced by recurrent droughts and partly 
attracted by government incentives. As a result, the number 
of Basarwa remaining in the area has gradually decreased. 
In March 2002, the government suspended services provi-
sion, based on financial considerations (the high cost of 
services delivery in relation to the small number of people) 
as well as their wish to make the Basarwa part of main-
stream development. This decision met with widespread 
criticism, not only from local civil society organisations, 
but also from a UK-based NGO, Survival International 
(SI). SI launched a major campaign speculating that the 
real reason for the relocation of the Basarwa was planned 
mining activity in the reserve. Their aggressive internation-
al campaign led the local human rights organisation, 
Ditshwanelo, to distance itself from SI and continue its 
own efforts which favoured ongoing negotiation with gov-
ernment and exploration of all the legal avenues open to the 
Basarwa. Furthermore, the government has several times 
responded that no mining exploitation is planned for the 
area. ■ MC 
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Interview with President Festus Mogae 
"We may be a middle-income country, 
but we are still a small country, 
with major disadvantages" 
President Festus Gontebanye Mogae is both head of state and head of government. 
He leads a country that for a long time has been the world's fastest growing economy, 
has a multiparty system, and has one of the most developed welfare systems in 
sub-Saharan Africa. The ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), of which he is leader, 
pursues a neo-liberal agenda based on the assumption that the private sector is the 
engine of economic growth, with minimal state intervention in economic activity. In 
this interview, President Mogae discusses the government's initiatives to diversify the 
economy from diamonds, the measures taken to tackle unemployment and poverty, 
and the greatest challenge his country is facing at the moment, HIV/AIDS 
Botswana has been celebrated as a model of 
development, but most of its revenues come from 
diamonds. Although many initiatives have been 
taken to diversify the economy, progress has been 
slow. What are the major constraints? 
There are at least three types of constraints. First, the small 
domestic market, as a consequence of the small population. 
When we ask foreign investors to invest in Botswana, we actual-
ly ask them to locate here but to produce for third country mar-
kets, whereas if they decide to invest in other African countries, 
like South Africa, Nigeria, Mozambique, at least there is a large 
domestic market to address. Second, if we want to produce for 
exporting, we are a landlocked country. Compared to Mauritius, 
which has a successful export industry, the sea is too far. Land 
transportation is more expensive than water transportation, and 
in Africa even more so than elsewhere. Third, we don't have the 
raw materials: we have to import everything from abroad. These 
are the major constraints, which are not policy constraints, but 
objective constraints. Otherwise, we have one of the lowest tax 
rates in the region and on the continent, we are relatively free in 
terms of bureaucracy, we have no exchange controls, we offer not 
only political stability, but also stability of policies. 
Is over-reliance on mining a problem in the long term? 
No, I don't think so, at least for now. It is true that diamond 
mining has been widely successful in financial terms, but the cop-
per and nickel mining sector, which is also assisted by SYSMIN, 
is one of the largest employers in Botswana. I am convinced 
that, if we continue with our appropriate financial policies, 
some day more investors may come, including in the mining 
sectors. Also, let me mention here the new International 
Financial Services Centre (IFSC). When we thought of it, we 
talked to the main regulatory authorities in Europe, the Bank 
of England, the Federal Reserve; the fear was that it could 
become a tax haven. It is not a tax haven, but it only charges 
15 per cent tax. The IFSC has been slow to start because it does 
not have the facilities that some other countries, for instance 
Luxembourg, could offer, but I am sure it will do better in the 
near future. 
President Festus Mogae was Executive Director for Anglophone 
Africa at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was appointed 
Governor of the Bank of Botswana and, in 1989, Minister of 
Finance and Development Planning. He was Vice President 
between 1992 and 1998, when he succeeded former President 
Sir Ketumile Masire, who retired from politics. 
Department of Information and Broadcasting, Gaborone 
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everything from abroad. But don't you think that, 
although small, the domestic market could be 
addressed better by the domestic private sector? 
It is again a problem of small scale. The domestic private sec-
tor is still in its learning curve. We hope that we will find for-
eign investors that can enter into partnerships with local busi-
nesses. This has not yet happened to a significant extent. Also, 
the domestic private sector tends to be excessively dependent on 
government. We used to subsidise it, but this was no longer sus-
tainable, although we maintained this system for over 15 years. 
What we can do now as a government is to foster an enabling 
environment for private sector development. 
Even though Botswana is considered a middle-income 
country, the number of poor people is still quite high. 
Also, the level of unemployment has reached 18 per 
cent. How do you address poverty issues? 
I think the most effective way is to generate private invest-
ment so that there are more employment opportunities. As 
far as social services are concerned, we are providing almost 
everything for free. Education and health are free; we have an 
old age pension, we offer destitution relief. The question is 
whether we can afford this in the long term. Probably what 
we're doing is not appropriate because people sit down and 
expect to receive everything from government. 
Next year there will be elections. The ruling party 
has been in power since independence, civil 
society is weak, the media have made some 
complaints. Some have even questioned the fact 
that Botswana is a true democracy. 
We are democratic, we have a multiparty system and we 
have elections every five years. Normally there are five or six 
political parties, but during the elections new opposition par-
ties are formed and their number goes up to ten or eleven. 
This is to the advantage of the ruling party. The opposition 
has not won power because of its tendency to fragment. Civil 
society and media are free. They criticise us a lot. 
They complain about the lack of funding... 
We don't think that funding private media is one of our pri-
orities. There is already too much dependency on government. 
Also, I don't think that the fact that we are not funding the 
media has been a constraint on them. Of course, they would 
like to be funded. The opposition parties would also like to be 
funded. But if, for instance, we decide to fund them, I am sure 
that their number would immediately double, and their chance 
Botswana 
of ever coming together would be 
reduced. But this does not mean we are 
not a free society. 
A negative campaign against 
Botswana has been launched by a 
British non-governmental 
organisa tion, Survival 
International, about the relocation 
of Basarwa from the Central 
Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR). 
Initially we were criticised by human 
rights organisations because we were not 
developing the Basarwa. Then, we re-
located these people outside the game reserve: we builr clinics 
and schools, we helped them relocate, compensated them, and 
gave them livestock. But after a while, a few wanted to go back 
to the park to hunt. That was no longer possible. We gave them 
everything, but to live outside the park: it was no longer sus-
tainable to look after them in the park. There have been imper-
fections, but our policy was meant to improve their life. Finally, 
Survival International has made the accusation that we moved 
the Basarwa because we wanted to allow further mining 
exploitations in the area. This is false: whenever we have mined 
we have built a settlement. The day we want to mine in the 
CKGR we will build a new settlement. 
One of the unintended consequences of being a 
middle-income country is that you don't receive 
much international aid. 
When we raise our voice about aid, debt relief, better terms 
of access to international trade, we often do this on behalf of all 
developing countries. As Botswana we really cannot complain 
too much: at present we are even failing to meet our beef quota 
into the EU. But of course we understand that other ACP 
countries may have concerns about bananas, sugar, and other 
commodities. We may be a middle income country, but we are 
still a small country, with major disadvantages. We are serious-
ly affected by HIV-AIDS. I made an appeal to the United 
Nations during the Millennium Summit. The international 
community has been very responsive; the private sector, espe-
cially in the US, has been very generous to us. But we still need 
help. We are still short of nurses, pharmacists, health techni-
cians, and doctors. Of course, our health facilities are currently 
overwhelmed and indeed we have developed a programme for 
those patients who are not very sick and can be cared for at 
home: we provide them with all the medicines, and at the same 
time we train their families. But still, we need aid, we need 
technical assistance, capacity building: this is our major request. 
HIV/AIDS is definitely the greatest challenge for 
Botswana in the near future... 
Yes, HIV/AIDS is a major threat. It reverses some of the 
achievements we reached in the past decades. We are losing 
too many people, and we are also losing those people that 
we have educated abroad, at very great expense. We have 
about 800 students in the UK, a similar number in the US 
and in Australia, and about 5,000 students in South Africa. 
We pay for everything. When these people die, not only do 
we lose our family and friends, but also the entire economy 
of Botswana suffers from these losses. ■ MC 
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Striving for sustained economic diversification: 
manufacturing or financial services? 
Botswana has recorded impressive growth rates since independence. 
However, much of this growth is due to the rapid expansion of only one sector, 
the mining sector, and government has been largely financed by the proceeds 
of mineral revenues. As a consequence, the economy remains vulnerable to the 
vagaries of diamonds. This dependence on a single sector has led the 
government to pursue a policy of diversifying the economy. 
When Botswana became independent in 1966, 
beef was the only significant export. The agriculture sector 
accounted for some 40 per cent of GDP. The discovery of 
diamonds changed this picture completely and the early 
dominance of agriculture was quicldy reversed. Today, the 
mining sector accounts for about 35 per cent of GDP, with 
diamonds contributing to about 94 per cent of the total min-
ing share. Botswana also produces other minerals, including 
copper and nickel, soda ash and salt. Other sectors of the 
economy have also performed relatively well, in part as a 
result of Botswana's market friendly environment, sound 
macroeconomic policies, strong currency, controlled infla-
tion, and social and infrastructural investments. The manu-
facturing sector, which accounts for about four per cent of 
GDP, suffered a setback in 1999 due to the closure of the 
country's main automobile assembly plant, following the liq-
uidation of the Hyundai assembly plant. The decline in agri-
culture is not across the board. The livestock sector involves 
about 80 per cent of Botswana's rural population; beef still 
remains a major foreign exchange earner after diamonds. 
The services sector has boomed along with the economy: 
tourism and the financial services sector have been identified 
as having important economic potential for Botswana. 
The need to diversify 
The central policy thrust for Botswana's development 
planning process, especially in the past three National 
Development Plans, has been economic diversification 
away from dependence on diamonds. "The need to diversi-
fy the economy is justified for several reasons. Amongst the 
most important is the need to avoid the high risks associat-
ed with prices and demand patterns for that commodity; to 
prevent external shocks, whether in the markets for that 
particular commodity or as part of broader economic 
cycles; to increase employment, since, being highly capital 
intensive, mining has not made a significant contribution 
to employment", explains Linah Mohohlo, governor of the 
Bank of Botswana. 
Diversification is especially critical for small economies 
like Botswana. "With constraints imposed by economies of 
scale effects, small economies tend to be constrained by the 
size of their markets, hence the range of goods that they can 
produce for the domestic economy is limited", says Baledzi 
Gaolathe, Minister of Finance and Development Planning. 
Along the same lines, Elias Dewah, Executive Director of 
BOCCIM (the organisation representing the private sec-
tor), complains about the pace of delivery of services: "the 
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The diamond 
industry has been 
key to Botswana's 
economic success. 
But dependence on a 
single commodity is 
not a sustainable 
basis for the 
economy, and the 
government is 
stressing the need 
for diversification. 
A* ye* + 
warn 
domestic market is too fragile. We should do everything 
possible to accommodate foreign investors. The govern-
ment should strive to cteate a conducive climate for invest-
ment. It has done a lot, but much still remains to be done 
in reducing bureaucratic and administrative burdens on 
new businesses". In this context, Botswana initiated a pri-
vatisation programme in 2000 out of a desire to improve 
efficiency in service delivery and from the need to create 
further opportunities for growth of the private sector. 
Support for manufacturing 
The participation of the indigenous business class in the 
economic miracle has been modest. Even though the gov-
ernment has implemented, for almost twenty years, a 
Financial Assistance Policy (FAP) to promote private sector 
investment and employment creation in a wide range of eco-
nomic activities, especially the promotion of manufacturing, 
the impetus gained from FAP was short-lived as some of the 
industries established under the scheme could not survive 
without subsidies. The fourth review of FAP completed in 
March 2000, was very critical, identifying problems of fraud, 
abuse, inadequate administrative and monitoring capacity, 
and an outdated structure of incentives. Following this 
review, the scheme was abolished. 
The government decided to 
introduce a new scheme, the 
Citizen Entrepreneurial Develop-
ment Agency (CEDA), which 
provides financing to citizens' 
businesses in the form of sub-
sidised loans and risk-sharing, as 
opposed to outright grants. This 
scheme is meant to develop an 
entrepreneurial culture which 
could allow Batswana to partici-
pate meaningfully in every aspect 
of the economy. In fact, data 
show that about 80 per cent of 
local enterprises cease trading 
within five years of commencing 
operations due to lack of market-
ing and managerial skills, and 
CEDA support is intended to 
addresses this. 
In order to promote manufac-
tured exports and to attract for-
eign investment, the Government 
established in 1998 the Botswana 
Export Development and 
Investment Authority (BEDIA). 
BEDIA faces a range of chal-
lenges in attracting FDI, includ-
ing the high cost of utilities, espe-
cially water, a shortage of skilled 
workers, perceived low labour 
productivity, and high trans-
portation costs. In order to facili-
tate the identification of opportu-
nities by investors, it has devel-
oped a list of sectors on which to 
focus its investment promotion 
efforts. The sectors that are cur-
rently promoted include textiles and garments, tanner)' and 
leather products, jewellery, glasses, and information technol-
ogy. "Despite objective constraints, BEDIA has already been 
instrumental in the establishment of 14 manufacturing com-
panies in the country", says Mmasekgoa Masire-Mwamba, 
BEDIA chief executive officer. "These companies have 
already created about 2,000 new jobs. Seven more compa-
nies are expected to start operations during the course of 
2003. BEDIA has also recently established a one-stop setvice 
centre to assist investors in obtaining the necessary clear-
ances, such as residence permits, work permits, customs, 
industrial land, licenses. The services sector has now attract-
ed more attention from government." She adds, "I don't 
Beef remains a major foreign exchange earner after 
diamonds: under the Beef Protocol, an amount of up 
to 18,916 tonnes per annum of Botswana beef, can, 
until 2008, enter the EU market with a rebate of 
90 per cent of the EU beef exports import levy. 
Botswana 
think it is a matter of choosing between the two. We have the 
raw material, why can't we manufacture it? It is true, there are 
some problems, but with a strong commitment from gov-
ernment they may be overcome". 
Foreign trade 
The regional and international economic environment is 
critical to Botswana's drive towards economic diversification. 
Botswana is a signatory to a series of agreements that bind 
signatories to open up their domestic markets to allow com-
petition from foreign producers. Botswana has been, since its 
inception in 1910, a member of the Southern African 
Customs Union (SACU), which includes Lesotho, Namibia 
Swaziland, and South Africa. The SACU market is the main 
source of imports for Botswana and is also the largest market 
for the country's non-traditional exports, such as textiles and 
clothing. A revised agreement was signed in October 2002; 
the new agreement incorporates a new revenue-sharing for-
mula through which members will share the customs dun' 
revenue in proportion to their intra-SACU imports. 
Botswana is also a member of the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), which comprises 14 
countries. In 2000, SADC member states launched a Protocol 
on Trade and Cooperation, which provides for progressive 
integration culminating in the formation of a Free Trade Area. 
This protocol is expected to increase intra-regional trade from 
its current level of 22 per cent to about 35 per cent by 2008. 
Botswana is a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement with 
the European Union, which, on the trade front, allows for 
tariff-free entry of ACP countries' goods into the European country report: Botswana 
market subject to some generous quotas. For example, 
under the Beef Protocol Botswana's beef exports, up to an 
amount of 18,916 tonnes per annum until 2008, can enter 
the EU market with a rebate of 90 per cent of the EU 
import levy. The beef industry is managed by the Botswana 
Meat Commission (BMC), a parastatal established in 1965. 
BMC handles all exports of beef, its by-products, processed 
meats, and live cattle, subject to certain criteria. 
New opportunities for textile development and apparel 
goods are offered by the amended African Growth and 
Opportunities Act (AGOA). This is an agreement between 
the US and sub-Saharan African countries aimed at offer-
ing beneficiary countries increased market access to the US. 
At first, Botswana was not allowed to benefit from AGOA's 
provisions since its per capita income GNP exceeded 
US$1,500. Under the new AGOA II, Botswana has been 
granted less developed country beneficiary status. However, 
this dispensation will only run until 2004. In an effort to 
improve market access, Botswana, together with other 
SACU countries, will enter into negotiations with the US 
government during 2003-04 to create a free trade agree-
ment between SACU and the US. Meanwhile, Botswana 
and the ACP countries will negotiate free trade arrange-
ments with the EU, which will replace the current non-
reciprocal trade arrangements in 2008. 
A financial services hub 
In the past few years, the importance of an effective 
financial sector for the attainment of sustainable economic 
diversification has been acknowledged by government. The 
financial system in Botswana is characterised by efficient 
institutions and infrastructure of a high standard with good 
telecommunications facilities and institutional support 
mechanisms. According to Minister Gaolathe, "the finan-
cial services sector is the most global of internationally trad-
ed business and the requirements for participation fit in 
well with Botswana's other strengths. These requirements 
include adherence to open market economic norms; a 
stable exchange rate regime; a good telecommunications 
infrastructure; a well-educated and trainable pool of people, 
a first class regulatory regime and a welcoming approach to 
inward investment". Furthermore, the two major rating 
agencies (Standard and Poors and Moody's) have given 
Botswana an investment grade sovereign credit higher than 
any other sub-Saharan country. 
Against this background the government decided to set up 
an International Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in order to 
carry out business across a range of financial sectors. The gov-
ernment had two main objectives in establishing the IFSC: 
firstly, creating an active and substantive financial centre 
which could generate job opportunities for an increasing flow 
of well educated gtaduates; secondly, as a platform to develop 
new skills and technology to link Botswana with major inter-
national institutions in globally traded businesses. 
"In order to attract investors, we had to create a series of 
incentives, including a corporate tax rate of 15 per cent until 
2020; exemption from withholding tax in Botswana; use of 
double taxation treaty network. The reason to have a corpo-
rate tax rate of 15 per cent is to avoid being seen as a tax 
haven," says Alan Boshwaen, Chief Executive Officer of 
IFSC. 
The marketing programme of the IFSC project has been 
implemented with the focus on large financial institutions, the 
major taxation practices and legal firms. The government is 
determined to make the IFSC work, seeing it as a sustainable 
way of reducing the dependence on the mineral sector. "So far 
I am satisfied. We have already attracted nine companies and 
a total of 13 have been approved by the projects' certification 
committee", concludes Mr Boshwaen. 
A war to win 
The challenges of economic diversification remain large-
ly to be met. The export base is still heavily concentrated, 
and therefore vulnerable to market changes. While it is true 
that the mining sector has supported a broad range of 
developments, it has contributed marginally to the objec-
tive of employment creation. The government has started 
several initiatives to support diversification; some of these 
have shown positive results, but some assistance schemes 
have been criticised as fostering further dependence on gov-
ernment. Although much reliance has been placed on man-
ufacturing in recent years, FDI in the manufacturing sector 
has grown more slowly than in other sectors. BEDIA has 
some limited success in attracting foreign investors. It is 
clear that the private business sector will also have to play a 
meaningful role as a lead agent in the development of the 
economy. An alternative to manufacturing is focusing on 
services, where Botswana might have an effective compara-
tive advantage. But this is not a choice between the two sec-
tors; rather, it is manufacturing and services. 
Thus, there are several challenges to success in economic 
diversification. However, overshadowing all future develop-
ments, economic diversification and social well-being is the 
possible impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Given current 
trends, it is estimated that there will be 33 per cent less eco-
nomic growth by the year 2020 than would have been the case 
without HIV/AIDS. The government budget will be reduced 
by over 20 per cent through increased expenditure on health 
and welfare services and reduced revenues from income and 
tax. In the words of Minister Gaolathe, "the impact of 
HIV/AIDS on the economy and the society can be devastat-
ing; hence the resolve of government to give it the highest pri-
ority. This is a war that we cannot afford to lose." ■ MC 
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Opening the telecommunications sector 
to competition and new technologies 
Since the mid-1990s, Botswana has pursued a policy of telecommunications 
expansion and liberalisation to ensure that the country's pace of economic 
growth is not constrained by an inefficient telecommunications network. 
The government has invested significantly in this sector and, as a result, 
Botswana has one of the most developed telecommunications networks in Africa. 
The development of the telecommunications sector in 
Botswana has been unprecedented in the past decade. For most 
of the post-independence period, many communications activi-
ties were carried out through South Africa. As such dependency 
had negative implications in terms of efficient delivery of services 
and forced reliance on the apartheid regime then governing South 
Africa, Botswana decided to develop its own telecommunications 
network. Thus, in 1980, the Botswana Telecommunications 
Corporation (BTC) was established as a parastatal. Over the 
years, BTC has emerged as a leader in service provision and tech-
nology in sub-Saharan Africa, with a telecommunications infra-
structure that is one of the most modern in Africa. 
Telecommunications reform 
The major reform, though, came in 1996 when the BTC 
monopoly over the provision of telecommunications services was 
ended. In that year, the Botswana Telecommunications Authority 
(BTA) was created with the responsibility of licensing operators in 
the country. The telecommunications reform, which aimed at 
enhancing competition in the market through a liberal regulato-
ry framework, is often consideted a model for other African states. 
Its success is largely due to the effectiveness of the BTA, which 
indeed enjoys substantial freedom in licensing operators and in 
establishing and financing its operational budget. 
However, some people have questioned this reform, claim-
ing that it reflected the ambiguities and diverse interests 
within government regarding telecommunications matters. 
If one side fought to respond to an increasingly organised 
private sector demand for better quality and variety of 
services, another side tried to protect the BTC constituency. 
As a result of the reform, fixed-line services were kept under 
the monopoly of BTC, whereas 
the cellular phone and internet 
sectors have been liberalised. 
In 1998 two mobile cellular 
operators - Mascom and Vista 
- started their operations. The 
number of subscribers rose 
from zero in 1998 to 380,290 
in 2002; prices were lowered, 
and services improved. 
However, the widespread adop-
tion of cell phone usage by 
After performing poorly in the past 
few years, the Botswana 
Telecommunications Corporation 
started an Integrated Transformation 
Plan in May 2002 to return to 
profitability within a period of three 
years before it is privatised. 
members of the general public has led to a serious reduction in 
the amount of disposable income available to many individuals. 
Although it is not used to its full potential, the internet 
industry has also experienced significant growth. Private 
internet access is still limited, but many Batswana have access 
to the internet at work or school, or in internet cafés, whose 
number has grown in the past two years. E-commerce has 
also been introduced, and the number of Botswana websites 
is rising, but the majority of businesses are not yet making 
full use of the recent technological innovations. 
A knowledge-based society 
Botswana aspires to utilising the best information technology 
(IT.) to enable it to become a leader in the production and dis-
semination ofinformation. "Botswana wants to be comparable to 
Europe, Asia, and America. With our digital readiness we want to 
attract international call centres, data back-up services; we want 
to compete with Asia on development of software and hardware 
applications. We have already put in place the right policies to 
attract foreign investment, but these are no longer comparative 
advantages. We have to go beyond. This is why digital readiness 
is so important to diversify the economy. We must also build a 
skilled and competitive workforce, and we are doing that. No 
country in the world can match us in the amount of money we 
are spending on human resource development," says Minister 
Boyce Sebetela, head of the new Ministry of Communications, 
Science and Technology, created in recognition of the importance 
that the current government places on the IT. sector. 
Minister of Finance and Development Planning, Baledzi 
Gaolathe, says that the government will "accelerate the imple-
mentation of the Science and Technology Policy. As part of this 
effort, the government is in the process of developing a nation-
al research, science and technology plan to guide the imple-
mentation of the Science and Technology Policy to make 
Botswana a knowledge-based society and a major participant in 
the competitive world". If these policies ate successfully imple-
mented, Botswana's economy will have made remarkable 
progress in improving its competitiveness in the global arena. 
But Botswana is not only seeking to develop its communica-
tions capacity; it is also trying to ensure that all villages have 
access to computer-based communications networks. "The gov-
ernment has funded a Rural Telecommunication Programme to 
provide services to the rural areas. We are just about to complete 
the connection of 147 small villages. During the next six years 
we will connect 200 villages. We are striking a balance between 
creating a modern economy supported by state-of-the-art, mul-
tiservice I.T. networks, and the need to introduce rural commu-
nities to these new technologies. We do this because we want a 
more equitable distribution of access to resources," explains 
Minister Sebetela. ■ MC 
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The tourism industry: 
from high value/low volume to ecotourism 
In the past years, the number of tourist arrivals in Botswana has grown 
substantially. This rapid expansion points to the considerable potential 
for the sector to contribute to economic diversification. Furthermore, since 
independence Botswana has pursued a policy of deep commitment to 
the conservation of its wildlife and heritage resources. 
According to the World Tourism Organisation, 
world-wide tourism arrivals declined by 0.6 per cent in 
2001, probably due to the impact of the September 11 ter-
rorist attacks in the United States. Africa experienced a 
4.6 per cent increase, but its market share remains quite low 
(4.5 per cent). South Africa is still the most important des-
tination on the continent, although it suffered a 1.5 per 
cent decrease in arrivals. As for Botswana, tourism has 
grown steadily over the past few years. Despite some con-
cerns about instability in the region (e.g., Zimbabwe), and 
the bad publicity the country received due to the relocation 
of the Basarwa from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve, 
the number of arrivals in Botswana has not declined. 
Tourism arrivals grew from 572,000 in 1997 to 923,000 in 
2001, thus contributing substantially to the national econ-
omy (however, still representing less than five per cent of 
Gross National Product [GNP] in 2001/02). "These trends 
confirm that tourism can be used as one of the tools for the 
diversification of the economy. Tourism has managed to 
teach second position in terms of its contribution to total 
GNP", says Penelomi Venson, Minister for Environment, 
Wildlife and Tourism. 
Conservation and sustainability 
Botswana possesses a vast abundance of wildlife and nat-
ural resources. Seventeen per cent of its land has been set 
aside for the maintenance and development of national 
parks and wildlife sanctuaries, and a further twenty per cent 
of land has been allowed for wildlife management areas. 
The main tourism assets include the Okavango Delta, 
which is the world's largest inland delta, and the Chobe 
National Park, which is renowned for its large elephant 
herds. Abundant wildlife is also found in community con-
servation areas and wildlife sanctuaries, which are now 
managed by the local communities. 
Conscious of its over-dependence on diamonds, since the 
early 1990s the government has encouraged tourism as a 
major engine for economic growth, adopting a "high value-
low volume" approach. The emphasis is on catering for a 
limited number of affluent visitors. This policy, intended to 
minimise the negative impact of tourism on the environ-
ment, faces several challenges. First, as most of the money 
for tourist packages is paid outside of Botswana, the local 
economy retains only less than a third of the total amount 
of money that tourists pay to visit Botswana. Furthermore, 
the growth of tourism in the major tourist attractions, espe-
cially in the Okavango Delta, is characterised by so-called 
"enclave tourism". Hotels, lodges, and camps are estab-
lished to meet the needs of foreign tourists and usually fail 
to take into consideration the needs of the local population. 
Expanding the tourism offer 
In the past few years, as most of the main tourist attractions 
could not sustain further growth, but there was a desire to 
increase economic gains from the tourism industry, it was 
necessary to expand the tourism offer. Furthermore, some of 
Botswana's rural areas and biospheres are unsuited to high 
value "lodge style" tourism, but can appeal to visitors with 
eco-friendly interests. In 2001, a national ecotourism strategy Elephants have been fully protected 
since 1989 after widespread 
poaching jeopardised elephant 
populations throughout Africa and 
Asia. The Conference of Parties of 
the "Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora" (CITES), dur-
ing its meeting ¡n Harare in 1997, 
agreed that for those countries 
with healthy elephant populations 
(Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, 
and Zimbabwe) the elephant could 
be "down-listed" from Appendix I 
(trade of animal products is not 
allowed) to Appendix II (trade is 
possible under certain circum-
stances). As a result, CITES autho-
rised three countries - Botswana, 
Namibia and Zimbabwe - to sell a portion of their stock of ivory. In view of the Conference of Parties held in Santiago, Chile, in 
November 2002, Kenya and India proposed to "up-list" the elephant population of the three southern African countries, alleging 
that poaching posed a serious threat to the survival of elephants. 
Botswana has the largest elephant population In the world. It has grown from 40,000 in 1980 to 120,000 today, with a growth rate 
of more than five per cent per annum. This rapid growth has caused several problems for the rural population (destruction of crops 
caused by straying, competition for living space, hungry elephants raiding farmland etc). A range of measures has been taken to 
address this issue: the rate paid for damages has recently increased; electrified game-proof fences are being constructed; rural com-
munities are being trained in animal control techniques. Furthermore, the ivory that Botswana Intended to trade is already in gov-
ernment storage and has been acquired from management activities as well as from natural mortalities. 
In order to find a solution for the elephant issue, Botswana presented a proposal to CITES, which was approved with minor amend-
ments. As a result, Botswana will be allowed to: a) trade in hunting trophies for non-commercial purposes; b) trade in live animals 
for commercial purposes to appropriate and acceptable destinations, as determined by the national legislation of the country of 
import; c) trade in leather goods for non-commercial purposes; d) trade in hides; e) trade in registered stocks of raw ivory (whole 
tusks and pieces) of Botswana origin and owned by the government of Botswana for commercial purposes only, to CITES-approved 
trading partners that will not re-export the ivory. An initial amount of not more than 20 tonnes of ivory may be traded, but not 
before May 2004. 
HHaEI 
was developed. According to the International Ecotourism 
Society, ecotourism is defined as "responsible travel to natural 
areas, that conserves the environment and sustains the well 
being of local people". The objective of the ecotourism strat-
egy is to diversify tourism by opening up new areas of the 
country and adding new components to include cultural, his-
torical, and archaeological atttactions. This in turn brings 
development in rural and remote areas and creates new 
opportunities for generating employment and income. "Our 
aim is to educate both the visitors and local communities 
about the importance of conserving natural and cultural 
resources", explains Minister Venson, who also pointed out 
that the collaboration between the Ministry of Trade and 
Ministry of Tourism is very important in this respect. "Until 
some months ago there was only one Ministry dealing with 
trade and tourism. Government felt that to improve the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of service delivery, tourism needed to 
be dealt with by a separate Ministry. The two Ministries con-
tinue to collaborate and indeed we have a programme on pro-
ducing crafts. The active involvement of host communities in 
all aspects of the industry's management and development is 
a common strategy accepted by both Ministries". 
An aggressive marketing strategy 
In order to promote its tourism internationally, 
Botswana is now engaged in an aggressive marketing 
strategy. "In the past few years, several initiatives have been 
taken to make Botswana a more attractive tourist destina-
tion, including advertising in international media and par-
ticipating at major international tourism fairs", says 
Odirile Merafhe, executive director of HATAB, the organ-
isation representing the interests of the private sector in the 
hotel and tourism sector. However, warns Beatrice 
Selotlegeng, deputy general manager of Air Botswana, 
"tourism outside well-established infrastructures is not 
going to make it if you don't upgrade the transport sector. 
Tourists want to arrive at their destination as soon as pos-
sible. Air Botswana is playing its role: we have now intro-
duced some direct flights from Johannesburg to Kasane so 
that international tourists no longer need to go through 
Zimbabwe or Gaborone if they want to reach the major 
attractions in the north. But the other components of the 
transport sector are relevant too: roads should also be 
improved." 
By encouraging high quality tourism with the aim of 
respecting the environment in world heritage sites, and by 
supporting ecotourism projects in which private investors 
work with local communities, the government is trying to 
promote tourism on a sustainable rather than a short-term 
basis. The expansion and development of new tourism 
attractions will enable more opportunities to be provided 
for all seements of tourists. ■ MC 
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An opposition point of view: 
A somewhat different 
development strategy 
Even though Botswana has a multiparty system, no turnover of government has 
taken place since independence in 1966. The opposition has so far failed to 
present itself as an alternative to the ruling party. This is primarily due to internal 
fights, splits, lack of financial resources, and the electoral system which tends to 
favour the incumbent Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). In this interview, 
Nehemiah Modupule, member of Parliament representing the Botswana National 
Front (BNF) and new leader of the opposition, discusses a development strategy 
which is somewhat different from the direction taken by the BDP. 
Two of the most important factors relating to the 
party system in Botswana in recent years have been the con-
tinuous steady decline in the BDP share of the vote and the 
increasing clustering of the 
opposition vote around the 
BNF. Following the end of the 
Cold War, the BNF has 
changed its socialist ideology 
to pursue a social democratic 
programme. It now recognises 
the role of the private sector in 
economic development, but 
still subscribes to an economy 
based on a strong public sector. 
The opposition is often 
accused of being too 
weak and fragmented. 
What is your opinion? 
It is true that we have had 
this problem of fragmentation. 
But we must look at the cause 
of it. I often say that Botswana 
is a rich country with poor 
people. When we contest the 
ruling party in the elections, 
we have no funds as opposi-
tion. We must use our own 
money, and if we are not elect-
ed that means that we have lost a lot of money. Funding is 
a major concern for the functioning of a true democracy. 
We have been calling for public funding of political parties. 
The government is resisting. We cannot campaign without 
money. The ruling party has been fortunate enough to be 
funded from outside; but the law says that sources are not 
to be disclosed. 
Is lack of funding the only cause that prevented 
the opposition from going to power? 
There is another major cause: the electoral system. At the 
moment we use a first-past-the-post system. We believe that 
proportional representation is a better system to reflect in 
parliament the popular vote. Let me give you some figures: 
Nehemiah Modubule joined BNF in 1974 
when he was still a student. In 1994 he 
formed the United Socialist Party, which 
in 1998 merged into the BNF. Member 
of Parliament for the first time in 1999, 
he has recently been chosen 
as leader of the opposition. 
if in 1999 we had used proportional representation, the 
BDP would have won 22 seats, and the opposition 18 seats. 
With the current system the BDP has 33 seats and the 
opposition only seven. Thus 
you hear that the opposition is 
weak. Also, according to a 
recent study conducted by the 
Independent Electoral Com-
mission, 73 per cent of the 
Botswana people are in favour 
of the proportional system. 
The government is resistant to 
changing it, but I am con-
vinced that eventually they 
will change. 
In the past the opposition 
has questioned the 
impartiality of the 
Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC)... 
We fought for an independ-
ent electoral commission. 
They have put a building 
somewhere, but the IEC still 
reports to the President of the 
Republic. That is not inde-
pendence. The President has 
interests in the elections. As it 
stands now, it is not independent at all. 
The next elections will be in 2004. If the ruling 
party does not have a majority of seats, would 
you be able to form a stable government with the 
other opposition parties? 
If we go to the elections as fragmented as we are now, 
there is no hope of winning the elections. We can only hope 
to increase the number of seats in Parliament, but winning 
the elections will just be an illusion. I am confident though, 
and in fact at the moment we are trying to develop a sort of 
working relationship with the other opposition parties so 
that in case we win the elections there is some sort of mech-
anism in place to allow us to form a new government. 
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What are the main differences between the ruling 
party and the opposition as regards economic and 
social development? 
There are many differences. We firmly believe the state must 
play a role in the economy. The current government does not 
think so. Botswana is a very young economy, which still needs 
to be assisted by the state. The government wants to move 
away from this approach and we are against it: the time is not 
ripe. We are against privatisation. If we leave things totally to 
the private sector, with no government involvement, we see 
problems. There are certain industries and sectors that cannot 
be privatised and must be run by the government, or at least 
the government must have a hand in those sectors. For 
instance, we cannot let water go to the private sector. 
Let me give you two more examples of some major differ-
ences between the BDP and the BNF. For a long time we have 
been advocating that people who are 18 years old should be 
allowed to vote. The government was against it, but eventually 
they accepted it. We advocated for free education. The 
government never had a policy of free education. We have been 
successful in persuading the BDP to provide free education for 
Botswana, but now they are talking about re-introducing 
school fees. In a country where 43 per cent of the population 
is 15 years and below, with 36.5 per cent living below the 
poverty line, we cannot think of re-introducing school fees. 
One of the major concerns of the current 
government is diversifying the economy. 
Do you think they are pursuing the right policies? 
What is your recipe if you win the elections? 
First let me say that the government over the years has 
focused too much on diamonds, which may not end, but we 
can't depend too much on markets that we are not able to 
control. I am not denying that the government has tried hard 
to diversify the economy. However, there is a sector that for 
a long time they have neglected: agriculture. Botswana is 
totally dependent on foreign countries for its food, mostly on 
South Africa. We believe that we should engage in a very 
Following a national referendum on 
electoral reforms, the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) was 
established in 1997 to replace the 
Supervisor of Elections (SE). Directly 
appointed by the President of the 
Republic, the SE headed a govern-
ment department and presented 
the findings of his office to the rele-
vant minister. The IEC, on the other 
hand, consists of seven commis-
sioners, selected from a list drawn 
up by an all-party conference. Its 
mandate is to ensure that elections 
are conducted efficiently, properly, 
freely and fairly. However, its auton-
omy has been questioned by the 
opposition for several reasons: it 
reports to the office of the President 
instead of to the parliament; it has 
mainly inherited the staff of the for-
mer SE; ¡t does not have complete 
independence over the administra-
tion of its funds. 
revolutionary policy in the agricultural sector. We must have 
dams and irrigation schemes so that we are self-sufficient in 
food production. We can have so many other industries from 
agriculture. We don't see why we cannot do this: we have the 
land; we are not rich in water, but we do have it. 
One of the most controversial issues in the past 
two years has been the relocation of Basarwa 
people. Do you have anything in common with 
the accusations of Survival International against 
the current government? 
As BNF, we said several times that the Basarwa relocation 
exercise was not done properly. Those people were not given 
enough time to think about their future. It was not easy for 
them: they were asked to completely change their culture, 
the way they have been living for centuries. I was in the 
Central Kalahari Game Reserve and I had the opportunity to 
talk to some people. They were not happy. We are not saying 
that the development of Basarwa is not correct. We are just 
criticising the government for not being patient, for not 
being able to show the advantages Basarwa would have 
enjoyed in the new settlements. For this reason, our approach 
as opposition is different from that of Survival International, 
which links the Basarwa issue to mining exploitation. We arc 
not doing that. Basarwa ought to be developed like any other 
Motswana in this country. We have nothing to do with 
Survival International; they are talking about diamonds, we 
are talking about human rights and development. 
What is your approach to international matters? 
Are there any substantial differences between the 
ruling party and the opposition? 
No, there is not much difference in foreign policy. We share 
the same ideas about being part of the non-aligned movement. 
We cannot complain about their foreign trade policies. They 
have tried to defend our national interest. However, in a true 
democratic system, the opposition should be involved, or at 
least consulted, on matters of national interest. This has not 
happened in this country. 
But let me say that we talk about free trade and opening 
borders, but if we don't work harder to develop the necessary 
human resources skills, Botswana will not be able to improve 
its status or even retain its current position in the global arena. 
It all depends on us, the people of Botswana, but in particular 
on what the government that wins the elections in 2004 will 
do for this country. ■ MC 
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Participatory development: 
the context of democratic governance in Botswana 
The Constitution of Botswana stresses the separation of the state from civil 
society and guarantees citizens free political activity, freedom of speech, 
association, and religion. This is at least what the Constitution says. 
But has the government created the necessary climate to allow civil society 
organisations to articulate their programmes and play a constructive role in 
fostering a culture of openness, tolerance and accountability? 
Botswana has a multiparty system and a strong decen-
tralisation programme; nonetheless, it is one of the few 
countries that has built a liberal democracy whilst its civil 
society is weak. Although in the past few years legislative 
and practical developments have provided for increased 
participation, civil society, apart from a few exceptions, has 
not been able to influence public policy and exert demo-
cratic pressure on the state. Three reasons have been given: 
cultural, historical, and political. 
The traditional system 
Most politicians in Botswana maintain that the country's 
democracy is rooted in the political culture, which is dem-
ocratic by nature. Therefore, the perception that civil soci-
ety is weak does not take into consideration the tradition of 
consultation and participation embedded in the national 
consciousness. The basic institution of this democratic sys-
tem was the kgotla (a public meeting place where people 
met to discuss issues of public interest). 
However, the kgotla was used to mobilise consensus, to 
test public acceptance of issues already discussed between 
the chief and his advisers. The majority of people were not 
able to make a significant contribution to the discussions: 
women, young people, and minorities were excluded or 
expected to remain silent. More generally, the Tswana cul-
ture did not recognise the importance of groups: the only 
social groups acknowledged were families and, to an extent, 
ethnic groups, although they depended on chiefs. For all 
these reasons, Keboitse Machangana, who has been very 
active in the women's movement in Botswana, concludes 
that "this traditional system is one of the reasons why civil 
society is weak today. Women and young people, if invited, 
were allowed only to listen; also in the kgotla it was diffi-
cult to question the chief. Today, many Batswana still look 
at government from that angle: if you live in a culture 
where you don't feel it appropriate to question the authori-
ty, the emergence of a vibrant civil society is not possible. 
This kind of culture is now going away but it is still there." 
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Smooth transition and state efficiency 
Civil society is generally very active and provides an alter-
native to the state as an agent for development under two 
circumstances: when states fail to deliver what they are 
expected to and during civil and political unrest. Botswana 
is an exceptional case: from an economic and social point 
of view, its human development record is impressive; from 
a political point of view, it has maintained a democratic 
environment. Furthermore, "unlike our neighbouring 
countries, Botswana was never involved in a liberation 
struggle. Transition from colonialism to independence was 
quite smooth. If you look at civil society in South Africa, 
Namibia, and Zimbabwe, it is very vibrant, but only 
because those countries have experienced civil unrest of 
some kind," says Keboitse Machangana. 
One of the unintended consequences of the efficiency of 
Botswana's welfare system is that citizens have high expecta-
tions of government. "The effectiveness of government in 
delivering social services is positive on the one hand, but on 
the other hand has created a culture of dependency: the gov-
ernment provides almost everything for free. As a result, 
people are not willing to be makers of their own destiny. If 
you want people to participate you need to do a lot of 
groundwork, motivate them, convince them that they are 
able to influence political decisions, and that they are not 
only a number for the statistics," explains Ketlomilwe 
Moletsane, executive secretary of the Botswana Council of 
NGOs (BOCONGO), the umbrella organisation formed in 
1995 to coordinate the NGO movement and facilitate the 
establishment of an enabling environment for NGOs. 
Lack of a policy framework 
Without questioning whether what was provided was the 
right thing for its people, the government did not develop 
a policy towards civil society. On the contrary, for many 
years it accused civil society organisations of introducing a 
culture alien to Botswana's society and even labelled them 
promoters of foreign interests or as being infiltrated by the 
opposition. 
It was only in the late 1990s that this political climate 
changed. In 2000, the Ministry of Labour and Home 
Affairs produced a draft National Policy on Non-
Governmental Organisations, intended to establish a gen-
eral framework in order to harmonise the various polices 
that impact the NGO sector. This process is still underway. 
"Our collaboration with the government is not well 
defined, it is an ad hoc relationship. There is a proposal to 
regulate this field, but it is sitting somewhere within gov-
ernment. We have submitted our inputs, now it depends on 
the will of the Government," says Mr Moletsane. 
The fact that there is not yet a policy framework does 
not prevent dialogue. For Keboitse Machangana, "in gen-
eral, the environment is conducive for civil society to 
operate well. Unlike other countries in the region the 
government seems to be receptive; we are able to discuss 
issues with them; they organise meetings and we are free 
to express ourselves. But being involved in all fora is also 
a way of making us ineffective. On the one hand, for 
example when we draw up a plan for gender equality, we 
believe that the government is listening to us, but when it 
comes to allocation of resources, the government is not 
responsive". 
Lack of adequate government funding combined with the 
decline in donor support (major international donors have 
pulled out based on the assumption that Botswana has its 
own resources to meet the development targets) is the major 
challenge that civil society faces today in Botswana. "Some 
NGOs are funded by government, but this depends on the 
activity of the individual NGO and on the relationship that 
it has built over time with the government. However, funds 
coming from government are not coordinated. There is not 
a budget line in the national budget tor NGO activities: dif-
ferent ministries provide some support for individual NGOs 
from their budget lines," explains Mr Moletsane. 
What development paradigm? 
A number of writers and reports from international 
organisations maintain that the country's human rights 
record is good. A success story is in the area of women's 
rights, where the leading NGO Emane Basadi (which 
means "Stand up women for your rights") has had a signifi-
cant impact on public policy related to the rights of women. 
However, Ditshwanelo, the Botswana Council for 
Human Rights, has complained about alleged violations of 
human rights. "Violations don't need to be blatant; repres-
sion may happen in a less obvious way. Unless a person is 
tortured and beaten up so that you can see injuries and 
wounds you don't say that there is a violation of human 
rights: that is a northern perspective of Africa." 
Ditswanelo has been very active on the issue of minority 
rights, and in particular the relocation of Basarwa from the 
Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR). "Under the current 
development paradigm, the government can move people 
claiming that all Batswana have the right to progress. But is the 
development paradigm of the government appropriate? Does it 
really serve the needs of people? There are increasing numbers 
of voices coming from minority groups who want to be recog-
nised and want to enjoy the gains that Botswana has achieved 
over the years: there are too many people who are not benefit-
ing from diamonds. True participation in democracy is not the 
only issue, it is part of a general question: What is wrong with 
our development model if so many people live below the 
poverty line?", wonders Ditswanelo's director Alice Mgowe. 
Limits to freedom of press 
The media has a central role to play in a democracy. In 
addition to its normal functions of educating and informing 
people, media can play an intermediary role between state 
and citÌ7.enry, providing public arenas for political participa-
tion and promoting accountability of ruling elites. But some-
times the media cannot carry out these functions because of 
harassment or legislative restrictions. Botswana's Constitution 
does not provide explicit protection for press freedom, hut 
such freedom is embraced under freedom of expression. The 
government generally respects these rights; however, on cer-
tain occasions, it has attempted to limit freedom of the press. 
For instance in 1997, it tried to impose a controversial mass 
media communications bill which was designed to give the 
state a strong control over the media. This was abandoned fol-
lowing vigorous protests in and outside the country. 
However, in November 2001, the government tried to intro-
duce a revised bill. The bill proposed the establishment of a 
statutory Press Council, compulsory registration ol all print 
media in the country, the establishment of accreditation of 
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journalists and the issuing of press cards. "Nothing has been 
finalised yet. We have been in consultation and dialogue with 
media for a long time. As a government we are responsible for 
the freedoms and rights of individuals in the nation. And if 
the media abuse their freedom and impinge on the rights of 
other individuals, I think we should intervene. Of course, 
they would like to shy away from everything they perceive as 
control," explains Botswana's Vice President Ian Khama. In 
response to government's concerns, in November 2002, the 
local media established a self-regulatory Press Council. "That 
was a great step towards the realisation of an independent and 
self-regulatory press in Botswana. One of the tasks of this 
Council is to receive petitions from the public about the per-
formance of the press and, where necessary, apply appropriate 
remedies and sanctions," explains Clara Olson, chair of this 
new Press Council. 
Print and broadcast media 
For the first 15 years after independence, the government 
dominated the country's media. The Daily News was the 
only paper available: it is still free of change and carries 
almost only government news and announcements. Over 
the years, a number of newspapers and magazines has 
emerged. "Today, media face many challenges, mainly relat-
ed to lack of resources. The independent media are not eli-
gible for government financial assistance. This is due to the 
fact that the government does not see the independent press 
as a viable industry, capable of producing employment and 
generating exports," explains Modise Maphanyane, 
Director of the Botswana chapter of the Media Institute of 
Southern Africa (MISA). 
As for broadcast media, currently only Radio Botswana 
(RBI and RB2), which is directly controlled by the gov-
ernment, transmits nationwide. As a consequence of the 
fact that in 1998 the Botswana Telecommunication 
Authority (BTA) started liberalising broadcasting, the first 
ever privately owned radio station (Yarona FM) was creat-
ed in the country. Soon afterwards another radio was creat-
ed in Gabarone (Gabz FM). The first national television 
station, Botswana Television (BTV), started its activities 
only in 2000; a wider programme of channels is available 
through a satellite system, but their cost is high and most of 
the population cannot afford it. 
It is often said that weak civil society and weak mass media 
are found together. Civil society groups grow and become 
politically relevant to the extent that they are allowed to dia-
logue with political leaders on behalf of the people they rep-
resent. Botswana's government has tried for more than two 
years to pass two laws to regulate the media and civil society 
sectors, without being successful. One of the areas of focus in 
the Vision 2016 is the creation of an open, democratic and 
accountable nation: the best way to achieve such a goal is by 
nurturing civic empowerment. ■ MC 
The House of Chiefs is made up of 15 members: the hereditary chiefs of Botswana's eight traditional tribes as 
set out in the Constitution, members as of right, and seven elected members. It must be consulted when the 
Constitution is reviewed, and when consideration is being given to the law on customs, family and personal law, 
the system of land ownership, and certain aspects of civil law. Earlier this year, history was re-written when a 
woman was elected as chair of the House of Chiefs. Kgosi Mosadi Seboko of Balete, the first woman paramount 
chief, has also become the first woman chair of the male-dominated House. 
The House of Chiefs still exerts significant influence, as chiefs regularly consult their tribes in the course of tra-
ditional assemblies (Kgotla). In many ways, thus, it is a unique institution that enables Botswana to undergo a 
managed transition into modernity by preserving traditional forms of solidarity and adherence, and simultane-
ously preventing the latter from fragmenting the country along tribal lines. 
According to Kgosi Seboko, "historically chiefs have played an important role towards the attainment of nation-
hood in Botswana. Today, they still have significant influence and authority at the grassroots level on all aspects 
of tribal and community welfare. They also have responsibility for the environment. Chiefs are also instrumental 
in the fight against HIV/AIDS, by changing attitudes about sex. They are also best placed to carry out the advo-
cacy, promotion and preservation of culture. Many people, especially in developing countries, tend to mistake 
westernisation with globalisation. Unfortunately, due to this lack of understanding, they have abandoned their 
cultures and norms. We must not lose our uniqueness and identity. But perhaps the biggest contribution of chiefs 
to present-day Botswana laying a foundation for democracy to take root in Botswana's society. This takes place 
through unique conflict resolution and peace strategies: Ntwa kgolo ke ya molomo- which means disputes are 
best settled through discussion, not war." 
(68) the Courier ACP-EU n° 198 may-june 2003 _Botswana 
EC-Botswana cooperation 
"Don't leave us in the middle 
of the river" 
The role of external assistance in Botswana was considerable for a long time in 
the post-independence period. In recent years, most donors have withdrawn their 
assistance as a consequence of the economic success of Botswana. External 
assistance is now only a very small component of the country's economy. The 
European Union (EU) has maintained its support and a new agreement, which was 
signed in April 2002 to cover the period 2002-2007, makes up to €91 million 
available in two different allocations. A significant part of this assistance will be 
utilised for human resource development, in recognition that a shortage of skilled 
citizens is a principal constraint to development. 
Botswana is often cited as a development "success story" 
that has managed its aid resources effectively. At independ-
ence, as the country was one of the poorest in the world, the 
government relied on foreign aid for all of its budgetary cap-
ital expenditures and a large part of recurrent expenditure. 
International aid was a crucial resource that was used strate-
gically to develop the physical and social infrastructure. At 
that time, aid provided 45 per cent of total government 
expenditure; it was still nearly 20 per cent in 1982, but has 
fallen dramatically to less than five per cent since Botswana 
was classified as a middle-income country in 1992. 
Victim of its own success 
In contrast to many other countries in Africa, external assis-
tance is today only a small component of Botswana's econo-
my. Most international donors, like the US and Canada, have 
ended their previously substantial programmes. As for the 
EU, most Member States have left the country: now, only 
Germany and Britain still have some relatively important pro-
grammes. The European Community, on the other hand, is a 
substantial provider of development assistance to Botswana. 
Several policy makers in Botswana regret the departure of 
international donors. Mompati Merafhe, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and International Cooperation, says diat "donors should 
not have withdrawn their support. We still need help. If at the 
EC level that has not happened, it is at the bilateral level, widi a 
number of European countries, that we feel penalised. These 
countries say that they cannot provide aid to a country like 
Botswana, because its economy is doing well. We don't subscribe 
to that view. We should not be penalised by our own success. 
Actually, we should be rewarded for our good performance". 
Support under the Lomé Conventions and 
the Cotonou Agreement 
Within the frameworks of the 6th, 7th, and 8th European 
Development Funds (EDF), Botswana has received a total of 
€100.5 million in development financing. EC-Botswana coop-
eration has focused mainly on vocational and technical educa-
tion and training, and natural resources and the environment. 
One example of an environmental project funded by the 
EC, which developed from a community based initiative, is 
the eco-tourism campsite at the remote Lekhubu Island. The 
local community formed the Gaing Ο Trust to protect and 
preserve this environment, at risk from unregistered visitors 
damaging the ancient baobab trees on this granite outcrop, 
which is surrounded by vast salt pans, the remains of an 
inland sea which long since dried up and disappeared. 
As a response to the shortage of training places, and the 
mismatch between skills acquired and skills required by the 
labour market, the new Gaborone Technical College has been 
designed, built, equipped and commissioned into service as a 
joint venture between the EC and the Government of 
Botswana. A similar college is planned for Francistown. 
According to Claudia Wiedey, Head of the EU Delegation 
in Botswana, "these interventions will directly contribute to 
Botswana's economic diversification policy and this is why the 
Government and the European Community jointly and 
wholeheartedly decided to continue cooperation in this area 
under EDF9". The new Country Strategy Paper and National 
Indicative Programme (CSP/NIP) was signed in April 2002 
for the period 2002-2007. The total indicative resource allo-
cation is €91: €39 million for programmable resources plus 
€52 million for unforeseen needs. "The fact that we already 
know the amount of resources available is very important for 
With a new building, state-of-the-art equipment and a revitalised 
curriculum, the Gaborone Technical College provides young people with 
skills that will equip them for the modern workplace or self employment 
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us. We cannot complain about our relationship with the EU, 
which understands our development priorities better than 
other donors do. In the past we used to complain about delays 
in getting responses on projects already agreed. But now, 
under EDF9, I see some changes. Also, the EU Delegation 
has more competencies, and this allows us to move faster", 
says Baledzi Gaolathe, Minister of Finance and Development 
Planning, who is also the National Authorising Officer 
(NAO) in Botswana. 
Human Resources Development (HRD) is the single focal 
sector of the CSP/NIP and will receive the bulk of the avail-
able funding. HRD will support Botswana's policies for diver-
sification of the economy, creation of employment opportu-
nities, reduction of povetty and addressing the problems 
related to HIV/AIDS. The remaining funds will be used for 
development in other areas such as natural resource conserva-
tion and management, community based initiatives to 
enhance rural livelihoods, the campaign against HIV/AIDS, 
trade development and regional integration. 
In addition to EDF funds, the European Investment Bank 
(EIB) over the years has financed large infrastructure projects 
in the water and power sectors, thereby assisting Botswana in 
maintaining high standards in the provision of basic infra-
structure. 
The Beef Protocol 
Botswana has also benefited from the Beef Protocol. 
Since 1975 the country has been able to sell beef and veal 
to the EU market at a substantial reduction in customs 
duty. Botswana enjoys a highet quota than other countries 
in the region, but has not been able to take full advantage 
of these arrangements. This is partially due to natural forces 
such as droughts, but also to the stringent health and qual-
ity requirements that the EU imposes on producers. "The 
beef protocol is definitely one of the most successful areas 
of cooperation between the EU and Botswana. So far we 
have been happy with it, but sometimes we complain about 
the strictness of the rules", says Minister Gaolathe. 
This preferential access was rolled over under the 
Cotonou Agreement; the new agreement thus secures the 
current levels until 1 January 2008. 
Access to the EU markets is dependent upon the provi-
sion of satisfactory disease control measures that restrict the 
Veterinary cordon fences and control points have been erected 
throughout the country in the past years to control the movement of 
animals and meat products. 
movement of livestock, and on regular inspections of abat-
toirs. The construction of veterinary disease control fences, 
recently intensified because of an outbreak of foot and 
mouth disease in the country, is primarily intended to safe-
guard Botswana's beef export industry. However, such 
fences, which bisect huge wildlife areas, are criticised by 
environmentalists because of the widespread damage they 
cause to the wildlife populations. 
Support for mineral diversification 
The EU has supported economic diversification and ini-
tiatives to reduce dependence on the diamond sector. 
Botswana has benefited twice from Sysmin support under 
the 6th and 7th EDFs. Even though the Cotonou 
Agreement does not retain the Sysmin facility, the same 
idea has been incorporated into the indicative allocation for 
unforeseen needs, which allows a more flexible utilisation. 
In February 2003, a new financing agreement was signed to 
provide €30 million to assist BCL Limited (a mining con-
sortium owned partly by the private sector and partly by 
the government) in the expansion of the Tati Mine at 
Francistown and in the orderly phasing out of its copper-
nickel mining operations in Selebie Phikwe. 
Botswana is a middle income country. However, given the 
challenges that the country is facing because of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, and considering that a large part of 
the population is still living below the poverty line, it was 
premature for donors to have pulled out. In the words of 
Minister Gaolathe, "donors have helped us starting to cross a 
river; now they cannot leave us in the middle of it". ■ MC 
SADC Investment Promotion Programme (ESIPP) 
G
SIPP 
The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is a regional organisation 
comprising 14 member states. The Secretariat and Headquarters are located in 
Gaborone and, for this reason, the EU Delegation in Botswana has a coordinating 
role in the management of relations and implementation of programmes between 
the EU and SADC which are detailed in the Regional Strategy Programme and 
Indicative Paper signed in Maputo in November 2002. 
The EU-SADC Investment Promotion Programme (ESIPP) is a major new initiative with 
funding of €18 million over a three-year period, with a possible extension of a fur-
ther two years. Signed in December 2002, the primary objective of ESIPP is to pro-
mote the SADC region to both EU and third country investors as an attractive option by important collaboration in the areas 
of private sector development, investment, and technical and economic support. ESIPP initiatives to link the private sector in 
SADC, EU and third countries are expected to increase Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) within the SADC region. 
ESIPP will institute forums and capacity building with private and state owned investment promotion bodies with SADC, 
focusing on five key sectors, identified as: agro-industry, mining, light engineering, construction materials and tourism. 
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Low cost hearing aids 
for the developing world 
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), more than 250 million 
people in the world have a disabling degree of hearing impairment; the burden 
is estimated to be approximately twice as large in developing countries as in 
developed countries. The total world production of hearing aids is less than 
one-fortieth of global needs, but only 25 per cent of the present annual 
production is distributed in developing countries. One of the microprojects 
financed by the European Union has helped Godisa, a non profit organisation, 
to provide low cost hearing aids for developing countries. 
In Ί992, SolarAid-Camphill in collaboration with the 
Botswana Technology Centre (BOTEC), set out to manu­
facture a low cost body-worn hearing aid, the SolarAid, 
which could be used by hearing impaired people living in 
Africa and other parts of the developing world. But in 2001, 
the World Health Organisation (WHO) issued a series of 
guidelines recommending that smaller models of the Behind-
The-Ear (BTE) type should replace body-worn models. 
SolarAid was thus changed into Godisa, which means in 
Setswana "do something that helps others to grow". Godisa 
is located in Otse, a village just outside Gaborone; its objec­
tive is to develop low cost technologies for third world 
countries and to create employment and training opportu­
nities for hearing disabled people. It is one of a number of 
workshops in the Camphill Community Trust, a Botswana 
non-profit organisation that educates, accommodates, 
trains, and employs people with disability. 
Hearing aids are currently 
largely available on the market 
but they are inappropriate for the 
living conditions of developing 
countries, where batteries are 
expensive and hard to find, espe­
cially for people living in rural 
areas. "We sell our hearing aid for 
about €50. The same hearing aid 
with the exact same components 
sold in Europe costs €200. But 
the major problem in developing 
countries is related to batteries. 
The cost for batteries for one year 
would be between €50 and €200 
and they last between four and eight days. This is a fortune 
for a developing country", says Howard Weinstein, a devel­
opment worker from Canada, with a past as a successful 
entrepreneur, who came to Botswana as a volunteer in 2002. 
In order to solve the battery problem, Godisa, with the 
funding assistance of the European Union, has developed a 
solar charger that will be used to recharge the BTE hearing 
aid. Godisa is not just the only manufacturer of hearing 
aids in Africa, but it is also the only manufacturer of hear­
ing aids in the world to have the training and empowering 
of hearing disabled people as part of its mission. At the 
moment, it employs 14 people, 10 of whom are either deaf 
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Godisa manufactures three kinds of 
hearing aids, which use regular zinc 
air or rechargeable batteries. Thanks 
to this solar power battery 
recharger, batteries can be charged 
up to 300 times. 
Workers at Godisa assembling hearing aids. 
or physically challenged. "They are fabulous workers. Their 
level of concentration and hand-eye coordination is far 
superior. Each person can make 20-25 hearing aids a day. 
Providing low cost hearing aids and employing hearing 
impaired people is essential to prevent these people from 
becoming a burden to their family and in the long run to 
the community and the national economy", says Modesta, 
the general manager, who is learning from Howard how to 
run an international sustainable business. 
The next challenge for Godisa is to better market its prod­
uct in the world. At the moment there is an agent in South 
Africa who covers three other countries in Southern Africa. 
There are also agents or distributors set up in Zimbabwe, 
Angola, Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania, as well as in 
Thailand, Vietnam, Hong Kong and China. Normal retail­
ers are obviously not interested as they make a lot of money 
selling batteries. For this reason, efforts will be concentrated 
on contacting NGOs and charitable organisations that 
already buy hearing aids for developing countries. Godisa is 
also starting to teach low cost earmould techniques so that 
people from other countries in Africa can learn how to make 
low cost hearing aids with low cost equipment. "Our mission 
is to provide low cost technologies for developing countries. 
We don't care if someone copies our model and makes their 
hearing aids. More people could enjoy low cost hearing aids. 
I have seen some studies that judge developing countries on 
how many patents they have got. That is a very elitist way of 
measuring development. If we patented this, we would have 
defeated our purpose,"concludes Howard. ■ MC 
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General Information 
Area (square km): 
Population (million): 
Capital: 
Major towns: 
Religions: 
Languages: 
People: 
Political structure 
Official name: 
Government type: 
Constitution: 
Legislative branch: 
Political parties: 
Legal system: 
Economy 
Johannesburg 
600,370 
1.6 
Gaborone 
Francistown, Selebi Phikwe, Molepolole, Kanye, Maun, Serowe, Lobatse, Mahalapye 
Indigenous beliefs (85%), Christian (15%) 
English (official), Setswana 
Tswana (79%), Kalanga (11 %); Basarwa (3%), other (7%) 
Republic of Botswana 
Parliamentary republic 
President: Festus Mogae (both head of state and government) since 1 April 1998 
March 1965, effective 30 September 1966 
The Botswana Parliament consists of an elective National Assembly with legislative 
powers and a consultative House of Chiefs which acts as an advisory body. The 
National Assembly is composed of 40 members directly elected by popular vote 
and four appointed by the majority party; members serve five-year terms. 
The House of Chiefs is a 15 member advisory body. 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP); Botswana National Front (BNF); 
Botswana Congress Party (BCP); Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM), 
New Democratic Front (NDF). 
Based on Roman-Dutch law and customary law 
Pula (1 Pula = €0.179284) 
Purchasing power parity-US$7,800 (2001 est.) 
Agriculture 2.4%; industry 38.9%; services 58.6% (2001 est.) 
4.7% (2001 est.) 
2,817 of which diamonds 1,507; copper and nickel, 58; manufactures, 30 
Total imports in 2001 in US $ million: 2,409 of which food 335; fuel and energy 117; capital goods 834 
Unemployment rate: 15.8% (September 2000) 
Foreign Direct Investment 
as a percentage of GDP: 2.4% 
Inflation rate: 6.6% (2001 est.) 
Currency: 
GDP per capita: 
GDP breakdown by sector: 
GDP growth rate: 
Total exports in 2001 in US $ million: 
Social Indicators 
Human development index rating: 
Population growth rate: 
Income poverty: 
Adult literacy rates: 
Life expectancy at birth: 
Infant mortality per 1.000 births: 
Urban population: 
HIV/AIDS adult prevalence rate: 
0.577 (126th out of 173 countries) 
1.7% 
47% 
75.6% 
40,3 (UNDP) 
58 
49% 
38,8% (UNAIDS). 
Sources: World Bank (2003), UNDP (2002), CIA World Fact Book (2002), European Commission, UNAIDS. 
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Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
France 
Territorial «iHeciiviiies 
M ay otte 
St Pierre and Miquelon 
Oversell iiTrnonc-
New Caledonia 
and dependencies 
French Polynesia 
French Southern and Antarctic 
territories 
Wallis and Futuna islands 
Netherlands 
Overseas «.mmrio 
Netherlands Antilles: 
Bonaire, Curaçao, St Martin, 
Saha, St F.ustache 
Aruba 
Denmark 
Country having special 
relations with Denmark 
Greenland 
United Kingdom 
Parnas «.HimtK> and territorio 
Anguilla 
British Antarctic Territory 
British Indian Ocean Territory 
British Virgin Islands 
Cayman Islands 
Falkland Islands 
Southern Sandwich Islands 
and dependencies 
Montserrat 
Pitcairn Island 
St 1 Ielena and dependencies 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
Marshall Islands 
Cook 
Tonga Niue Islands 
Steli, Alrltm 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbulla 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize-
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Cook Islands 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Cuba* 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
Djibouti 
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Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guinea 
Guinea Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
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Malawi 
Mali 
Marshall islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Micronesia 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Niue 
Pal au 
Papua New Guinea 
Rwanda 
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Samoa 
Sau'lomé and Principe 
dines 
a signatory of the Cotonou Agreement. 
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ises maps from a varied of sources. Their use doe 
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Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sudan 
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Togo 
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Trinidad & Tobago 
Tuvalu 
Uganda 
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